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Abstract 
One step ahead: Investigating the influence of prior knowledge on the perception of others’ actions by 
Toby Nicholson 
Historically, a dominant view has been that we understand others by directly 
matching their actions to our own motor system, emphasising the importance of 
bottom-up processes during social perception. However, more recent theories 
suggest that instead we actively anticipate others actions based upon intentions 
inferred outside of the motor system, from social cues such as language, eye gaze and 
object information. Across 13 experiments, the established representational 
momentum paradigm, as well as a cross-modal visuotactile paradigm were employed 
to test the hypothesis that people’s perceptual processes while observing the actions 
of others would be affected by such top-down cues about the actor’s intentions.  
 We found, first, that people overestimate other people’s actions in the direction 
of motion. Importantly, these overestimations were directly influenced by social cues. 
Saying or hearing a word congruent with a subsequently observed action resulted in 
the action being perceived as further along its trajectory. Second, we found that 
people anticipate the tactile outcomes of other people’s actions with their own 
sensory tactile systems but that the mechanisms differed for bottom-up and top-
down driven predictions. In a task in which people had to detect tactile stimulation 
while watching others, seeing impending hand-object contact increased the bias to 
perceive tactile stimulation, even when there was none, while impending contact that 
could not be seen but only inferred increased tactile sensitivity. 
These findings are discussed in the context of recent theories of top-down 
predictive processing during social perception and from the perspective of 
multisensory integration. 
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Chapter 1 - Social perception and its mechanisms 
 
The importance of social perception 
 
We live in a rich social environment that shapes how we understand the 
world around us. How we perceive other people and their actions has a direct 
influence on our own subsequent behaviour, and in turn how others perceive 
and interact with us. This perceptual loop is vital for social interactions. Social 
perception facilitates anticipating others’ actions, which in turn aids planning 
and coordinating one’s own actions, enhancing the fluency of social interactions 
(Bekkering et al., 2009; Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006). For example, 
when being a passed a ticket from the bus driver we meet her hand at the end 
of the action rather than intercept it on its way. From studying someone’s gaze, 
we can predict which item they will choose on the shelf, and, when dancing, we 
can fluently anticipate our partners’ movements.  In addition, social perception 
strongly influences learning, as evidenced by our tendency to imitate the 
actions of others (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Meltzoff & 
Decety, 2003; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). For instance, when learning a new skill 
we tend to observe and copy the actions of someone who already has the skill, 
such as how children learn to lace their shoes or button their coat for the first 
time by watching a parent. Likewise, when in a foreign country one learns the 
conventions of the culture by observing how the locals behave, such as 
validating ones train ticket prior to travel. This tendency to imitate happens in 
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social situations even when not intended and occurring outside of direct 
awareness (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).  
 
Social perception is also important when merely passively observing 
other people. Our ability to read other people’s intentions appears to come to us 
naturally (Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 2000; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & 
Moll, 2005). For instance, when noticing a friend sweating we are not surprised 
if he subsequently removes his jumper. Moreover, this tendency to apply 
intentionality to other people also applies to seemingly non-social stimuli, such 
as Heider and Simmel’s abstract figures (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Hubbard, 
2004). Such effects can also work against us though. For example, when asked 
in isolation to match the length of a line with three other lines, people show 
high accuracy (Asch, 1956; Bond & Smith, 1996). However, when the same 
judgement is required in a group situation with seven other confederates who 
give an incorrect answer on purpose prior to the participant’s judgement, 
people are far more likely to copy the incorrect answer. This demonstrates that 
the behaviour of others can strongly influence one’s own decision making. 
Similarly, people show implicit biases towards one’s own racial group, 
emphasising the potential dangers of automatized social perception 
(Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998; Smith-McLallen, Johnson, Dovidio, & 
Pearson, 2004). These studies show that we are both consciously and 
unconsciously affected by social perception and this can change our behaviour 
in both useful ways, but also in ways that could be harmful.  
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Social perception is clearly then of central importance for understanding 
how we integrate our own thoughts, feelings and actions with those of others, 
and therefore has profound implications for human and societal development. 
One difficulty at the core of understanding social perception is how we make 
sense of other people’s actions. With no direct access to their internal mental 
states, we are left only with inferences generated by what we see others say and 
do. Nevertheless, humans typically take an “intentional stance” (Dennett, 1996) 
and interpret others’ behaviour in terms of their goals and desires.  However, 
sometimes these inferences are wrong, and it is not always clear how we adjust 
our understanding of the situation fast enough to respond efficiently when 
required. These problems are compounded by the fact that people are masters 
of deception, and social interactions are riddled with strategies that aim to 
control the perception we present to others. Despite this we still seem relatively 
efficient at anticipating others’ behaviour, a skill likely to have been vital 
evolutionarily, and one that seems to mark us out from many other species 
(Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Saxe, 2006). What remains less clear are the mechanics 
of how we achieve this, making social perception of central importance in the 
quest for a more complete understanding of the human mind in its social 
environment.   
 
A case of simulation? Humans see, humans do? 
 
One dominant view of how people make sense of the actions of others 
has risen to prominence in recent decades, and has sparked a plethora of 
research buoyed by its implications for how social perception works. In this 
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view social perception strongly involves one’s own motor system (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). According to this perspective, during action observation 
visual information is transformed in one’s own motor system, and an internal 
simulation of the action is re-enacted. This is thought to provide a gateway to 
social perception, and understanding the mind of the observed through one’s 
own motor experience (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).  
 
The catalyst for these ideas was an accidental finding by a group of 
Italian researchers investigating the motor cortex of the Macaque monkey. 
Measuring single cell activity, these researchers stumbled upon the discovery 
that a certain group of neurons in the premotor cortex fired both when the 
monkey performed an action, but also when the monkey passively observed an 
experimenter performing the same action (di Pelligrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). This unique group of neurons became known as 
‘mirror neurons’, and was subsequently also found to exist in the parietal lobe 
of the macaque (Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002). The authors 
interpreted the dual activation during observation and execution as reflecting a 
motor representation of the action that they believed was crucial for action 
understanding, because it allowed the other person’s action to be understood 
through one’s own motor experience (Rizzolatti et al., 1996).  
 
Subsequent research using indirect imaging techniques found support 
for a similar ‘mirror system’ within human premotor and parietal regions, the 
assumed human homologs of the regions where mirror neurons were found, 
with overlapping activations during both action performance and action 
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observation (Decety et al., 1997; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). A 
dominant explanation for the function of such an overlap is the ‘direct matching 
hypothesis’, which argues observed actions are internally re-run in the motor 
system to provide the observer with an understanding of the action’s goal 
(Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001). This view, therefore, sees the motor 
system as key to understanding other people’s actions. Social cognition is 
conceptualised predominantly as a bottom-up matching process of observed 
action to one’s own motor representation. Such a viewpoint extended previous 
theories emphasising the importance of simulation for social perception 
(Gordon, 1992), by providing the first neurophysiological evidence. 
 
Further support for such motor views of action observation comes from 
the finding that different body parts, such as the hand, mouth or foot, results in 
somatotopic activation of the premotor cortex during action observation that 
matches the somatopy when acting with the same body parts (Buccino et al., 
2001). In addition, studies have shown that expert dancers show greater 
activation of mirror areas when observing dance moves from their own 
repertoire, compared to those they do not perform and one would assume have 
less comprehension of (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 
2005; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006). Likewise, 
studies have found an increase in activation within mirror regions when 
viewing possible, but not impossible, biological movements, again suggesting 
that these are more ‘understandable’ (Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 
2000). All these studies imply that the motor system is integral to social 
perception and supports the direct matching hypothesis. 
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Behavioural studies have also revealed an involvement of the motor 
system during social perception. For example, action observation can facilitate 
the simultaneous performance of a similar action but interfere with the 
performance of a different action (Kilner, Paulignan & Blakemore, 2003). 
Likewise, the action of lifting a box can distort the simultaneous perception of 
the weight of a lifted box that is only observed (Hamilton, Wolpert & Frith, 
2004). These studies demonstrate that both action execution and action 
observation can affect one another when performed simultaneously, providing 
support for the idea that perception and action share a common code (Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997). Other studies have 
demonstrated that the prediction of an observed action improves when the 
action more closely resembles one’s own action (Knoblich & Flach, 2001; 
Knoblich, Seigerschmidt, Flach, & Prinz, 2002). It has also been shown that, 
compared to controls, individuals who have experienced de-afferentation (a 
lack of working nerve fibers to communicate sensory information to the brain) 
demonstrate difficulties in accurately perceiving whether an observed actor’s 
expectation of the weight of a lifted box is correct (Bosbach, Cole, Prinz, & 
Knoblich, 2005). This provides support that action observation involves a 
simulation of the observed action involving one’s own motor and sensory 
system. From this perspective, any simulation resulting from action observation 
would be easier to understand and predict when it mirrors one’s own motor 
experience.  
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Studies showing the specific muscles involved in an observed action can 
become activated during passive viewing also demonstrate an involvement of 
the motor system during action observation (Candidi, Vicario, Abreu, & Aglioti, 
2010; Gueugneau, McCabe, Villalta, Grafton, & Della-Maggiore, 2015; Urgesi, 
Candidi, Fabbro, Romani, & Aglioti, 2006). Moreover, disruption of the motor 
cortex using transcranial magnetic stimulation has been shown to delay 
predictive gaze shifts during action observation providing support for its 
importance in guiding action perception (Elsner, D'Ausilio, Gredebäck, Falck-
Ytter, & Fadiga, 2013). These findings all point towards an overlap between 
perception and action strengthening the case that the motor system is 
important for social perception. 
 
The growing body of research focused on the mirror system has led to a 
raft of different cognitive processes being associated with it. These include 
imitation (Iacoboni et al., 1999), empathy (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 
2005; Iacoboni, 2005), theory of mind (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) and language 
(Arbib, 2005; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998), to name but a few, all of which are key 
aspects of social perception. For example, a growing number of studies have 
demonstrated that observing touch (Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo, & 
Aglioti, 2007; Schaefer, Xu, Flor, & Cohen, 2009) and pain (Lamm, Decety, & 
Singer, 2011; Morrison, Tipper, Fenton-Adams, & Bach, 2013; Voison, Marcoux, 
Canizales, Mercier, & Jackson, 2011) can engage brain regions associated with 
directly experiencing the phenomena oneself. Similar effects have also been 
found when observing emotional expressions, with brain activations 
overlapping with those involved in performing those expressions (Bastiaansen, 
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Thioux, & Keysers, 2009). Its apparent importance for social perception has 
also led to the suggestion that abnormalities in the system may be responsible 
for disorders such as Autism (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Oberman et al., 2005) 
and Schizophrenia (Arbib & Mundhenk, 2005).  
 
Overall, the evidence provides a strong case that action observation 
involves, at least in part, many of the same processes involved in action 
execution, making the case for a direct matching explanation of social 
perception compelling. However, what remains less clear is the exact role that 
one’s own motor system plays in social perception. From the direct matching 
perspective, these studies demonstrate the integral part of the motor system in 
understanding the actions of others, but others have proposed alternative 
explanations within which a top-down prediction precedes and generates any 
motor activity (Csibra, 2007; Kilner, Friston, Frith, 2007). Moreover, several 
recent findings cannot be explained within a purely bottom-up direct matching 
account, further challenging the view that motor simulation is the key to social 
perception. 
 
The limits of a bottom-up explanation of social perception 
 
As previously mentioned, the initial interpretation saw mirror neurons 
as crucial for action understanding, and therefore central to social perception 
(Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001). From this perspective an internal 
simulation of what one perceived when observing a conspecific was necessary 
in order to make sense of the goal of the action and therefore their intention. 
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This explanation is attractive primarily because it emphasises the bottom-up 
nature of social perception, where sensory information activates matching 
motor representations in the observer. As the main information we have about 
other people seems to be what we observe in a bottom-up manner, it is easy to 
be convinced that the simulation of other people’s actions could be involved in 
our ability to decode them. However, there are many reasons why such an 
interpretation seems to extrapolate further than the evidence really allows 
(Caramazza, Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 2014; Hickock, 2009).  
 
The initial inspiration for the theory of direct matching was motivated 
by the early monkey studies, which suggested that mirror neurons 
predominantly responded only to actions towards an object, thought to 
emphasise their goal-driven nature (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). However, 
subsequent research has found that many macaque mirror neurons also 
respond to actions where no object is present (Kraskov, Dancause, Quallo, 
Shepherd & Lemon, 2009) or are activated by intransitive actions using the 
mouth, for example protrusion of the tongue or lip and lip smacking where it is 
hard to derive any straightforward intention (Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & 
Fogassi, 2003). Moreover, other studies have shown that mirror neurons also 
respond when the object to which an observed grasp is directed is hidden from 
view (Umilta et al., 2001), and a proportion of mirror neurons have been shown 
to also fire when an action is withheld (Maranesi, Livi, Fogassi, Rizzolatti, & 
Bonini, 2014). All these findings are hard to reconcile with a predominantly 
bottom-up, direct matching explanation of mirror neurons, making their exact 
role in cognition far from clear. 
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In humans, similar issues arise, as lesions to key areas of the mirror 
system do not lead to clear-cut impairments in action understanding, which 
would be expected from a direct matching explanation. For example, damage to 
the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), thought to be the human homolog of region F5 
in the monkey, does not affect patients’ comprehension of actions (Kalenine, 
Buxbaum, & Coslett, 2010). Likewise, several studies have shown that, at the 
single subject level, individuals with brain lesions often show dissociations 
between the ability to recognise objects and the actions associated with them, 
and the ability to use those objects (Negri et al., 2007; Pazzaglia, Smania, Corato, 
& Aglioti, 2008; Tessari, Canessa, Ukmar, & Rumiati, 2007). Such dissociations 
suggest that the motor system cannot be as crucial to social perception as the 
direct matching hypothesis argues. 
 
This is further supported by the demonstration that individuals with a 
lack of motor experience can still make sense of the actions of others. For 
example, a patient with upper limb aplasia, who was born without upper limbs, 
demonstrated similar accuracy and speed as control participants when tested 
on the comprehension of manual actions (Vannuscorps, Andres, & Pillon, 2013). 
While it cannot be discounted that the patient may have developed alternative 
methods for comprehending manual actions based on visual information alone, 
it still provides further support that motor experience is not crucial for social 
perception, further weakening the case for the importance of the motor system 
in action understanding. 
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Finally, many of the studies cited as support for a human mirror system 
have come from research involving indirect measures of cellular activity, such 
as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography 
(EEG) and transcranical magnetic stimulation (TMS), where any activity or 
disruption of brain regions is coarsely measured. Due to the differences in 
species and resolution of neuronal measurement, any results from these 
methods are not straightforwardly equatable to those from the single cell 
studies with monkeys. Moreover, many methodological techniques used 
between the studies differ, making any extrapolation from one body of research 
to the other somewhat speculative (Turella, Pierno, Tubaldi, & Castiello, 2009). 
To date, only one study has presented evidence for human mirror neurons at 
the cellular level (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). 
Interestingly, this study found evidence for human mirror neurons in areas 
outside the classical premotor and parietal regions, suggesting that the mirror 
system may in fact be much wider than previously thought, and may not be 
solely motor in nature (see, Caramazza et al., 2014, for similar claims). 
However, as this study was based on a patient sample the results should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 
When taken together, these findings provide strong counter evidence 
that the direct matching hypothesis would not be sufficient to explain the 
mechanics of social perception. They show that mirror neurons fire in a number 
of different situations where bottom-up input levels vary, that lesions in key 
regions dissociate action perception from action execution abilities, and that a 
lack of motor experience does not result in a reduction of action 
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comprehension. Therefore, social perception must rely on more than merely 
the internal simulation of observed actions. Indeed, more recent models assume 
that the brain is a prediction device and that all incoming stimulation, both 
social and non-social, is processed in the light of prior expectations (Bar, 2009; 
Brown & Brune, 2012; Bubic, Von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Clark, 2013; 
Friston, 2011; Howhy, 2013). 
 
Is the brain a prediction machine? 
 
Ever since the early days of psychology, researchers have theorised 
about the importance of inference during perception (Helmholz, 1925). But in 
the last few decades a number of theories have risen to prominence, which 
argue that predictions are more important for the brain and behaviour as a 
whole than previously thought. One of the most influential is the free-energy 
theory of the brain (Friston, 2010). This argues that the central goal of 
biological systems is to maintain order against entropy, and that the brain is no 
different. Therefore the chief goal of the brain is to minimise free energy, which 
is achieved through the implementation of top-down generative models. These 
models predict sensory inputs based on prior knowledge freeing up cognitive 
resources for processing new or unexpected stimuli. This process, which 
Friston calls active inference, has the goal of minimising the surprise 
encountered during perceptual events (Clark, 2013). Therefore, the aim of 
these predictions is to minimise the prediction error, allowing cognitive 
resources to be streamlined and attention to focus on the errors alone. In this 
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way prediction errors are important for learning through their potential to 
influence future predictions (Wills, Lavric, Croft & Hodgson, 2007).  
 
From this standpoint, top-down predictions are central to the 
interaction between perception and action, facilitating effective behaviour 
through the anticipation of sensory information. These ideas fit with current 
models of action control, which claim that motor behaviour includes an 
efference copy of the action in order to anticipate the sensory outcomes of 
actions and respond quickly to events in the world, particularly unexpected 
outcomes (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Evidence to support this comes from 
studies identifying sensory attenuation, the finding that the sensory effects of 
self-produced actions are perceived as weaker than those produced by an 
unpredictable external influence (Bays, Wolpert & Flanagan, 2005; Blakemore, 
Frith & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 1998; Shergill, Bays, Frith, 
& Wolpert, 2003). This is thought to allow the discrimination between self-
produced and externally produced sensations. Moreover, evidence suggests 
that this phenomenon is due to predictive, rather than postdictive, mechanisms 
(Bays, Flanagan & Wolpert, 2006). 
 
A similar view focuses on the role of memory in forming these top-down 
predictions. According to Bar (2009), learning produces memory scripts. These 
scripts produce the predictions we generate about what to expect in different 
environments. From this view memories can generate simulations even in the 
absence of any observation. Bar suggests that these predictions can even be 
derived by analogy. For example, when one comes across an object for the first 
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time, for instance a new fruit, its colour, shape and texture will all be linked to 
previous fruits will similar features, drawing an analogy between the novel 
object and previously experienced objects. In effect, Friston’s generative models 
are labelled memories here, but the effect is the same.  
 
Both these theories share the idea that cognition is essentially 
predictive, with perception not merely reflecting the receipt of bottom-up 
sensations, but instead resulting from the interaction between top-down 
predictions, based on prior knowledge, and bottom-up sensory input. These 
prior experiences produce top-down predictions based on the current context, 
which result in some aspects of the incoming sensory data becoming more 
salient than others. Moreover, they also imply that these predictions inform 
perception suggesting that they may have the power not just to guide but also 
to directly bias perception towards expectations (Feldman & Friston, 2010; 
Panichello, Cheung, & Bar, 2012). While this has the benefit of guiding effective 
actions and speedier reactions to changes in sensory input, it also provides a 
model to interpret other people, as the same forward models used for one’s 
own actions could also be applied to the actions of others to anticipate their 
future actions (Brown & Brune, 2012). 
 
Is social perception predictive? 
 
Phenomena such as sensory attenuation (Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 
2013) support the idea that people internally anticipate the consequences of 
their own actions, based on prior experience, which allows the discrimination 
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between self-generated and externally generated actions. But recent theories 
explaining social perception (Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007) have suggested 
that such top-down predictions also provide the ability to anticipate the 
consequences of other people’s actions through the tight link between 
perception and action (Hommel et al., 2001). These theories suggest that any 
motor involvement during social perception does not represent a simulation 
that deciphers the goal of the action. Instead, they argue it represents an action 
prediction, based on an inferred intention, allowing anticipation of, and 
comparison with, incoming sensory information. These ideas produce some 
interesting predictions about how such influences may directly influence social 
perception.  
 
One such alternative theory is the action reconstruction account, within 
which simulation of another person’s action is like a predictive apparatus akin 
to a tool used for verification (Csibra, 2007). According to this view, rather than 
simulation producing an understanding of observed actions in a retrospective 
fashion based on the receipt and subsequent interpretation of bottom-up 
sensory data, instead the interpretation of an action comes first from outside 
the motor system. Cues such as eye gaze (Macdonald & Tatler, 2015), objects 
(Bach, Nicholson & Hudson, 2014) and intention statements (Macdonald & 
Tatler, 2013) provide rich information about an action’s goal that can be used to 
make such initial action interpretations. This shifts the emphasis of social 
perception from relying on the interpretation of bottom-up signals to the 
prediction of bottom-up signals based on inferences generated by prior 
experience. Such predictions can guide one’s own actions, in pursuit of one’s 
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own goals during competition and coordination, but also aids collective goals, 
for example joint action (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009), and can therefore aid the 
fluency of social interactions (Sebanz et al., 2006).  
 
Csibra (2007) distinguishes his account from the direct-matching 
account by referring to the distinction between imitation and emulation. In the 
direct-matching account observed actions are mirrored within the motor 
system to identify their intention. In contrast, in the action reconstruction 
account this sequence is reversed. A possible intention is inferred outside the 
motor system, which produces a top-down emulation of the actions required to 
achieve the predicted intention. Here then the emulation differs from a direct 
imitation by being produced not by the visual input of sensory data but instead 
by top-down prior knowledge. This action hypothesis can then be used to check 
whether the predicted action is indeed occurring, to fill in and compensate for 
ambiguous sensory stimulation, and to predict ahead what is going to happen 
next. From this perspective, social perception is predictive in nature and the 
mirror system is involved in gaining an understanding of the action, but its role 
is changed from producer of understanding to a checker of understanding.  
 
Similar to this view is the predictive coding account, which is central to 
the free-energy theory of the brain (Friston, 2010). While it shares with the 
action reconstruction theory an emphasis on top-down predictions it is rather 
more specific in regards to its mechanisms (Kilner et al., 2007). According to 
predictive coding, the brain is organised hierarchically with multiple interacting 
signals communicating in a bidirectional manner from higher cortical levels 
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down to lower ones and vice versa (Friston, 2010). The chief processing goal of 
such an organisation is reducing prediction error at each level of the hierarchy. 
The prediction error is the difference between a prediction and the subsequent 
observation of the thing predicted. When a prediction is correct, the prediction 
error will be minimal. In contrast, when a prediction is incorrect, the error will 
be high. Importantly, prediction errors themselves have perceptual 
consequences, as they render the source of the discrepancy from the initial 
prediction more salient. In this way, top-down predictions aid perception but 
also have the potential to bias perception when a prediction is incorrectly 
accepted or rejected. Top-down predictions are therefore not merely a passive 
tool to aid comprehension. Instead, according to this view they actively guide 
and affect perception. Therefore, while sharing the emphasis on top-down 
predictions with the action reconstruction view, the predictive coding account 
goes beyond this to make very specific predictions about how such a system 
should directly affect perception. 
 
According to the predictive coding account such predictions are 
strengthened through experience, due to the mechanism’s aim of reducing the 
size of prediction errors. This means that as prediction errors change in 
magnitude over time through learning, stimuli are perceived differently as a 
result (Cheung & Bar, 2012). Top-down predictions are beneficial to perception 
as they allow the disambiguation of stimuli, allowing sensory data to be 
processed more fluently (Bar, 2003, 2004; Fenske, Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 
2006; Kok, Jehee, de Lange, 2012). However, such effects can also result in 
faulty predictions being accepted when sensory inputs either heavily correlate 
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with a predicted outcome (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) or are limited due to 
context (Summerfield, Egner, Mangels, & Hirsch, 2006). This implies that top-
down predictions are very useful during perception but can also bias people to 
certain interpretations, based on prior experience, which may not be veridical 
(Kok, Brouwer, van Gervan, & de Lange, 2013). For example, deficits in 
producing prediction errors can result in hallucinations (Horga, Schatz, Abi-
Dargham, & Peterson, 2014).  
 
The predictive coding theory suggests that the genesis for these 
predictions is prior knowledge. In the case of social perception, this refers to 
previous experiences of other people’s behaviour, such as their emotional 
expression, verbal statements of intent or the direction of their gaze, and how 
such cues predict subsequent actions. In this way, these cues become associated 
with certain intentions, for example when somebody looks towards an object 
this is likely to elicit the prediction that they will move towards or pick up the 
object (Castiello, 2003; Pierno, Becchio, Tubaldi, Turella, & Castiello, 2008; 
Pierno et al., 2006). Therefore, the context of the situation, in the form of cues 
picked up either from other people (Teufel, Fletcher & Davis, 2010), or the 
objects they have access to (Bach et al., 2014), directly shape the top-down 
predictions a person will make in a given social situation. As in the action 
reconstruction account, the mirror system is seen as the core node that 
develops these predictions – what the other person is likely to do – from these 
assumed intentions (Kilner et al., 2007). However, here more than just checking 
the assumed intention, top-down predictions appear to exhibit a level of 
influence that implies a direct effect on perception not specified by Csibra. 
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The predictive coding account and the action reconstruction account are 
highly compatible, both suggesting that top-down predictive processing is 
central to social perception. However, the predictive coding account  resides in 
a larger context of the free-energy theory (Friston, 2010), and subsequently 
goes beyond the action reconstruction theory in its reach. Moreover it posits 
that such a predictive mechanism should directly affect perception, with 
predictions enhancing or distorting what is perceived depending upon their 
accuracy. This can disambiguate stimuli, facilitating a comprehension of other 
people’s actions that were not clear from the bottom-up input alone. Moreover, 
as prediction is seen as a central feature of perception, top-down predictions 
should happen automatically, whether people want them to or not. This 
suggests that our perception of other people’s actions is not as veridical as 
previously thought, and is instead strongly shaped by what we expect to 
perceive due to prior experience. 
 
Predictive perception in a social context 
 
Top-down theories suggest that social perception itself is predictive and 
that prior knowledge directly shapes how stimuli are perceived. Therefore, 
rather than internally simulating an observed action to understand its 
intention, contextual cues in the form of gaze direction, emotional expressions 
and verbal statements have the potential to generate top-down predictions 
based on our prior experiences of the intentions associated with these cues 
(Teufel et al., 2010). This facilitates the anticipation of potential future actions 
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of others and informs our own action planning in a complex and dynamic 
environment. A number of different lines of research provide evidence that we 
indeed predict the actions of others, often based on the intentional cues 
present, and suggests that this tendency begins early in life.  
 
From an early age, children engage in anticipatory eye movements 
during action observation that takes into account both action and object 
information (Falck-Ytter, Gredeback & von Hoften, 2006). Moreover, when 
children observe others interacting with objects, anticipatory gaze shifts reflect 
a prediction of the goal of the action. For example, observing a person with a 
phone produces gaze shifts to the ear (Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, & Gredebäck, 
2012; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). It has also been shown that a child’s ability 
to predict the goal of an observed action based on the type of grip and its match 
to available objects correlates with their own ability to perform such a grip 
(Ambrosini et al., 2013). This suggests that the tendency to anticipate events is 
an early developmental process, which seems to rely on one’s own action and 
object knowledge, in line with predictive coding (Kilner et al., 2007) and action 
reconstruction views (Csibra, 2007). 
 
Studies in adults further support these conclusions. A seminal study 
showed that the pattern of eye movements when stacking a pile of blocks was 
very similar to when the same task was observed, but completed by another 
person (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). Moreover, the coordination between 
gaze and hand was predictive rather than reactive. Gaze was anticipatory for 
one’s own actions, but also when observing others’ actions, revealing some 
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continuity between both domains. Research also suggests that anticipatory gaze 
shifts during action observation are present when both movement and 
contextual cues are available, but not when only movement information is 
available, supporting a guidance by top-down information rather than bottom-
up information alone (Eshuis, Coventry & Vulchanova, 2009). Observing 
another person looking at an object has also been shown to prime actions 
towards that object, as if one were predicting, with one’s own motor system, the 
action the other person will do in line with Csibra’s model (Castiello, 2003). 
Likewise, observing object-directed gaze activates similar brain regions as 
observing actions with the object, in line with the idea that gaze at an object 
predicts a (simulated) reach towards it (Pierno et al., 2006, 2008). In addition, 
during action observation hand pre-shaping (whether it was precision or power 
grip) has been shown to elicit more accurate and proactive eye saccades to the 
target object of the reach (a large or a small object, Ambrosini, Costantini & 
Sinigaglia, 2011). All these studies demonstrate the predictive nature of eye 
movements also during adult action observation, supporting the idea that social 
perception is anticipatory and that intentional cues are a key driver of such 
predictions.  
 
Other research has shown that some of the classical mirror neuron 
regions are also involved in action prediction. For example, one study has 
shown that the dorsal premotor cortex is important for predicting how an 
observed action will continue behind an occluder and that disruption to the 
region impairs this process (Stadler et al., 2011; 2012). Similarly, prior 
knowledge of object presence behind an occluder during action observation 
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leads to activation within the somatosensory cortex, even though the touch is 
not directly perceived, implying that the consequence of the reach was 
predicted (Turella, Tubaldi, Erb, Grodd, & Castiello, 2011). This finding is line 
with previous research showing overlapping activation for touch and the 
perception of touch by another (Bufalari et al., 2007; Schaefer et al, 2009), but, 
because it occurred when contact was not directly perceived, is also evidence 
that such an overlap resulted from top-down predictive processes rather than 
bottom-up processes alone. This suggests that motor activity elicited during 
social perception could in fact reflect predictive processing as opposed to a 
direct matching process. 
 
Research has also started to show that the integration of kinematic and 
object information is central to action observation. For example, action 
predictions are dependent upon the context within which they happen and 
which objects are available, and minute kinematic differences determine their 
generation and accuracy (Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & Castiello, 2011; 
Stapel, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2012). Likewise, in a recent study by Jacquet and 
colleagues (2012) participants identified, in a condition of visual uncertainty, 
complete and incomplete object-directed actions. For each object, an optimal 
(low biomechanical cost) and sub-optimal (high biomechanical cost) movement 
was presented. In line with the idea that predictions are derived from the 
object’s affordances and bias visual perception towards them, participants 
more easily identified the movements optimally suited to reach a given object. 
Moreover, other studies have shown that observing somebody next to an object 
activates the most effective grip for interaction as if the observer was in the 
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other person’s position (Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011; 
Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2013). In addition, when observing 
reaches to objects, the spatial alignment of hand and object leads to more 
automatic imitation even when these aspects are task irrelevant, suggesting 
that these social predictions are automatic (Bach, Bayliss & Tipper, 2011). 
These studies emphasise the importance of intentional cues in generating 
expectations during action observation, which can facilitate accurate 
predictions.   
 
A number of other studies have probed social perception by using point 
light displays of biological actions interrupted by periods of occlusion to test 
whether people predict the actions of others accurately. One study found that 
over three different time intervals (100, 400 & 700ms) participants consistently 
showed fewer errors when judging a static test pose that was temporally in line 
with the duration of occlusion, providing evidence that people simulate in real-
time (Graf et al., 2007). Subsequent research has supported this and found that 
these simulations are present even when the length of the action prior to 
occlusion is as short as 20ms (Parkinson, Springer & Prinz, 2012; Springer, 
Brandstader & Prinz, 2013). However, a different study which included a wider 
variety of test poses found that action simulation tended to lag the real time of 
the action (Sparenberg, Springer & Prinz, 2012), while another found that 
participants tend to view actions as slightly further forward in time (Jarraya, 
Amorin & Brady, 2005). Taken together these studies provide evidence that 
people can accurately simulate the actions of others during action observation, 
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but provide mixed conclusions on whether such a process is anticipatory, real 
time or slightly slower.  
 
Taken together all these studies provide support for the existence of 
predictions during social perception. However, in many of the studies, 
prediction was the actual task required, making it difficult to assess the 
automaticity of such predictions. Similarly, while all these studies support the 
idea that people anticipate other people’s actions during social perception, none 
of them directly test whether these predictions affect perception itself. 
Therefore, in order to investigate whether perception is predictive during 
action observation perception itself needs to be tested, rather than the ability to 
predict or the enhanced processing of predictable actions. 
 
Summary & Overview 
 
Social perception is of vital importance both for social interactions and 
for action observation. Previous views conceptualising social perception as 
strictly reliant on the bottom-up simulation of an observed action using one’s 
own motor system have recently been undermined by evidence and 
interpretations to the contrary (Kalenine et al., 2010; Carramazza et al., 2014). 
This has shifted the focus towards top-down predictions during social 
perception (Kilner et al., 2007; Csibra, 2007). Findings from a wide range of 
studies, across a number of different aspects of social perception, are beginning 
to provide support for the claim that we anticipate the actions of others and 
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such predictions are heavily reliant on social cues of intention. If this is true it 
would flip around the traditional conceptualisation of social perception relying 
predominantly on bottom-up cues (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), and instead 
shift the focus of research to include the role of top-down predictions based on 
social cues to intention.  
 
The implication of these top-down theories is that perception itself is 
directly affected by predictions, suggesting that the impact of any predictions 
during social perception should be automatic. However, up until now the 
research supporting the role of predictions during social perception have not 
directly measured such perceptual effects but have instead inferred its impact 
based upon people’s explicit ability to predict and their tendency to process 
predictable actions faster and more fluently.  
 
The current thesis had the aim to test whether predictions have such an 
automatic effect on perceptual processes during action observation. Moreover, 
if such predictions are generated by prior knowledge of the intentional nature 
of certain cues (eye gaze, statements of intent, objects in the scenes), the 
manipulation of these cues should in turn modulate the top-down predictions 
and produce different effects on perception. To achieve this, an established 
experimental effect from the non-social domain, representational momentum, 
was utilised in order to test whether our perception of other people’s actions 
really is predictive and how intentional cues affect it (Chapter 2 to 4). In 
addition to this, in order to investigate the role of other sensory systems during 
social perception, a cross modal paradigm was also utilised (Chapter 5). It 
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measured people’s tactile perception during action observation in order to test 
how predictions of contact affect tactile perception on the observer’s own body, 
and whether these predictions are derived from bottom-up or top-down 
information. 
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Chapter 2 - Methodology 
 
As laid out in Chapter 1, the aim of the current thesis is to investigate the 
claims of top-down theories of social perception (Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al., 
2007), which suggest that social cues that imply an intention should result in 
top-down predictions of what will be perceived, influencing the perception of 
others’ actions. While intentions can be processed at multiple different levels of 
abstraction the current thesis focuses on low-level short term intentions 
relating to actions, rather than higher level intentions relating to attitudes and 
beliefs. In order to investigate this question, a paradigm was required which 
tested people’s visual perception during action observation, and which would 
make such forward predictions measurable. Representational momentum was 
chosen due to its robust demonstration of perceptual modulation based on 
prior expectations (Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 2005).  
 
Representational Momentum as a manifestation of predictive 
coding 
 
 
The term “representational momentum” was first coined by Jennifer 
Freyd in a 1983 paper as a possible explanation for differences in response 
times when testing people’s memory of frozen-action photographs (Freyd, 
1983). Participants were shown one frozen action photograph of a person 
jumping from a wall, followed by another very similar photograph from the 
same scene, but at a slightly later point in time. However, both photographs 
were close enough in location to not be easily distinguishable. Their order was 
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counterbalanced, so that half the time the order mirrored the real-world 
temporal order of the images, while the other half the temporal order of the 
images was reversed, as if the movement was going backwards in time. 
Participants were asked to judge whether the second photograph was the same 
or different as the first. As the stimuli were never the same, the correct answer 
to all stimuli was that they were different. Freyd found that response times to 
make such a “different” response were significantly longer when the order of 
the images followed the real world temporal order. The author suggested that 
this delay could have resulted from a conflict generated by an internal 
representation of the implied movement, making it harder to report differences.  
 
In a subsequent experiment this hypothesis was tested using a different 
experimental set-up (Freyd & Finke, 1984). Here, rather than photographs, 
participants were shown a sequence of rectangles presented at different angles 
to produce the appearance of an ongoing rotation. They were asked to judge 
whether a following static probe rectangle was in the same or different angle as 
the last seen image (see Figure 1). The probe could either have the same angle, 
or if it was different could be either rotated further forward or further 
backward. They found that both errors and reaction times increased when 
judging the forward probes, as if participants were continuing to internally 
represent the movement once it disappeared, making forward probes harder to 
distinguish from this forward rotated mental image. This confirmed the 
interpretation of the previous experiment and solidified the term, 
representational momentum, as a description of the effect. Since these initial 
studies, a raft of research has investigated the representational momentum 
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effect confirming it to be a highly robust finding across a wide range of stimuli 
and methodological arrangements (see Hubbard, 2005; 2014, for reviews).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Adapted from Freyd & Finke’s (1984) paper demonstrating the effect. 
Participants viewed a series of rectangles interspersed with inter-stimulus 
intervals (ISI). The fourth image could either be in the same location as the third 
image or in one of two possible different locations rotated either 6° forward (dark 
grey, large dashes) or backward (light grey, small dashes) from the position of the 
third image. (note: the stimuli depicted is not the exact stimuli used but a 
recreation for illustrative purposes) 
 
Because participants are asked to accurately judge the object’s final 
position, the representational momentum effect reflects an involuntary 
prediction generated by the perceived motion of the stimulus, which interferes 
with the participant’s ability to accurately judge its final position. It is directly in 
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line with theories of predictive coding (Friston & Kiebel, 2009). Expected 
stimuli (forward displacements) match the predictions and they are perceived 
as identical with the object’s last seen position. Unexpected stimuli (backward 
displacements), however, elicit salient prediction errors and are readily 
detected. The effect therefore implies that people automatically simulate how a 
movement will continue and this changes how the probe stimuli are perceived: 
relative to predictions rather than objective reality.  
 
Recent research is very much in line with such an interpretation. 
Historically, the representational momentum effect has been interpreted in a 
number of different ways (Hubbard, 2010). These range from low-level 
explanations relating to eye movements (Kerzel, 2000; Kerzel, Jordan, & 
Müsseler, 2001) to higher-level explanations related to mental representations 
(Freyd, 1987), beliefs (Hubbard, 2004), and a representational change in 
memory (Hubbard, 1995). However, more recent work suggests that it has a 
perceptual locus. While one study has implicated a fronto-parietal network in 
the effect linking it to working memory (Amorim et al., 2000), other research 
has provided evidence that area MT is integral to the effect, suggesting it may 
be more perceptual (Senior, Ward & David, 2002). Indeed, more recent 
research has revealed that the perceived result of a forward motion can be 
mathematically described by a superposition of observed stimuli and expected 
stimuli (Kimura & Takeda, 2015), and others have revealed that perceived 
motion already induces forward-directed perceptual changes while the motion 
is perceived, in line with a forward prediction of motion that happens not only 
in the gap between the disappearance of movement and presentation of the 
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probe stimulus (Roach, McGraw & Johnson, 2011). Moreover, predictable 
movement at the leading edge of a stimulus suppresses BOLD responses, while 
an unpreceded movement at the trailing edge increases the BOLD response, as 
would be expected by predictive coding (Schellekens, van Wezel, Petridou, 
Ramsey, & Raemaekers, 2014). Finally, recent studies have revealed that 
unexpected probe stimuli in a visual sequence similar to representational 
momentum elicit visual mismatch negativities in the event related potentials 
(Kimura, Kondo, Ohira, & Schröger, 2011), a component directly related to the 
perceptual processing of unexpected stimuli, and interpreted as a prediction 
error response in the visual domain (Kimura, Schroeger & Czigler, 2011).  
 
Moreover, in line with the assumptions of predictive coding, the 
representational momentum effect is directly affected by one’s top-down 
knowledge about the stimulus, and the forces affecting it. For example, the 
representational momentum effect has been found to be susceptible to physical 
factors. For instance, movements in the direction of gravity show a greater 
representational momentum effect than movements against gravity (Hubbard 
& Bharucha, 1988; Hubbard, 1995, 1997). Other physical factors shown to 
modulate the effect include speed (Freyd & Finke, 1985), acceleration (Finke, 
Freyd & Shyi, 1986), friction (Hubbard, 1995, 1998; Kerzel, 2002), centripetal 
force (Hubbard, 1996; Kerzel, 2003), shape (Nagai & Yagi, 2001) and depth 
(Bertamini, 1993).  
 
Similarly, representational momentum has also been shown to be 
modulated by ones’ prior knowledge of the specific stimulus, providing further 
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evidence for top-down influences on representational momentum. In one study 
researchers compared the effect of different objects on representational 
momentum, as well as the effect of the same object being presented with 
different conceptual labels (Reed & Vinson, 1996). In the first experiment, an 
identical target object was either labelled a rocket or a steeple, and 
representational momentum was measured when the object moved either up, 
down, left or right. The conceptual difference generated by the label here was 
that while a rocket is known to move in the real world a steeple is not. The 
results showed that across all directions the rocket elicited greater 
representational momentum, even though the object itself was identical and the 
only difference was what the participants were told what the object was. In 
later experiments they compared target objects of different shapes, and found 
that a ‘rocket’ target showed a greater upward representational momentum 
effect than a weight, box or church, while the weight showed the greatest 
downward representational momentum across all object types. These results 
showed that the conceptual processing of the object altered the level of forward 
extrapolation, providing evidence that more than the mere physical properties 
of the stimuli modulate the effect.  
 
In a later study the same researchers investigated how far such effects 
relied on the concept of the objects alone, specified by its label, or by its 
appearance (Vinson & Reed, 2002). Again, stimuli depicting a rocket were used 
as a stimulus, but this time an atypical rocket was also used, which, although 
labelled as a rocket, did not match the prototypical appearance of one. This 
allowed a test of whether the conceptual effects emerged from the conceptual 
 
 
33 
label alone or on an interaction of appearance and label. They found that the 
atypical rocket did not produce a similar increase in representational 
momentum as the regular rocket. This suggests that any conceptual effects on 
representational momentum are not produced by the label alone, but rely on 
the interaction between label and visual appearance. These results show that 
modulation of representational momentum in relation to conceptual 
information relies not only on prior object knowledge, but is directly integrated 
with the visual appearance, in line with the assumption that top-down 
predictions constantly interact and are verified by bottom-up information 
(Friston & Kiebel, 2009). 
 
These studies demonstrate that while the representational momentum 
effect is automatic and represents a low level extrapolation of motion, it is 
affected not just by physical properties of the stimuli, but also by conceptual 
properties. They therefore demonstrate that the effect results, at least in part, 
from top-down predictions generated by prior knowledge.  
 
Representational momentum during social perception 
 
 
More recently, the representational momentum paradigm has started to 
be applied to less abstract stimuli, such as biological motion. However, even 
though these studies reveal the same representational momentum effect as for 
non-social motion, it is less clear to what extent these social predictions are 
influenced by top-down information about other individuals. 
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For example, evidence of a representational momentum effect has been 
found when participants watched short video clips of complex natural scenes, 
such as a high school, town square, department store and railway station, 
involving multiple different people, and therefore the processing of multiple 
actions at once in a holistic and naturalistic manner (Thornton & Hayes, 2004). 
Similar representational momentum effects have been found when participants 
are asked to judge the development in movement of an animated face from a 
neutral expression to the full extent of certain emotional expressions, showing 
the tendency to report a more extreme expression than was present 
(Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008). These findings highlight that the representational 
momentum effect is transferable to more naturalistic scenes involving real, as 
opposed to animated, biological motion and where a complex range of 
contextual cues are present. They therefore offer initial support for the 
hypothesis that social perception is indeed influenced by predictions, and that 
this tendency extends to more complex perceptual environments, but leave 
open whether top-down information affects these processes.  
 
In another study, participants – sign language experts or novices – 
observed whole body stimuli of real actors performing sign language and 
revealed evidence for representational momentum when observing manual 
actions (Wilson, Lancaster & Emmorey, 2010). Interestingly, however, the study 
showed that experienced signers showed a decrease in representational 
momentum compared to non-experienced signers, rather than an increase. 
Based on the assumption that more experience with the actions should 
strengthen any top-down predictions of how the action would continue, and 
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therefore increase representational momentum, this result seems to contradict 
the idea that action predictions are derived from prior top-down knowledge. 
The study did, however, demonstrate that easy actions resulted in more 
representational momentum than awkward actions, supporting the influence of 
action information on the effect. However, the finding that experience does not 
increase the effect challenges the view that expectations based on prior 
knowledge can affect representational momentum and, therefore, perceptual 
prediction.  
 
A key question for the present purposes is whether representational 
momentum of others’ actions reflects the intentions attributed to them. Recall 
that top-down models of social perception argue that any intention one 
attributes to another individual should have a top-down effect on the 
perception of their subsequent behaviour, biasing it towards these goals. Two 
studies attempted to address this issue. In one study an animated head turning 
to face the participant was used to measure representational momentum in 
conditions where the gaze of the actor was either ahead of, in line with, or 
lagging behind the head rotation (Hudson, Liu & Jellema, 2009). It was assumed 
that leading gaze would suggest a goal in this direction. While representational 
momentum was consistently found for each condition, it was indeed enhanced 
when the eye gaze led the direction of motion. This is line with the idea that 
people use the eye gaze of others as a cue to anticipate their future actions.  
 
In a subsequent study the same authors investigated the effect that two 
cues, eye gaze and emotional expression, occurring in tandem had on 
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representational momentum (Hudson & Jellema, 2011). Again, the gaze of the 
actor could either be ahead of, in line with or lagging behind, the direction of 
the head’s motion, but this time the actor’s emotional expression was also 
varied. Emotional expressions were classed as either congruent (i.e. joy and 
anger) or incongruent (i.e. fear and disgust) with the head’s rotation towards 
the viewer. The assumption was that congruent expressions would further 
increase representational momentum when eye gaze led the direction of 
motion, as they would provide a further suggestion for an intentional head 
rotation towards the viewer. However, the findings revealed the opposite: 
representational momentum was greater when leading eye gaze was 
accompanied by fear or disgust, and the cues were therefore incongruent with 
one another.  
 
Together, the above studies provide evidence that social cues such as 
gaze and emotional expression can produce similar representational 
momentum effects as non-social stimuli. While they provide some initial 
evidence that such effects can be modulated by social cues, the effect of 
intention on this modulation was not straightforward. While leading eye gaze 
seemed to increase the representational momentum effect of a turning head in 
one study, aversive emotional expressions seemed to increase the 
representational momentum of a turning head in the gaze direction. If 
representational momentum reflects a perceptual prediction based on top-
down processes, cues suggesting an action goal – such as leading gaze and 
positive emotional expressions – would be expected to produce greater 
perceptual prediction and therefore more representational momentum. While 
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these results provide evidence for the modulation of the effect in response to 
changes in social information, they provide unclear evidence concerning the 
influence of prior intentions on the perception of others’ actions.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
 
The above studies involving biological motion illustrate the extension of 
the representational momentum effect to social perception, and provide 
support for the idea that the effect is modulated, to some extent, by the content 
of the social cues. However, the results of these studies also provide 
contradictory findings when viewed from the perspective of top-down 
predictive explanations of social perception. According to these theories 
intentional cues should increase perceptual prediction. However, while some 
studies provided evidence that unexpected social stimuli decrease 
representational momentum, others find the opposite, suggesting that 
unexpected social stimuli increase representational momentum. These studies 
therefore provide general support for the influence of top-down information on 
perceptual prediction, but fail to provide clear-cut evidence about how prior 
knowledge of others’ intentions affects predictive processing.  
 
The aim of the current thesis was to investigate this influence of 
intentional cues on perceptual prediction during action observation. This 
allowed top-down theories of social perception to be tested, specifically 
whether cues that signal an intention will increase perceptual prediction 
compared to those viewed as non-intentional. Importantly, intentions can be 
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conceptualised at a variety of different levels, from short-term low-level 
intentions, to high-level long term intentions. While there is likely to be a link 
between high-level beliefs and subsequent action prediction during action 
observation, the current thesis focuses on low-level intentions at the level of 
actions as opposed to high-level intentions relating to cognition.   
 
The established representational momentum paradigm was used to 
address this question. While the paradigm has already successfully been 
applied to social stimuli to demonstrate top-down effects on social perception, 
the influence that social cues have on these effects has produced inconclusive 
results, making the validity of top-down theories of social perception difficult to 
confirm on the basis of this research.  
 
One limitation of the studies was that the intentions of the actions 
observed may not have been as clear-cut as hoped. For example, while facial 
expressions expressing fear and disgust were classed as incongruent with head 
rotations towards the participant, such a classification is not a given. Both these 
expressions can equally be viewed as valid expressions directed to a 
conspecific. Similarly, the so called congruent emotional expressions, 
particularly anger, in some situations may produce an expectation the head will 
turn away from, rather than toward, a conspecific. Therefore, in order to better 
answer the question of whether intentional cues increase perceptual prediction, 
and therefore representational momentum, the stimuli need to present a more 
clear distinction between intentional and non-intentional actions. To achieve 
this the representational momentum paradigm was used to display object-
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directed actions to address the influence of intentional cues on social 
perception more directly. 
 
 
  
 
 
40 
Chapter 3 - Do cues to intention increase 
perceptual prediction during action observation? 
 
The aim of the initial studies was to establish a working representational 
momentum paradigm and test the hypothesis that cues, which signal an action’s 
intention, generate predictions during action observation. One key intentional 
cue accessible during action observation is the kinematics of an action and how 
they relate to the available goal objects. Therefore the congruency between 
kinematics, in the form of hand shape and object orientation, was used to 
investigate whether actions perceived as intentional, those where hand and 
object were congruent, resulted in larger representational momentum than 
actions not perceived as intentional, when hand and object were incongruent. 
This would provide evidence that top-down information about other people’s 
intentions produces perceptual predictions of their forthcoming actions, 
therefore supporting a predictive coding explanation of social perception 
(Kilner et al., 2007). 
 
The kinematics and grip type of an action depend upon an action’s goal. 
For instance, when reaching to pick up a cup, there is a particular hand shape (a 
power grip) required to successfully grasp it, and this differs from the hand 
shape required to pick up a pen (a precision grip). Similarly, the kinematics of a 
reach and the shape of one’s hand depend upon the orientation and position of 
the object to be grasped. For example, when one wants to grasp a book, the 
book’s position (upright or on its side) determines the required hand 
orientation. The failure to apply the appropriate kinematics and hand shape 
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will prevent the successful achievement of one’s goal of grasping the object. 
This is evident in the case of patients with optic ataxia, where a lesion to the 
posterior parietal lobe can result in impairment in the ability to successfully 
reach and grip an object (Rosetti, Pisella & Vighetto, 2003).  
 
The process which helps us to select appropriate grips appears to be 
highly automatic. Research has shown that in the general population, object 
recognition can engage grip information even when this is irrelevant to the task 
performed. For example, seeing an object in a graspable orientation speeds up 
reaction times with the hand most suitable to perform this grasp (Tucker & 
Ellis, 1998; Symes, Ellis & Tucker, 2007). Similarly, responses using a power or 
precision grip are faster when this grip matches the type of object observed 
(e.g. small and large objects, Ellis & Tucker, 2000). These studies demonstrate 
that the mere observation of an object can automatically prime the appropriate 
grip.  
 
This direct link between grip and object makes it an ideal tool to 
manipulate the perceived intentionality of an action. Indeed, research has 
demonstrated that, from an early age, children link the actions of others to the 
target objects associated with those actions (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 
1995; Reid, Csibra, Belsky, & Johnson, 2007; Kochukhova & Gredback, 2010; 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). For example, infants as young as 6-9 months have 
been shown to be sensitive to the link between grip types and object sizes, 
showing dis-habituation when observing grasps that are incongruent with an 
initial grip (Daum, Vuori, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2009). Moreover, 20-month-
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old toddlers can use grip cues to anticipate which one of two objects an action is 
directed to (Paulus, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2011). 
 
In adults, merely showing a particular grip type triggers anticipatory eye 
movements towards an object with the corresponding shape (Fischer, Prinz, & 
Lotz, 2008). Another study measured eye movements when observing a reach 
that could be directed to one of two possible objects, one matching and one 
mismatching (Ambrosini et al., 2011). They found that, compared to reaches 
with the aim of merely touching an object, reaches with the goal of grasping an 
object resulted in earlier eye movements towards the object. This suggests that 
the kinematic cues inherent in the grasp, but not the touch, allowed observers 
to infer the intention of the action. This in turn demonstrates that kinematic 
cues signal to observers the intention of an action well in advance of its 
completion, and allow its further course to be predicted. 
 
Grip-object matches also affect explicit action and object judgements. 
For example, viewing different grip types facilitate the subsequent recognition 
of objects matching this grip (Helbig, Steinwender, Graf, & Kiefer, 2010), and 
viewing objects gripped congruently helps identifying the goal of the action 
(Yoon & Humphreys, 2005). Conversely, the application of an incorrect grip 
type to a target object interferes with the ability to judge the correctness of an 
action goal (van Elk, van Schie & Bekkering, 2008) and a spatial mismatch 
between grip type and object impairs observers’ ability to judge the semantic 
appropriateness of actions (Bach, 2004). These studies show that viewing a grip 
type facilitates recognition of the associated goal object, and similarly that 
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processing an object facilitates the recognition of a grip type suitable for acting 
upon it. This shows the integrative nature of object and grip information, and 
confirms that object-grip matches are processed to some extent automatically 
also during action observation. 
 
Together, these studies demonstrate that kinematic cues and their link 
to objects are an important signal of intention during action observation. If such 
intentions provide top-down information about forthcoming actions, then 
observers should specifically create predictions for congruent actions but not 
incongruent actions. To test this, we applied the representational momentum 
paradigm to reaches to a target object, which could either be spatially 
congruent or incongruent to the hand grip. If an action’s intention triggers a 
prediction in the observer, representational momentum should be larger when 
the observed reach is congruent with the object compared to when it is 
incongruent.  
 
Experiment 1 – Hand-object matches 
 
 
Experiment 1 utilized the match of grip type and the orientation of the 
target object to convey the action’s intention. Observing a hand reach towards 
an object with a congruent – but not with an incongruent – grip suggests the 
intention to reach for the object. If congruent actions signal the intention of the 
action, according to a predictive coding account of perception, they should 
generate forward predictions of how the observed action will continue to a 
greater degree than incongruent actions (Kilner et al., 2007). To the extent that 
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representational momentum is a measure of these prediction processes, it 
should therefore be increased for such congruent (intentional) actions. 
 
Participants were shown reaches to objects, which were either 
positioned standing upright or on their side. The hand orientation could either 
match the orientation of the object, representing a normal reach to grasp, or it 
could suggest a mismatch with the object’s orientation, suggesting a reach that 
was not obviously bound to grasp the object. As in the standard 
representational momentum paradigm, participants observed the hand at three 
different sequential points along its reach. Participants were then asked to 
judge whether a fourth static image of the hand, which followed a brief 
interruption, was in the same location as its last previous position or in a 
different location. This fourth probe image could be in one of three different 
locations, the same position as prior to the interruption, slightly further 
forward towards the object or slightly backward, away from the object.  
 
The first hypothesis was that this experiment would, overall, replicate 
the classical representational momentum effect. When the probe hand is 
displaced further forward along the movement’s trajectory, participants should 
be more likely to mistake it for the hand’s last position and respond ‘same’, 
compared to when the probe hand was displaced further backward along its 
trajectory.  
 
The second hypothesis was that this representational momentum effect 
would be larger when the hand orientation was congruent, rather than 
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incongruent, with the orientation of the object. This was based on the 
assumption that a spatial match between hand and object would allow people 
to infer that the reach was indeed directed at the goal object, and the hand 
intended to pick it up, compared to mismatches, which would disrupt such goal 
inferences. This would mean that in cases where a reach appears designed to 
grasp an object (intentional action) this should increase the expectation that the 
hand is aimed for the object and perceptual prediction should be stronger 
(larger representational momentum). Conversely, when reaches are more 
ambiguous (non-intentional action) and it is not clear where the hand is 
headed, these predictions may be restricted (smaller representational 
momentum). 
 
Method 
 
Participants. 35 students (14 male, mean age = 22.5, SD = 6.1) at 
Plymouth University or members of the wider Plymouth community took part 
in exchange for participation points or payment (£8 p/h). All had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were native English speakers. All provided 
written informed consent prior to participation and were debriefed once the 
experiment had finished. The study was approved by the University of 
Plymouth’s ethics committee.  
 
Stimuli and Apparatus. The stimuli were filmed using a Canon Legria 
HFM36 HD video camera and edited using Moviedek and Corel PaintShop Photo 
Pro x3. Stimuli consisted of natural reaches of a man’s right hand towards one 
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of seven target objects (plastic cup, book, paint tin, cleaning spray, wine bottle, 
water bottle and tea cup) placed in either a horizontal or vertical orientation 
(see Figure 2). Individual frames were extracted from the videos, and for each 
reach 12 images were chosen which spanned the trajectory, from the start of 
the reach to approximately two thirds of the way through the reach. These 
images were then separated into 4 groups of 3 images, each representing a 
slightly different stage of the action, such that each covered equidistant points 
in time. For each of these 4 groups the last of the 3 images in the set was used to 
create the probe image. This involved digitally shifting the hand forward 
(‘forward’ probe) or backward (‘backward’ probe) along the trajectory by 20 
pixels. This led to the addition of 2 images to each set. This resulted in 4 sets of 
5 images for each reach. For each of these sets an additional set of images was 
digitally created which involved replacing the target object with the same 
object but positioned in the different orientation. This resulted in a total of 4 
sets of images for each reach, 2 sets showing the original (congruent) reaches to 
a horizontally or vertically orientated object, and 2 sets showing the same reach 
but to the modified (incongruent) object orientation. Therefore half of the 
sequences showed reaches to a horizontally positioned object and half to a 
vertically positioned object, and within each of these, half showed a reach that 
matched the orientation of the target object, while in the other half the reach 
did not match the orientation of the object. For all images the object and hand 
were superimposed onto a black background to eradicate any other details 
from the scene. The complete stimulus set consisted of 28 (14 congruent, 14 
incongruent) image sequences, each consisting of 20 images (4 groups of 5). 
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The stimuli were presented on a 20-inch monitor (60 hz) using Presentation 
(Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc.).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. A: Trial sequence of reaches for each condition (horizontal 
congruent, horizontal incongruent, upright congruent, upright incongruent), 
followed by a blank screen, and then the probe stimulus. The larger image is a 
magnification of the probe image which shows the different probes (‘forward’, 
‘same’ ‘backward’) overlapping one another for illustrative purposes. B: The 
objects in their horizontal orientation (upper row) and their upright orientation 
(lower row). Sizes have been modified for presentation purposes. In the 
experiment they were presented at their actual size. 
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Procedure. Participants were seated in a cubicle approximately 60 cm 
from a colour monitor, and were given written and verbal instructions. The 
experiment was split into two parts, part one included the representational 
momentum task while part two included a questionnaire explicitly asking 
participants how they thought each action would continue. In part one, each 
trial (see Figure 2) began with a fixation cross, presented for 500ms, followed 
by a blank screen also presented for 500ms. The first frame of the action 
sequence was then presented for 1000ms, followed by two subsequent frames, 
each presented for 150ms. A blank screen, also presented for 150ms, separated 
each of the 3 frames. Following the last frame a blank screen was presented for 
350ms, before a probe stimulus was presented, which could either be exactly 
the same image as the last of the action sequence, or could show the arm 
slightly further towards the target object or slightly further away from the 
target object. Participants were asked to judge, as quickly and accurately as 
possible, whether the probe stimulus showed the arm in the ‘same’ or ‘different’ 
position compared to its last position prior to the probe. They made their 
judgment by pressing one of two possible response keys (‘x’, right, and ‘z’, left, 
counterbalanced between participants). If no response was made within 3 
seconds, a prompt was displayed that they were ‘too slow’ along with a 
reminder of the response button assignment.  
 
Part one of the experiment consisted of 12 training trials (not analysed), 
followed by 336 experimental trials, split by two break periods. Across part 
one, each stimulus combination was shown once (4 starting points, 2 hand 
orientations, 2 object orientations, 3 probe locations, and 7 objects), and their 
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order was randomised. In part two, participants were shown all the actions 
again in the same way as part one, but instead of a probe image, participants 
were asked a question regarding how they thought the action would proceed. 
For each action, participants were instructed to choose between one of three 
possible answers: ‘the hand would pass the object or knock it over’ (press left 
arrow key), ‘the hand would grasp the object’ (press down arrow key) or ‘the 
hand would come to a stop before the object’ (press right arrow key). If no 
response was made within 5 seconds, a prompt was displayed that they were 
‘too slow’ along with a reminder of the response button assignment. Across part 
two, each stimulus combination was shown once (4 starting points, 2 hand 
orientations, 2 object orientations and 7 objects) resulting in 112 trials. The 
experiment in total lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Statistical analyses. To ensure that participants were able to differentiate 
between probe types (same and different), the difference between the 
percentages of probes correctly identified as ‘same’ and the average of the 
percentages of probes incorrectly identified as ‘same’ (‘forward’ or ‘backward’) 
was computed for each participant. This produced a measure of participants’ 
sensitivity to differences between the probes. To calculate the level of 
representational momentum, the percentage of incorrect ‘same’ responses 
when the probe was actually ‘backward’ was subtracted from the percentage of 
incorrect ‘same’ responses when the probe was ‘forward’ for each condition of 
intention, congruent and incongruent. 
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Results 
Exclusions. One participant’s data were removed from the analysis 
because they failed to respond in more than 20% of trials. Inclusion or 
exclusion of this participant did not affect the results. Trials where reaction 
times were longer than 2000ms were also excluded from the analysis (<2% of 
all trials).  
 
Sensitivity. Analysis of perceptual sensitivities confirmed that 
participants were able to distinguish ‘same’ from ‘different’ probes. They 
identified more probes as ‘same’ when they really were at the same locations as 
the last image, compared to the average of ‘backward’ or ‘forward’ probes, t(33) 
= 3.03, p = .005. Perceptual sensitivities in the congruent and incongruent 
conditions did not differ, t(33) = .90, p = .376.  
 
Representational Momentum. The percentage of ‘same’ responses for the 
‘forward’ and ‘backward’ probes was entered into a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with Probe direction (‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) and Intention 
(congruent/incongruent) as factors. The analysis revealed a significant effect of 
Probe direction, F(1,33) = 10.34, p < .005, ηp2 = .239, 95% CI [3, 13], with 
participants more likely to judge ‘forward’ probes as ‘same’ compared to 
‘backward’ probes, confirming the classical representational momentum effect. 
Importantly, as predicted, there was also a significant interaction between 
Probe direction and Intention, F(1,33) = 6.54, p < .02, ηp2 = .165, 95% CI [1, 7], 
demonstrating that this tendency to mistake more ‘forward’ than ‘backward’ 
probes as ‘same’ was larger for congruent grips than for incongruent grips (see 
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Figure 3). The average percentage of ‘different’ responses to same probes was 
31%, and did not differ depending upon the intention of the action, t(33) = 1.33, 
p = .192. 
 
Reaction times. The same 2x2 used for the representational momentum 
analysis was applied to the reaction times for correct responses, and revealed 
that neither main effect nor interaction were significant, all F < 1.61, all p > .213.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean percentages of ‘same’ responses to ‘forward’ and 
‘backward’ probes, for both intentional (congruent grip, black bars) and non-
intentional actions (incongruent grip, white bars) in Experiment 1. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Questionnaire. One participant did not complete part 2 of the 
experiment, resulting in 33 participants’ data being analysed. Analysis of the 
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questionnaire responses confirmed that participants did differentiate the 
intentionality of congruent and incongruent actions. Congruent actions were 
identified more often than incongruent actions as destined to grasp the object, 
t(32) = 4.68, p < .001 (see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean percentages of responses to judgements of how actions 
were expected to end, by knocking over or going past the object (black bars), by 
grasping the object (grey bars) or by stopping before the object (white bars), for 
both congruent and incongruent actions when the object was either in a 
horizontal or upright orientation in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Discussion 
 
 
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the classical 
representational momentum effect also applies to the observation of object-
directed reaches. Displacements in the direction of motion were more easily 
mistaken for the hand’s final position than displacements in the other direction. 
This supports prior research, which has provided evidence for representational 
momentum using biological stimuli (Hudson et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2010; 
Hudson & Jellema, 2011), and extends it to intentional object-directed actions. 
 
Crucially, the findings also confirmed that representational momentum 
was greater when viewing reaches with hand orientations that matched the 
orientation of the object. This provides the first evidence that representational 
momentum, when observing the actions of others, can be modulated by the 
action’s perceived intention. As the intentional link between object and hand 
was task irrelevant, the fact that representational momentum was greater for 
intentional actions implies that the relationship between hand and object was 
processed automatically. The effect of intention can therefore be seen as 
resulting from an automatic perceptual prediction based on the congruency 
between hand grip and object. This is supported by the questionnaire, which 
demonstrated that congruent actions were viewed as more likely to grasp the 
object than incongruent actions. However, it is notable that over a third of 
incongruent actions were seen as likely to grasp the object, suggesting that the 
effect of intention may have been reduced by the perceived ambiguity of some 
of the incongruent stimuli. 
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The results of Experiment 1 provide initial evidence for top-down 
theories of social cognition. The spatial congruency between hand and object 
orientation modulated the representational momentum effect, with congruent 
actions increasing the tendency to misperceive ‘forward’ probes as further 
forward than they really were. However, as this was the first demonstration of 
an effect of intention on action perception, a replication of the study was run to 
ensure the conclusions of Experiment 1 were reliable. 
 
 
Experiment 2 – Replication 
 
 
In order to test the robustness of the findings of Experiment 1, a direct 
replication of the study was run. A power analysis was applied to existing data 
to estimate the number of participants required to confidently replicate the 
effects (Cohen, 1992), and it was calculated that 64 participants would be 
required to do so. 
 
Method 
 
 
64 students (9 male, mean age = 19.5, SD = 2.6) of Plymouth University 
took part in exchange for participation points or payment (£4). All other 
aspects were identical to Experiment 1.   
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Results 
 
 
Exclusions. Five participants’ data were removed from the analysis 
because these participants failed to respond in more than 20% of trials. Their 
inclusion or exclusion did not affect the results. Trials where reaction times 
were longer than 2000ms were also excluded from the analysis (5% of all 
trials). All analyses mirrored those of Experiment 1. 
 
Sensitivity. Analysis of perceptual sensitivities confirmed once again that 
participants identified more probes as ‘same’ when they really were at the same 
locations as the last image, compared to the average of ‘backward’ or ‘forward’ 
probes, t(58) = 4.99, p < .001. Perceptual sensitivities in the intentional and 
non-intentional conditions did not differ, t(58) = .074, p = .941.  
 
Representational Momentum. The analysis revealed a significant effect of 
Probe direction, F(1,58) = 11.35, p < .005, ηp2 = .164, 95% CI [2, 8], replicating 
the classical representational momentum effect demonstrated in Experiment 1, 
with participants more likely to judge forward displacements as ‘same’ 
compared to backward displacements (see Figure 5). However, the interaction 
between Probe direction and Intention was not significant, F(1,58) = 1.262, p = 
.266, ηp2 = .021, 95% CI [-1, 5], although numerically congruent actions did 
show a larger representational momentum effect. The average percentage of 
‘different’ responses to same probes was 42%, and did not differ depending 
upon the Intention of the action, t(58) = .604, p = .548. 
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Figure 5. Mean percentages of ‘same’ responses to forward’ and ‘backward’ 
probes, for both intentional (congruent grip, black bars) and non-intentional 
actions (incongruent grip, white bars) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
Reaction times. Analysis of reaction times of correct responses revealed a 
significant effect of Probe direction, F(1,58) = 12.61, p < .005, ηp2 = .179, 95% CI 
[17, 58], with ‘backward’ probes eliciting faster reaction times than ‘forward’ 
probes (see Figure 6). This supports the representational momentum finding in 
relation to incorrect response judgements, showing that when responding 
correctly, participants responded faster to backward displacements than to 
forward displacements. There was also a marginally significant effect of 
intention, F(1,58) = 3.82, p = .056, ηp2 = .062, 95% CI [0, 28], with non-
intentional actions responded to faster than intentional actions. The interaction 
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between Probe direction and Intention was not significant, F < 1. The average 
reaction time when correctly responding to ‘same’ probes was 835ms and did 
not differ depending upon the intention of the action, t(58) = .840, p = .404. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean reaction times to correct responses to 'forward’ and 
‘backward’ probes, for both intentional (congruent grip, black bars) and non-
intentional actions (incongruent grip, white bars) in Experiment 2. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Questionnaire. Analysis of the questionnaire responses confirmed that 
participants did differentiate the intentionality of congruent and incongruent 
actions. Congruent actions were identified more often than incongruent actions 
as destined to grasp the object, t(58) = 10.02, p < .001 (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Mean percentages of responses to judgements of how actions 
were expected to end, by knocking over or going past the object (black bars), by 
grasping the object (grey bars) or by stopping before the object (white bars), for 
both congruent and incongruent actions when the object was either in a 
horizontal or upright orientation in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The results of Experiment 2 replicate the representational momentum 
effect shown in Experiment 1, with participants being more likely to mis-
identify forward displaced probe hands with the hand’s final position than 
backward displaced probe hands. However, Experiment 2 failed to replicate the 
effect of intention on action observation found in Experiment 1. While object-
congruent actions again elicited more representational momentum numerically 
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than incongruent actions, there was no statistical difference between them. 
Moreover, as in Experiment 1, over a third of incongruent actions were rated in 
the questionnaire as likely to grasp the object, again suggesting that some of the 
incongruent actions were, to some extent, seen as intentional as well. 
 
Reaction times did differ when responding to ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ 
probes, with ‘backward’ probes eliciting faster correct responses than ‘forward’ 
probes, in line with prior research (Freyd & Finke, 1984). This supports the 
‘same’ judgement response data in suggesting that, even when participants 
correctly distinguish a ‘different’ probe, this process is slower for ‘forward’ 
probes that conform to the direction of the reach.  
 
Overall, the results are mixed. Experiment 2 again demonstrated a 
representational momentum effect. However, the effect of intention could not 
be replicated, calling the original finding into question. While a non-significant 
finding does not mean that no effect of intention exists, the larger sample size 
would be expected to strengthen, rather than weaken, any association between 
the observed reach and its perceived intention. While the questionnaire data 
show that intentional actions were identified as such, they also suggest that the 
non-intentional actions were more ambiguous than expected. Over a third of 
incongruent actions were classified as reaching the goal object, suggesting that 
the spatial congruency between hand and object may have been too subtle to 
produce a robust effect of intention. 
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Experiment 3 – Verbal cue 
 
 
Due to the failure to find a robust effect of intention on representational 
momentum, a series of new studies were run on a modified paradigm that used 
language as an intentional cue. An important source of intentional information 
is the utterances of the observed individual. Language is humans’ central form 
of communication, and is therefore a far more explicit indicator of their 
intention. In many cases, people state their intentions before acting, especially 
in social situations (Searle, 1969). Moreover, research has demonstrated that 
when an action is performed in response to an action sentence, people find it 
harder to respond correctly when the response required contradicts the action 
implied by the sentence (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). This is in line with the 
notion that language comprehension is situated within the context of action and 
elicits visuomotor imagery (Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001) and may rely, at least in 
part, on the same system involved in action selection and execution.  
 
Experiment 3 therefore tested the impact of verbal intention statements 
on representational momentum. The stimuli depicted an actor reaching to a 
number of different objects on the table in front of them. At the onset of the 
action, participants were played (via headphones) a verbal statement that 
highlighted the intention of the actor. Some of the verbal statements declared a 
desire for the target object (‘I’ll have that’). Other, non-intentional verbal 
statements declared a lack of desire for the target object (‘not that one’). To 
strengthen the intentional link between the verbal statements and the actions, 
the statements were spoken with an extra emphasis, highlighting the emotion 
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being expressed. Therefore, intentional verbal statements were spoken in a 
positive tone while non-intentional verbal statements were spoken in a 
negative tone.  
 
The assumption was that if intentional verbal cues facilitate top-down 
predictions, participants should show larger representational momentum after 
hearing intentional verbal statements suggesting a goal to reach for the object 
compared to non-intentional statements. Participants should therefore be more 
likely to miss forward displacements after having heard a positive intentional 
statement compared to hearing a negative non-intentional statement.  
 
Method 
 
 
Participants. 41 students (14 male, mean age = 21.2, SD = 4.1) at 
Plymouth University or members of the wider Plymouth community took part 
in exchange for participation points or payment (£8 p/h). All had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were native English speakers. All provided 
written informed consent prior to participation and were debriefed once the 
experiment had finished. The study was approved by the University of 
Plymouth’s ethics committee.  
 
Stimuli and Apparatus. The stimuli were filmed using a Canon Legria 
HFM36 HD video camera. Stimuli consisted of an actor sitting opposite the 
camera and reaching with their right arm diagonally across the table to one of 
six objects (beer can, chocolate bar, apple, pen, bottle opener and scissors) 
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located on the actor’s left and the viewer’s right (see Figure 8). All of the actor’s 
upper body was visible to the camera with the exception of their head. For each 
reach 12 temporally equidistant steps through the reach were extracted. Each 
action sequence consisted of 4 images, and 4 different start points were 
selected from different stages of the reach so that some sequences showed the 
start of the reach while others showed the reach further towards the target 
object. In addition 24 verbal statements were created, 12 positive statements 
and 12 negative statements (see figure 7). Each object was matched with its 
own unique verbal statements, 2 positive and 2 negative statements which 
were varied across the experiment. The stimuli were presented on a 15-inch 
monitor using Presentation (Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc.). 
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Figure 8. A: Trial sequence of reaches toward a target object. The audio 
stimulus began at the same time as the action stimulus and ended before it ended. 
A grey blank screen followed, before the probe stimulus was presented. An 
example of each is shown (‘backward’, ‘same’ and ‘forward’). B: The table displays 
all the verbal statements used for each object. Each object had 2 unique positive 
and 2 unique negative statements. C: The six target objects used in the experiment 
(beer can, apple, chocolate bar, scissors, pen and bottle opener). Sizes have been 
modified for presentation purposes. In the experiment they were presented at 
their normal size. 
 
Procedure. Participants were seated in a cubicle approximately 60 cm 
from a colour monitor, and were given written and verbal instructions. Each 
trial (see Figure 8) began with a fixation cross presented for 500ms, followed 
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by a blank screen also presented for 500ms. The first frame of the action 
sequence was then presented for 200ms, followed by the next three frames of 
the action sequence, presented sequentially, each for 200ms. In contrast to the 
first experiments, the different steps were not separated by blank screens, to 
achieve a more natural presentation. At the same time as the first frame was 
presented, either a positive or negative verbal statement was played via 
headphones. Each verbal statement lasted longer than 200ms but less than 
800ms, so that the verbal statements were presented at the same time as the 
action sequence but always finished prior the end of the action sequence. 
Participants were asked to listen to the verbal statement and not to ignore it, 
even though it was not specifically task-relevant. After the final action of the 
sequence, a neutral image of roughly equal luminance (a grey box matching the 
dimensions of the frame and presented in the same location) was presented for 
700ms, before the probe image was presented. The probe stimulus could either 
be the same as the final frame of the action sequence (‘same’ probe), further 
along the observed trajectory (‘forward’ probe), or in a position just prior to the 
final frame (‘backward’ probe). Participants were asked to judge, as quickly and 
accurately as possible, whether the probe stimulus showed the arm in the 
‘same’ or ‘different’ position as its last position prior to the probe. They made 
their judgment by pressing one of two possible response keys (‘x’, right, and ‘z’, 
left, counterbalanced between participants). If no response was made within 3 
seconds, a prompt was displayed that they were ‘too slow’ along with a 
reminder of the response button assignment. The experiment consisted of 12 
training trials (not analysed) and 288 experimental trials. Each stimulus 
combination was presented once (4 starting points, 2 positive verbal 
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statements, 2 negative verbal statements, 3 probe locations and 6 objects), and 
their order was randomised. The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Results 
 
 
Exclusions. One participant’s data were removed from the analysis 
because the participant failed to respond in more than 20% of trials. Inclusion 
or exclusion of this participant did not affect the results. Trials where reaction 
times were longer than 2000ms were also excluded from the analysis (<2% of 
all trials).  
 
Sensitivity. Analysis of perceptual sensitivities confirmed that 
participants were able to distinguish ‘same’ from ‘different’ probes. They 
identified more probes as ‘same’ when they really were at the same locations as 
the last image, compared to the average of ‘backward’ or ‘forward’ probes, t(39) 
= 10.18, p < .001. Perceptual sensitivities in the intentional (positive verbal 
statement) and non-intentional (negative verbal statement) conditions did not 
differ, t(39) = .837, p = .408.  
 
Representational Momentum. The percentage of ‘same’ responses for the 
‘forward’ and ‘backward’ probes was entered into a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with Probe direction (‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) and Intention (positive 
verbal statement/negative verbal statement) as factors. The analysis revealed a 
significant effect of Probe direction, F(1,39) = 22.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .371, 95% CI 
[7, 17], with participants more likely to judge ‘forward’ probes as ‘same’ 
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compared to backward probes, confirming the classical representational 
momentum effect (see Figure 9). There were no other significant effects, all F’s< 
0.3. 
 
Reaction times. The same 2x2 used for the representational momentum 
analysis was applied to the reaction times for correct responses. One 
participant was removed from the analysis as they failed to make a correct 
response in some of the conditions. The analysis revealed a significant effect of 
Probe direction, F(1,38) = 9.36, p < .005, ηp2 = .198, 95% CI [22, 100], with 
correct responses to ‘backward’ probes significantly faster than correct 
responses to ‘forward’ probes. There were no other significant effects, all F’s< 
2.94. 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean percentages of ‘same’ responses to forward’ and ‘backward’ 
probes, for both intentional (positive verbal statement, black bars) and non-
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intentional actions (negative verbal statement, white bars) in Experiment 3. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
Experiment 3 followed the results of the first two experiments by 
successfully finding a representational momentum effect. Using different 
stimuli, participants were once again consistently more likely to misperceive 
the position of an actor’s arm when it was further forward in the action 
sequence than when it was further backward. The representational momentum 
effect was also evident in the reaction times, with backward displacements 
resulting in significantly faster detections than forward displacements. 
However, the verbal cues conveying the intention of the action did not affect 
representational momentum, with both intentional and non-intentional verbal 
statements resulting in virtually identical levels of representational momentum. 
While language is a clear tool in the communication of intentionality more 
generally, it did not translate to the perception of low-level actions here.  
 
Overall, while Experiment 3 revealed a representational momentum 
effect both for judgements and reaction times, supporting the findings of the 
first two experiments, it failed to show that intentional verbal cues modulated 
the effect. However, the lack of any explicit requirement to process the verbal 
cues or any method to measure the degree to which they were processed, 
makes it difficult to know whether the lack of an effect of intention was due to 
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limitations in the experimental design or because verbal cues to intention do 
not modulate top-down predictions.  
 
Experiment 4 – Gaze cue 
 
 
While the first three experiments all demonstrated a representational 
momentum effect, they failed to demonstrate a reliable effect of intention based 
on either kinematic or verbal cues. Consequently, the next experiment applied 
the paradigm to a new intentional cue, eye gaze.  
 
Eyes are not just the window to the soul but are also the window to 
other people’s actions and intentions (Frischen, Bayliss & Tipper, 2007). Before 
performing an action, actors typically look at the endpoint of the action, rather 
than at the movement’s path (Land, Mennie & Rusted, 1999; Flanagan & 
Johannson, 2003), and observers use these cues to infer the action’s goal 
(Rotman, Troje, Johansson, & Flanagan, 2006). For example, studies have 
demonstrated that merely seeing somebody else look at an object can prime 
actions towards that object, as if one were observing the action (Castiello, 
2003). In addition, seeing somebody else looking at an object has been shown 
to result in similar brain activity to that produced when observing actions 
directed to the same object (Pierno et al., 2006, 2008). These studies suggest 
that eye gaze does not just alert us to the intentions of other people, but it also 
allows us to anticipate the particular actions that the person may initiate. This 
further suggests that eye gaze is an effective cue in conveying the intentions of 
other people. Just as we use gaze as a key tool to guide our own actions, we 
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process other people’s gaze, linking its direction to potential subsequent 
actions. 
 
In order to test the influence of gaze as a cue to an actor’s intention, the 
representational momentum paradigm was applied to actions showing an actor 
performing congruent reaches towards an object. Crucially, participants were 
shown an actor gaze either towards or away (towards the other side of the 
table) from an object before reaching towards the same object. While gaze 
towards an object signals a potential intention to grasp the object, gazing away 
from an object does not. Once again based on the assumption that intentional 
actions should generate a top-down prediction of the action, it was 
hypothesised that representational momentum would be greater when reaches 
followed a gaze towards the object, compared to when the gaze was directed 
away from the object prior to action onset. 
 
Method 
 
 
Participants. 39 students (6 male, mean age = 19.9, SD = 3.2) at Plymouth 
University or members of the wider Plymouth community took part in 
exchange for participation points or payment (£8 p/h). All had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were native English speakers. All provided 
written informed consent prior to participation and were debriefed once the 
experiment had finished. The study was approved by the University of 
Plymouth’s ethics committee.  
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Stimuli and Apparatus. The stimuli were filmed using a Canon Legria 
HFM36 HD video camera and edited using Moviedek and Corel PaintShop Photo 
Pro x3. Stimuli consisted of an actor sitting opposite the camera and reaching 
with their right arm diagonally across the table to one of seven target objects 
(book, cup, bottle, pen, mobile phone, tape measure, and wristwatch) located on 
the actor’s left and the viewer’s right (see Figure 10, panel C). For each object 
two separate actions were filmed, one where the actor looks towards the object 
before reaching for the object (gaze toward/intentional) and one where the 
actor looks away from the object, towards the other side of the table, before 
reaching for the object (gaze away/non-intentional). This resulted in 16 
different action sequences, half where the actors gaze was toward the object 
and half where it was directed away from the object (See figure 9, panel A). 
Individual frames were extracted from each action, and for each reach 12 
images were chosen which spanned the trajectory, from the start of the reach to 
approximately two-thirds of the way through the reach.  
 
Procedure. Participants were seated in a cubicle approximately 60 cm 
from a colour monitor, and were given written and verbal instructions. Each 
trial began with a fixation cross, presented for 500ms, followed by a blank 
screen also presented for 500ms. The first frame of the action sequence was 
then presented for 200ms, followed by three subsequent frames in the action 
sequence, each presented for 200ms. Following the last frame of the sequence a 
grey image of equal overall luminance was presented for 700ms, before a probe 
stimulus was then presented. The probe stimulus could either be the same as 
the final frame of the action sequence (‘same’ probe), further along the 
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observed trajectory (‘forward’ probe), or in a position just prior to the final 
frame (‘backward’ probe). Participants were asked to judge, as quickly and 
accurately as possible, if the probe stimulus showed the arm in the ‘same’ or 
‘different’ position as its last position prior to the probe. They made their 
judgment by pressing one of two possible response keys (‘s’ for ‘same’ and ‘d’ 
for ‘different’). If no response was made within 3 seconds, a prompt was 
displayed that they were ‘too slow’ along with a reminder of the response 
button assignment. The experiment consisted of 16 training trials (not 
analysed), followed by 294 experimental trials, split by two break periods. Each 
stimulus combination was shown once (7 starting points, 2 gaze directions, 3 
probe locations, and 7 objects), and their order was randomised. The 
experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
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Figure 10. A: Trial sequence from Experiment 4 of reaches for each 
condition (gaze away and gaze toward). A grey blank screen followed, before the 
probe stimulus was presented. An example of a ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ probe 
are presented. B: Trial sequence from Experiment 5 of reaches for each condition 
when the top half of the image has been removed (gaze away and gaze toward). A 
grey blank screen followed, before the probe stimulus was presented. An example 
of a ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ probe are presented. C: The seven target objects 
used in both Experiment 4 and 5 (book, cup, bottle, wristwatch, tape measure, pen 
and mobile phone). Sizes have been modified for presentation purposes. In the 
experiment they were presented at their actual size. 
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Results 
 
 
Exclusions. Out of the 294 experimental trials, only the trials where the 
probe was a frame that across the experiment could occur in each of the three 
probe positions (‘same’, ‘forward’ and ‘backward’) were included. This resulted 
in 168 trials being analysed, but the results did not differ when the full dataset 
was analysed. Four participants’ data were removed from the analysis because 
these participants failed to respond in more than 20% of trials. Inclusion or 
exclusion of these participants did not affect the results. Trials where reaction 
times were longer than 2000ms were also excluded from the analysis (<2% of 
all trials).  
 
Sensitivity. Analysis of perceptual sensitivities confirmed that 
participants were able to distinguish ‘same’ from ‘different’ probes. They 
identified more probes as ‘same’ when they really were at the same locations as 
the last image, compared to the average of ‘backward’ or ‘forward’ probes, t(34) 
= 8.41, p < .001. Perceptual sensitivities were also shown to differ significantly 
depending upon the intention of the action, t(34) = 2.06, p = .047. This showed 
that perceptual sensitivity was higher when viewing intentional actions 
compared to non-intentional actions. 
 
Representational Momentum. The percentage of ‘same’ responses for the 
‘forward’ and ‘backward’ probes was entered into a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA Intention (intentional/gaze toward or non-intentional/gaze away), and 
Probe direction (‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) as factors.  The analysis revealed a 
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significant effect of Probe direction, F(1,34) = 19.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .362, 95% CI 
[8, 21], with participants more likely to judge ‘forward’ probes as ‘same’ 
compared to ‘backward’ probes, confirming the classical representational 
momentum effect. In addition, the analysis revealed a significant effect of 
Intention, F(1,34) = 20.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .374, 95% CI [5, 14], with participants 
more likely to judge ‘different’ probes in the non-intentional condition as ‘same’ 
than those in the intentional condition. Importantly, as predicted, there was 
also a significant interaction between Probe direction and Intention, F(1,34) = 
10.03, p < .005, ηp2 = .228, 95% CI [3, 12], demonstrating that the tendency to 
mistake more ‘forward’ than ‘backward’ probes as ‘same’ was larger for 
intentional than non-intentional actions (see Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11. Mean percentages of ‘same’ responses to forward’ and 
‘backward’ probes, for both intentional (gaze toward, black bars) and non-
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intentional actions (gaze away, white bars) in Experiment 4. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Reaction times. The same 2x2 used for the representational momentum 
analysis was applied to the reaction times for correct responses. One 
participant was removed from the analysis as they failed to make a correct 
response in some of the conditions. The analysis revealed a significant effect of 
Probe direction, F(1,33) = 6.30, p = .017, ηp2 = .160, 95% CI [11, 89], with correct 
responses to ‘backward’ probes significantly faster than correct responses to 
‘forward’ probes. There were no other significant effects, all F’s< 1.4. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The results of Experiment 4 once again demonstrate a representational 
momentum effect when observing the actions of others. Participants were more 
likely to misperceive the position of an actor’s hand when the probe stimulus 
was further forward along its trajectory than when it was further backward. 
This tendency was found across gaze conditions demonstrating the bias to 
predict the future position of an actor’s hand regardless of gaze information. 
This supports the earlier studies in this chapter, and prior research 
demonstrating people’s tendency to predict the actions of others ahead of real 
time (Graf et al., 2007).  
 
Most importantly, this tendency was greater when the actor gazed 
towards the object, compared to when they gazed away from it, prior to action 
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onset. This demonstrates the importance of gaze when observing the actions of 
others (Flanagan & Johannson, 2003; Frischen et al., 2007) and provides 
support for its role in generating top-down predictions of other people’s 
intentions and therefore future actions. It supports top-down theories of social 
perception by illustrating that when social cues such as eye gaze imply an 
action’s intention the tendency to misperceive the position of an actor’s hand 
further forward in time increases. It would provide key evidence that 
perception can be modulated by intentional information in line with the idea 
that cues to the intention of an observed action induce top-down predictions 
and bias participants’ perception. 
 
While the findings of Experiment 4 showed that perceptual prediction 
increases when the actor’s eye gaze signals their intention, the results could be 
explained by differences in action kinematics alone. During action execution, 
eye gaze informs action control, so that the actions in the intentional condition 
may not have been identical to those within the non-intentional condition, even 
though the model was instructed to perform both equally fluently. When 
performing the gaze away actions, the model could not see the object, which is 
likely to have had an effect on the fluency, accuracy and kinematics of the action 
compared to when the gaze was directed to the object and the hand was fully 
visible. It is therefore possible that the increase in representational momentum 
resulted from subtle kinematic differences between the actions, rather than the 
gaze cues. In order to address this concern, a control experiment was run 
showing the same actions with all gaze cues removed. 
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Experiment 5 – Gaze cue control 
 
 
In order to test whether the results of Experiment 4 resulted from 
differences in the actor’s gaze rather than their kinematics a control experiment 
was run. Experiment 5 was identical to Experiment 4 with the exception of the 
stimuli presented. The top halves of all images presented in Experiment 4 were 
removed, removing all head and gaze cues, and leaving only the arms and chest 
of the actor present. This allowed a test of whether kinematic differences 
between the arm movements in the gaze towards and gaze away conditions 
were responsible for the differences in representational momentum.  
 
If representational momentum does not significantly differ between the 
gaze toward or away actions, this would support the assumption that the 
direction of gaze was responsible for the results of Experiment 4. If, however, 
the kinematics belonging to the gaze toward action results in a significant 
increase in representational momentum compared to the kinematics belonging 
to the gaze away action, as in Experiment 4, then this would show that the 
differences between the conditions are due to the kinematics of the actions 
rather than the direction of gaze. 
 
Method 
 
 
Participants. 31 students (5 male, mean age = 20.3, SD = 5.2) at Plymouth 
University or members of the wider Plymouth community took part in 
exchange for participation points or payment (£8 p/h). All had normal or 
 
 
78 
corrected-to-normal vision and were native English speakers. All provided 
written informed consent prior to participation and were debriefed once the 
experiment had finished. The study was approved by the University of 
Plymouth’s ethics committee.  
 
Stimuli and Apparatus. The same stimuli used in Experiment 4 were 
digitally edited by removing the top half of each image, resulting in identical 
action sequences but without access to the direction of the actor’s gaze (see 
Figure 10, panel B). 
 
All other aspects of the method were identical to Experiment 4. 
 
Results 
 
 
Exclusions. Out of the 294 experimental trials, only the trials where the 
probe was a frame which across the experiment could be classed as all three of 
the probe positions (‘same’, ‘forward’ and ‘backward’) were included. This 
resulted in 168 trials being analysed. Two participants’ data were removed 
from the analysis because these participants failed to respond in more than 
20% of trials. Inclusion or exclusion of these participants did not affect the 
results. Trials where reaction times were longer than 2000ms were also 
excluded from the analysis (<2% of all trials).  
 
Sensitivity. Analysis of perceptual sensitivities confirmed that 
participants were able to distinguish ‘same’ from ‘different’ probes. They 
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identified more probes as ‘same’ when they really were at the same locations as 
the last image, compared to the average of ‘backward’ or ‘forward’ probes, t(28) 
= 12.18, p < .001. Perceptual sensitivities were also shown to differ significantly 
depending upon the intention of the action, t(28) = 2.105, p = .044. This showed 
that perceptual sensitivity was higher when viewing intentional actions 
compared to non-intentional actions. 
 
Representational Momentum. The percentage of ‘same’ responses for the 
‘forward’ and ‘backward’ probes was entered into a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA Intention (intentional/gaze toward or non-intentional/gaze away), and 
Probe direction (‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) as factors.  The analysis revealed a 
significant effect of Probe direction, F(1,28) = 31.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .527, 95% CI 
[9, 20], with participants more likely to judge ‘forward’ probes as ‘same’ 
compared to ‘backward’ probes, confirming the classical representational 
momentum effect. In addition, the analysis revealed a significant effect of 
Intention, F(1, 28) = 30.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .520, 95% CI [6, 12], with participants 
more likely to judge ‘different’ probes in the non-intentional condition as ‘same’ 
than those in the intentional condition. Importantly, as predicted, there was 
also a significant interaction between Probe direction and Intention, F(1,28) = 
4.55, p < .05, ηp2 = .140, 95% CI [0, 11], demonstrating that the tendency to 
mistake more ‘forward’ than ‘backward’ probes as ‘same’ was larger for 
intentional than non-intentional actions (see Figure 12).  
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Figure 12. Mean percentages of ‘same’ responses to ‘forward’ and 
‘backward’ probes, for both intentional (gaze toward, black bars) and non-
intentional actions (gaze away, white bars) in Experiment 5. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Reaction times. The same 2x2 used for the representational momentum 
analysis was applied to the reaction times for correct responses. The analysis 
revealed a significant effect of Probe direction, F(1,28) = 9.32, p = .005, ηp2 = 
.250, 95% CI [27, 127], with correct responses to ‘backward’ probes 
significantly faster than correct responses to ‘forward’ probes. There were no 
other significant effects, all F’s< 1.2. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The results of Experiment 5 replicated the findings of Experiment 4. 
Participants were again more likely to misperceive probes further forward 
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along the reach trajectory with the hand’s last seen position, than probes 
further backward, demonstrating the classical representational momentum 
effect. Crucially, the kinematics of reaches, which belonged to actions when the 
actor gazed at the object, produced more representational momentum than the 
kinematics of reaches, which belonged to actions when the actor gazed away 
from the object, despite the actual gaze information not being present. This 
complete replication of the results of the previous experiment, despite the lack 
of gaze information, strongly suggests that the differences in representational 
momentum between the conditions were due to kinematic differences between 
the reaches rather than due to the direction of the gaze.  
As the intention of the action never varied in the current experiment the 
difference between the two conditions cannot be explained by different top-
down predictions indicating different intentions. However, as both action 
conditions were related to slightly different bodily positions (due to different 
gaze directions) they are separable in relation to the biomechanical efficiency of 
their reach trajectories. Kinematics belonging to gaze toward actions are likely 
to have been more biomechanically efficient due the actor’s gaze toward the 
object. Conversely, kinematics belonging to gaze away actions are likely to have 
been less efficient due to the actor’s split biomechanical tasks. Therefore the 
differences in representational momentum here are likely to be due to 
differences between the biomechanical efficiency of the two action conditions.  
 
 
Overall, the results of Experiment 5 demonstrate that the findings of 
Experiment 4 were likely to have emerged due to differences in the kinematics 
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of the actions observed rather than due to differences in the direction of gaze. 
While this does not negate the influence of gaze on kinematic efficiency, it does 
show that here kinematic differences were sufficient to explain the differences 
found in Experiment 4. This demonstrates that differences in bottom-up 
sensory inputs can modulate perception even when the explicit intention of the 
actor is the same.  
 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
The aim of the initial experiments was to establish a robust 
representational momentum effect during action observation and explore 
whether it was modulated by social cues provided by kinematic, verbal or gaze 
information that implied the action’s intention. All the experiments were 
consistent in finding a representational momentum effect, supporting previous 
research demonstrating the effect during action observation (Wilson et al., 
2010). Moreover, the current set of experiments extends previous research by 
showing that representational momentum also applies to object-directed 
actions and persists across a number of different social stimuli and task set-ups. 
These findings support the idea that we perceptually predict the future location 
of a moving body part when observing the actions of others in a similar manner 
to a moving inanimate object (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005).  
 
While intentional grip-object matches showed increased perceptual 
prediction during action observation in Experiment 1, this effect could not be 
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replicated in Experiment 2. However, the later finding that kinematic 
differences between actions (Experiments 4 and 5) with the same intention, 
modulated perceptual prediction based on biomechanical efficiency suggests 
that  kinematic cues do effect perceptual prediction, at least on some level. .  
While this could be seen as a challenge to top-down theories of social 
perception it is important to remember that the differences in kinematics in 
Experiment 5 did not specify different intentions. Therefore, the findings of 
Experiment 4 and 5 cannot be explained by a bottom-up explanation of social 
perception. So while they could be taken as support for bottom-up processing 
during action perception this would be independent of the intention of the 
action. Moreover, top-down theories of perceptual prediction would predict 
that optimal reaches to a goal will match top-down predictions to a greater 
extent than sub-optimal reaches (Jacquet et al., 2012), and lead to more 
perceptual prediction, and therefore representational momentum. In this way 
while these findings challenge top-down theories to some extent, they could 
also be taken as evidence for them. For these reasons they can also not be seen 
as evidence for a bottom-up explanation of social perception. 
The finding that kinematics can modulate perceptual prediction 
supports the aims of Experiments 1 and 2 and suggests that 
the lack of a reliable intention effect for the grip and object matches 
could be due to a number of different reasons. One issue with these 
experiments concerned the different grip types, which were somewhat 
ambiguous. For example, all reaches ended well in advance of where the object 
was located, so it could be that for some participants incongruent hand grips 
were not perceived as such, and seen as still able to change course and grip the 
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object. While secondary questionnaires confirmed a distinction between the 
different grips in line with expectations, over a third of the non-intentional 
actions were still viewed as directed towards the object. Therefore it appeared 
possible that the grip-object matches were too subtle to elicit perceptual 
predictive processes.  This was clearly overcome in Experiment 5 by making the 
intention of all actions unambiguous allowing the biomechanical efficiency and 
fluency of the action to inform perceptual prediction alone. 
 
However, a number of studies have shown that participants use 
information relating to hand-object matching as cues to intention (Yoon & 
Humphreys, 2005; Bub, Masson & Cree, 2008; Fischer et al., 2008). Yet here, the 
experiment involved no explicit need to process the object, and as this is 
thought to be key to engage affordance processing, it may have reduced any 
effect of intention. Indeed, research has shown that information relating to the 
integration of grip and object as opposed to grip information alone is the 
primary driver of action processing (Bach, Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 
2005; van Elk et al., 2008). This suggests that future experiments need to force 
participants’ attention towards the object in order to ensure that object 
affordances are engaged and consequently that the intention of the action is 
processed.  
 
A number of possible reasons could have been responsible for the failure 
to find an effect of intention in relation to the verbal statements. Firstly, it may 
have been that the verbal statements were not processed sufficiently. Like the 
grip-matching experiments, the task did not require the verbal statements to be 
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explicitly processed. That is, as the verbal cues were not task-relevant and were 
presented at the same time as the action sequence, participants may have 
consciously ignored them, despite being instructed to process them. The 
assumption was that this would be difficult due to the volume of the auditory 
stimuli and the reduction in extraneous sounds because of the presence of the 
headphones. Moreover, even if participants did consciously ignore them, it was 
assumed that they would be processed on some level automatically (for a 
review, see Shtyrov, 2010). However, as there was no way to measure this, it is 
impossible to know to what degree these verbal statements were actually 
processed.  
 
Another possibility is that the verbal cues were merely not distinct 
enough, and were therefore not associated with the viewed action. While this is 
possible, the verbal cues were purposefully created to be as emotionally salient 
as possible. Alternatively, it might have been merely that the repetition of the 
verbal cues, and actions associated with these verbal cues, across the span of 
the experiment led to a decrease of attention, thereby undermining the 
association between verbal cue and action. However, when analysing the effects 
over the course of different blocks no such decline was evident. Lastly, it may be 
that the verbal statements were too complex to affect perception. Therefore, 
future use of verbal statements would need to be explicitly linked to the actions 
they refer to in order for their processing to be assured. Likewise, it may also be 
that verbal statements need to be simpler in order to facilitate processing. Such 
changes would allow the effect of verbal information as an intentional cue to be 
better addressed. 
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As mentioned above, the experiments investigating the influence of gaze 
direction on action prediction seemed to show that gazing towards an object 
increased subsequent perceptual prediction. However, a subsequent control 
study identified that this was due to differences in the kinematics of the actions 
rather than the direction of gaze. This highlights a problem with comparing 
natural reaches to an object that follow different gaze directions, as there will 
obviously be differences in kinematic information. This could be overcome by 
adopting artificial stimuli that keep the kinematics constant while varying the 
gaze direction, although such a design would restrict the ecological validity of 
such a study.  
 
Other issues concerning the current experiments relate to the 
presentation of the stimuli. In all the experiments, while the starting point of 
the action was varied, the length of the action sequence throughout an 
experiment was always constant (3 or 4 frames). This entailed the danger of 
reducing the requirement for prediction more generally. Participants were 
certain that, once the final frame was reached, no further movement would 
happen, and there was no need to predict further ahead. Another factor, which 
may have reduced prediction, was the predictability of the spatial dynamics of 
the whole scene. As all objects were positioned in the same spatial location on 
the screen, all actions had the same endpoint. Participants therefore did not 
have to predict the hand’s path based on the object in the scene, but could just 
rely on their memory of the previous reaches. This may have further reduced 
the requirement for prediction. In effect, participants knew in advance where 
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each action would stop so that there was no requirement to attend to the visual 
cues at all.  
 
In conclusion, while the experiments presented here provide support for 
the perceptual extrapolation of biological motion during action observation, 
they failed to find reliable evidence that top-down predictions are elicited by 
cues, which signal the actor’s intention. Instead, they provide some evidence 
that differences in kinematics can modulate perceptual prediction 
independently of the actor’s intention. While the lack of a consistent effect of 
intention  challenges top-down theories of social cognition, the effect of 
kinematics does suggest that differences in biomechanical efficiency can inform 
perceptual prediction. Moreover, the failure to find any reliable top-down 
intentional effects could be due to a number of different factors regarding the 
methodology across the different experiments. Therefore, based on this, 
numerous changes were applied to the paradigm in an attempt to better 
address the role of top-down social cues of intention on perceptual prediction.  
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Chapter 4 - The effect of verbal cues on action 
observation 
 
The experiments in Chapter 3 demonstrated a reliable representational 
momentum effect across a range of different stimuli and experimental designs. 
However, these experiments failed to find consistent evidence that the effect 
was modulated by kinematic, verbal or gaze cues to intention. This calls into 
question the influence of intentional social cues on predictions implied by top-
down theories of social perception (Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007). Moreover, 
Chapter 3 also revealed evidence that changes in the kinematics of a reach 
during action observation can modulate representational momentum, in the 
absence of intentional cues. This provides evidence that changes in bottom-up 
sensory inputs could drive predictive processes rather than top-down 
predictions. However as the kinematic differences were not clearly linked to 
different intentions they do not support the direct matching hypothesis of social 
perception either (Rizzolatti & Singaglia, 2010). Instead they suggest that more 
tightly controlled experiments are really required to tackle the influence of 
social cues to intention on perception. Indeed, a number of different 
methodological aspects of the experiments in Chapter 3 may have contributed 
to the failure to find an effect of intention on action prediction. Therefore, a 
number of changes were made to the paradigm in an attempt to investigate the 
role of top-down cues to intention more effectively. 
 
One serious concern with the grip-matching experiments (Experiments 
1 and 2) was the lack of an explicit requirement to process the objects’ 
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orientation, and therefore to derive the actor’s intention. Additionally, as 
reaches stopped relatively far from the object, the distinction between 
intentional and non-intentional actions was potentially ambiguous. Therefore, 
here, grip-matching was replaced with language cues to convey the action’s 
intention. While the previous verbal experiment (Experiment 3) suggested that 
such language cues did not increase representational momentum, it suffered 
from a similar issue as the grip experiments, in that there was no explicit 
requirement to process the language cues. Therefore, a solution to this issue 
was to ask participants to produce the verbal statements themselves, as if they 
were instructing the agent, thus ensuring that the cues were processed 
explicitly. 
 
In the experiments in Chapter 4, actions now varied with respect to their 
movement direction. Each action could either be a reach for or a withdrawal 
from a goal object. To generate differential action expectations, the goal objects 
were either painful or safe. This produced a dichotomy regarding the intentions 
likely to be associated with each object that could match or mismatch with 
action type. While safe objects are more directly associated with the intention 
of reaching forward to grasp, painful objects are more likely be associated with 
withdrawals (Anelli, Borghi & Nicoletti, 2012). To trigger each action, 
participants were required to state, as if they were instructing the actor, the 
appropriate action for the object. For safe objects, participants had to make 
verbal statements implying an approach goal (Experiment 6 – “Forward”, 
Experiment 7 – “Take it”) and an avoidance goal for painful objects (“Backward” 
and “Leave it”). This ensured that participants explicitly processed the object 
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and also created an expectation about which action they expected to see (e.g. 
reach toward for a safe object and withdrawal away for a painful object). The 
action could then either follow the instruction or do the opposite. By 
independently varying both action direction (reach, withdrawal) and the object 
type (painful, safe), the effect of verbal statement on representational 
momentum could be measured. 
 
Another potential problem with the verbal statements used in the 
previous experiment was their complexity. The statements were expressed 
emotionally and were also in many cases several words long. Both these factors 
may have meant that their meaning was not processed fast enough to influence 
the representational momentum task. By replacing these verbal statements 
with categorical statements (forward/backward, or take it, leave it), which 
were simpler, more direct and less ambiguous, it was hoped that a more direct 
link with the observed actions could be created. Moreover, by linking these 
categorical statements to two action directions, the relationship between verbal 
cue and subsequent observed action was more apparent and increased the 
likelihood that differential expectations would be elicited. 
 
In addition to these key changes a number of other slight adjustments 
were made to the representational momentum task.  
 
Firstly, while the experiments in Chapter 3 all demonstrated a robust 
representational momentum effect, a potential concern was that the 
directionality of the response keys (e.g. ‘z’ left and ‘x’ right) could affect the 
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responses, in a Simon-like manner (Simon, 1969). While counterbalancing 
addressed this issue in the previous experiments, the representational 
momentum task here was changed from a forced choice task to a GO/NOGO 
paradigm to fully rule out this potential influence. Rather than having to 
respond to every probe with either a ‘same’ or ‘different’ response, participants 
were required to make a response only when they thought that the probe hand 
was in a different position to its last location, and not respond if they judged it 
to be in the same position. The ‘different’ probe was chosen for GO responses 
based on the assumption that inputs conforming to an action prediction should 
be attenuated, while deviations should become more salient. Therefore, the 
perception of ‘different’ probes would reflect the ‘prediction error’ signal, which 
in theories of predictive processing is central, and thought to alert one to the 
disconfirmation of a previous prediction (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013).  
 
In addition to this, as mentioned in Chapter 3, while the action 
sequences included different start points, sequences always included the same 
number of frames, which is likely to have reduced the requirement to predict, 
as participants always knew in advance when the movement would terminate. 
Subsequent pilot testing indeed revealed that varying the length of the 
sequence as well as the start point increased representational momentum, thus 
also increasing the misperception of ‘forward’ probes as the same as the last 
seen image. Indeed, in most cases the shortest sequences produced the most 
representational momentum, whereas it was almost eliminated in the longest 
sequences, where participants could be sure that the motion would not 
continue. Therefore, the paradigm was altered to include 3 different sequence 
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lengths (between 3 and 5 frames) so that participants were less able to 
anticipate the stopping of the sequence.  
 
Similarly, in the experiments of Chapter 3, the actions and goal objects 
were always located in the same spatial position on screen, resulting in 
identical end points. This meant that participants could rely on their memory of 
previous reaches rather than predict the hand’s path in relation to the object. 
To rectify this, the position of the scene was shifted randomly along the midline 
from trial to trial, and all background information was digitally removed. In this 
way, the hand’s likely path could only be derived from the position of the object 
on screen, and not from one’s memory of the last reach. Accurate judgement of 
the movements would now only be possible if participants, on a trial by trial 
basis, predicted the movement they would see, based on the initial positions of 
hand and target object. 
 
Finally, the evidence from the experiments in Chapter 3 suggested that 
the representational momentum task was sometimes difficult for participants 
to complete. While overall sensitivities showed that participants could 
differentiate between the ‘same’ and ‘different’ probes, closer inspection of the 
single subjects revealed that, in each experiment, a large number of participants 
showed no differences between probe types, suggesting random response 
strategies. To rectify this, training blocks were added in order to a) familiarize 
participants with the task and b) add an objective means for participant 
exclusion prior to the experiment. In addition, catch trials with extreme probe 
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displacements were interspersed into the main task to measure task 
performance and compliance, providing an objective means for exclusion.  
 
The first three experiments of the chapter (6, 7 and 8) investigate how 
expectations of intention generated by self-performed speech affected action 
perception as measured by the representational momentum task. In the 
subsequent two experiments (9 and 10), the paradigm is extended to test 
whether representational momentum is affected if expectations are generated 
not through self-performed speech but heard speech, when actors state their 
own intentions. 
 
Experiment 6 – Spoken verbal cue – “Forward” and “Backward” 
 
 
The aim of Experiment 6 was to implement the raft of changes to the 
paradigm. As in the experiments from Chapter 3, participants observed reaches 
towards objects, but this time also observed withdrawals away from them. The 
objects could either be safe or painful to grasp. The representational 
momentum task was the same as in the earlier experiments, but this time the 
participants only responded – with a press on the space-bar – when they judged 
the probe hand to be ‘different’ from its last position and pressed nothing if 
they judged it to be the ‘same’. With this shift from forced choice to GO/NOGO 
decision, the response data in effect measured the ‘prediction error’ signal. As 
before, the expectation was that ‘backward’ probes would be easier to correctly 
identify as different from the hand’s last location than ‘forward’ probes. 
Representational momentum was measured by how much greater the ability to 
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identify a ‘backward’ probe as ‘different’ proved to be, compared to a ‘forward’ 
probe. 
 
In order to investigate the effect of intentional verbal cues, participants 
were required to respond verbally to the type of object by verbalizing the 
appropriate action with the object, which would then initiate the start of the 
action sequence. We hoped that this direct temporal link between verbal 
statement and action onset would increase the perception of causality between 
statement and action. If the object was safe to grasp, participants said 
“Forward” while if the object was painful, participants said “Backward”. This 
served to create a meaningful context for the participants’ utterances, but also 
crucially aimed to produce an expectation of which action the participant would 
subsequently expect to see. The task therefore fused the social cues of objects 
and language, with the aim of eliciting the maximal effect on representational 
momentum. It was expected that representational momentum would be 
greatest whenever the verbal response matched the subsequent action 
direction. Therefore, representational momentum should be larger for reaches 
towards safe objects and reaches away from painful objects, than for reaches 
towards painful objects and reaches away from safe objects.  
 
Method 
 
 
Participants. 45 participants took part in Experiment 6. They comprised 
students from Plymouth University or members of the public from the wider 
Plymouth community. They took part in exchange for participation points or 
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payment (£8 p/h). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were native 
English speakers and right-handed. All provided written informed consent 
before participating and were debriefed at the end of the experiment. The study 
was approved by the University of Plymouth’s ethics committee. An initial 
training/calibration session (see procedure) took place prior to the proper 
experiment, and those who failed this did not proceed to the experimental 
session. Five participants were excluded based on the training session, leaving 
40 participants (26 females, mean age = 23.3 years, SD = 8.9) to proceed to the 
experimental session. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli. A Canon Legria HFS200 video camera was used to 
film stimuli, and edited using Moviedek and Corel PaintShop Photo Pro x6. 
Stimuli were filmed at 30 frames per second and consisted of natural reaches of 
a man’s right hand towards one of four target objects (drinking glass, wine 
glass, plastic bottle, knife with handle oriented toward hand; see Figure 13, 
panel A). Individual frames were extracted from each video, and for each reach 
26 images were chosen which spanned the trajectory from the start of the reach 
to approximately two-thirds of the way through the reach. For all images the 
object and hand were superimposed onto a black background to eradicate any 
other details from the scene. Each object was paired with a painful object that 
was matched for grip type and size (broken glass, broken wine glass, cactus, 
knife with blade oriented towards hand; see Figure 13, panel A). Each set of 
images was duplicated with each original object digitally replaced with its 
painful object pair, resulting in 2 identical sets of reaches with only the target 
object different. The result was 8 sets of 26 images, each containing a different 
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target object (4 non-painful and 4 painful) and including 4 different reaches, 
each duplicated once. Each displayed action sequence began at a randomly 
chosen frame from the middle of the action (between frames 13-17). The length 
of each action sequence varied between 3 and 5 frames and proceeded in 2-
frame steps, either towards the object (forward reaches) or away from the 
object (backward withdrawals). Withdrawal sequences consisted of playing the 
frames in reverse order.  
 
Like the earlier experiments, the probe image could either be the same 
as the last image of the action sequence (‘same’ probe), or different. When the 
probe was different, it could either be further forward along its trajectory in a 
future position (‘forward’ probe) or back along the trajectory in a past position 
(‘backward’ probe). Different probes varied between 1 and 2 frames in distance 
from the last image of the action sequence (varied between participants based 
on their calibration performance, see below) in experimental trials and 4 
frames in catch trials (see Figure 13, panel C). The stimuli were presented on a 
22-inch Philips Brilliance 221P3LPY monitor (resolution: 1920 X 1080, refresh 
rate: 60 Hz) using Presentation software (Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc.). 
Participants wore Logitech PC120 headphones with a microphone. 
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Figure 13. A: The safe objects (left column) and the paired dangerous 
objects (right column), and the knife oriented safely or dangerously with respect 
to the hand (bottom). B: Trial sequence of a reach towards (top) or away from 
(middle) an object (action stimulus), followed by a blank screen, and then the 
probe stimulus. In this example, both actions finish on the same frame, and the 
probe position is the same as the final action stimulus frame. C: The probe 
stimulus levels. In each image, the centre hand is the same as the final action 
stimulus frame in B, and the ‘different’ probe stimuli are superimposed either side 
of it. For reaches toward the object, the probe nearest the object was the ‘forward’ 
probe and the probe farthest from the object was the ‘backward’ probe. For 
reaches away from the object, the probe farthest from the object was the ‘forward’ 
probe and the probe nearest the object was the ‘backward’ probe. The difference 
between the ‘same’ and ‘different’ probes decreases across the images from left to 
right (4 frames, 3 frames, 2 frames, 1 frame). 
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Procedure. Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from a colour 
monitor, and were given written and verbal instructions. The experiment began 
with a training session comprising 4 training blocks (each 36 trials) that 
measured participants’ ability to discriminate between the different types of 
probe. This session was added due to the finding from earlier experiments and 
pilots that the representational momentum task is difficult for participants. The 
first block contained ‘different’ probes that were 4 frames from last image, and 
with each subsequent block they became closer to the ‘same’ probe (+/-4, +/-3, 
+/-2, +/-1, see Fig. 13). This meant that in the first block ‘different’ probes were 
easier to judge, and with each block the task became harder.  
 
Each trial began with a fixation cross displayed for 500ms, followed by a 
blank screen presented for a randomly chosen time between 500 and 1000ms. 
Following this, the first image of the action sequence was presented for 
1500ms. All action sequences were presented in the same vertical position, but 
the position along the X-axis varied across trials, thereby increasing variation. 
Each subsequent frame was displayed for 80ms and depicted either a reach 
towards the object or a withdrawal away from the object. After this a blank 
screen was presented for 260ms before a probe image was displayed (distance 
of ‘different’ probes varying as specified above).  
 
The participants’ task was to press the space-bar with their left hand if 
they thought the probe was in a different position from its last position, and not 
respond if they thought it was in the same position. They had 4000ms to 
respond.  
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Participants who did not meet the inclusion criteria did not proceed to 
the main experiment (see Results – Exclusions). The main experimental session 
was identical to the training session, apart from one important change: the 
requirement of a verbal response to initiate the task. The first image of the 
action sequence would stay on screen until a verbal response was registered 
(detected via Presentation’s sound threshold logic). Participants were 
instructed to verbally respond depending on whether the object was safe or 
painful to grasp, and were asked to say “Forward” to initiate the action 
sequence for safe objects and “Backward” for painful objects.  
 
1000ms after the verbal response was registered, the action sequence, 
either reaching towards or withdrawing away from the object, would begin, and 
participants would complete the representational momentum task. The 
experiment consisted of 144 experimental trials with each stimulus 
combination shown once (4 objects X 2 object types X 2 action directions X 3 
movie lengths X 3 probe types). In addition 24 catch trials (CTs) where the 
probe type was either +4 or -4 frames from the final position were included. 
The experiment was split into 3 blocks of 56 trials with self-terminated breaks 
between blocks.  
 
Inclusion criteria. In the training session, participants were rated on two 
measures, accuracy and sensitivity. Accuracy was merely the average of correct 
responses across all probe types. Sensitivity was calculated by subtracting the 
percentage of ‘same’ responses when the probe was ‘different’ from the 
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percentage of ‘same’ responses when the probe was the ‘same’. If participant 
performance within a block dropped below chance on either accuracy (50%) or 
sensitivity (0%) the block was failed. Participants only proceeded to the main 
experiment if they passed at least block +/-2. If a participant passed block  +/-2, 
but not +/-1, then their experimental session was set at +/-2 probe distances. 
However, if block +/-1 was also passed then their experimental session was set 
at +/-1. In the experimental session, if participants’ catch trial errors exceeded 
the group mean error rate by + 1SD they were excluded from analysis. 
However, because perfect catch trial performance could be reached by pressing 
the space-bar on every trial, participants were also excluded if their detection of 
displacements in catch trials did not show at least a minimum improvement of 
10% compared to experimental trials. These exclusion criteria were 
deliberately conservative to focus particularly on those participants that 
engaged with all aspects of the task. Moreover, the prior calibration session 
effectively ensured that participants were at detection threshold, and it was 
important to ensure that those were excluded for whom this threshold shifted 
or was measured incorrectly. The same exclusion criteria were applied to all 
subsequent experiments. 
 
Results 
 
 
Exclusions. Based on the inclusion criteria, nine participants were 
excluded after the experimental session. Of the remaining 31 participants, trials 
where responses were either faster than 200ms (anticipations) or slower than 
3000ms were also excluded from the analysis (0.3% of trials). 
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Main analyses. Participants detected 94% (SD = 11%) of displacements 
in the catch trials, and 55% (SD = 16%) in the experimental trials. Responses 
were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with Intention (“Forward” vs. 
“Backward”), Action Direction (reach vs. withdrawal) and Probe Direction 
(‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) as factors. The ‘same’ probes were not analysed. 
There was a significant effect of Probe Direction, F(1,30) = 99.15, p < .001, ηp2  = 
.768, 95% CI [23, 35]. As expected, backward displacements were detected 
more often than forward displacements, replicating the representational 
momentum effect. Crucially there was a three-way interaction between 
Intention, Action Direction and Probe Direction, F(1,30) = 4.89, p = .035, ηp2  = 
.140, 95% CI [1, 26], showing that representational momentum increased when 
action and intention matched (see Figure 14). There were no further main 
effects or interactions (all F < 2.29, all p > .14). 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
 
Figure 14. The interaction between prior expectation and action direction 
on the size of the representational momentum effect (‘backward’ probe detections 
– ‘forward’ probe detections) in Experiment 6. Participants said “Forward” if the 
object was safe and “Backward” if the object was dangerous. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The results from Experiment 6 revealed a robust representational 
momentum effect. Participants more readily detected displacements that went 
backward, against the trajectory of motion, compared to those that went 
forward. This supports the idea that humans process the actions of others by 
generating predictions of how the action will continue, resulting in the 
modulation of perception forward in line with these expectations. It is also in 
line with the representational momentum effect found in the experiments in 
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Chapter 3, but here with the new stimuli and changes in methodology the effect 
is far more robust. It also supports previous work demonstrating the 
representational momentum effect when observing other people’s actions 
(Wilson et al., 2010; Hudson et al., 2009; Thornton & Hayes, 2005).  
 
Importantly, the current results demonstrate that this change in 
perception can also be affected by prior expectations created by the participant. 
Expectations generated by the specific verbal instructions about the kinematics 
of the action enhanced representational momentum. Here, if the verbal 
instruction of the participant matched the subsequent observed movement, 
representational momentum increased compared to when the verbal 
instruction mismatched the movement. These findings suggest that the verbal 
cue uttered by the participant altered their perceptual judgement of the 
subsequent action. Moreover, the verbal statements (“Forward”, “Backward”) 
corresponded to the direction of the reach from the actor’s viewpoint, and not 
the viewpoint of the participant, which would have been ‘left’ or ‘right’. 
Therefore, the alteration of the participant’s perception as a result of “Forward” 
and “Backward” must have resulted from the participant taking the perspective 
of the actor when making the verbal statements. While prior evidence has 
shown evidence for representational momentum using social stimuli, this is the 
first study to show that social representational momentum can be affected by 
prior expectations.  
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Experiment 7 – Spoken Verbal cue – “Take it” or “Leave it” 
 
 
While the results of Experiment 6 were encouraging, the failure to 
replicate results within Chapter 3 highlighted the need for replication. 
Experiment 6 showed that saying words that denoted a potential movement 
altered the subsequent perceptual judgement of a hand’s position in relation to 
the target object. This indicated that lower-level verbal cues related on the 
kinematic level to the action’s intention can alter predictive processing. The 
question now was whether the same would happen when the verbal utterances 
were of a higher level of intention.  
 
Experiment 7 was identical to Experiment 6 apart from the verbal 
utterances required. This time, when a safe object was present, participants 
were required to say “Take it” and when a painful object was present they were 
required to say “Leave it”. This allowed the replication of the previous 
experiment, and testing whether the effect also applied to intentions at a 
higher-level. 
 
Method 
 
 
Participants. 42 participants took part in Experiment 7. Participants 
were recruited and rewarded in the same manner as Experiment 6, adhering to 
the same ethical guidelines and participant requirements. Ten participants 
failed the training session, leaving Experiment 7 with 32 participants (22 
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females, mean age = 23.3 years, SD = 6.9) to take part in the experimental 
session. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli. These were identical to Experiment 6. 
 
Procedure. Experiment 7 was identical to Experiment 6 with the sole 
exception of the difference regarding the verbal response required. This time 
participants were asked to say “Take it” in response to safe objects and “Leave 
it” in response to painful objects.  
 
Inclusion criteria. These were the same as Experiment 6. 
 
Results 
 
 
Exclusions. In line with the inclusion criteria, eight participants were 
excluded after the experimental session. 1.4% of trials from the remaining 24 
participants’ responses were excluded based on reaction time measures. 
 
Main analyses. The mean reported displacements were 99% (SD = 2%) 
in the catch trials and 61% (SD = 11%) in the experimental trials. Responses 
were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with Intention (“Take it” vs. 
“Leave it”), Action Direction (reach vs. withdrawal) and Probe Direction 
(‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) as factors. The ‘same’ probes were not analysed. 
There was a significant effect of Probe Direction, F(1,23) = 17.60, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.433, 95% CI [11, 32]. As expected, backward displacements were detected 
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more often than forward displacements, replicating the representational 
momentum effect. There was also a significant effect of Action Direction, 
F(1,23) = 18.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .446, 95% CI [7, 19], with displacements for 
withdrawal more readily detected than displacements for reaches. Crucially 
there was a three-way interaction between Intention, Action Direction and 
Probe Direction, F(1,23) = 4.67, p = .041, ηp2 = .169, 95% CI [1, 26], showing that 
representational momentum increased when action and intention matched (see 
Figure 15). There were no further main effects or interactions (all F < 0.47, all p 
> 0.5). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The interaction between prior expectation and action direction 
on the size of the representational momentum effect (‘backward’ probe detections 
– ‘forward’ probe detections) in Experiment 7. Participants said “Take it” if the 
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object was safe and “Leave it” if the object was dangerous. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The results of Experiment 7 fully replicate those of Experiment 6. Once 
again a significant representational momentum effect revealed participants’ 
tendency to more easily detect ‘backward’ probes than ‘forward’ probes, 
further confirming the robustness of the representational momentum effect. 
 
Crucially, again the verbal utterances affected participants’ subsequent 
perception of a hand’s position, but these results show that this effect extends 
to expectations about the action’s goal in addition to movement kinematics. As 
in the previous experiment, when prior expectations created by the verbal 
statements were met, representational momentum was larger, suggesting more 
forward prediction. In contrast, when prior expectations were not met, 
representational momentum decreased, suggesting a decline in forward 
prediction. This demonstrates that prior expectations generated on a range of 
different levels alters people’s subsequent perception. The amount of predicted 
forward motion seems to be a combination of expectations from prior motion 
(bottom-up input from the hand’s motion) and expectations generated from the 
verbal statements. The largest predictive effects emerged, for both reaches and 
withdrawals, when both were aligned. 
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However, one issue within Experiments 6 and 7 was that the verbal 
response was dependent on the type of object (safe/painful), making the two 
always confounded. This means that it is difficult to know whether the effects 
emerge from the intentional cues or on object information. In order to address 
this, another experiment was run which eliminated the role of object 
knowledge. 
Experiment 8 – Spoken Verbal cue – Colour control 
 
 
The findings from Experiments 6 and 7 have shown that expectations 
generated by verbal utterances in response to different types of objects altered 
the perception of subsequent actions. However, in these experiments, the 
verbal utterance for each object category was constant, making the two 
confounded, and making it hard to know how far the effect relied on 
expectations derived from the verbal statements or from object information. 
For instance, a decrease in representational momentum when observing 
reaches towards a painful object could be a result of the object’s painfulness or 
because the verbal utterance denoted avoidance. Experiment 8 was run to 
dissociate the two factors from one another. The experiment was the same as 
Experiment 6 except that the colour of the object was randomly manipulated 
across object types. If the object was green, participants said “Forward” to 
initiate the action, and if it was red they said “Backward”. This meant that 
verbal responses were now independent of object type allowing the influence of 
movement expectancies alone, regardless of object type, to be investigated.  
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Method 
 
 
All aspects of the experiment were identical to Experiment 6 apart from 
the following. 
 
Participants. 36 participants (28 females, mean age = 21.6 years, SD = 
6.0) took part in Experiment 8. All participants passed the training session. 
 
Stimuli. The existing stimuli were modified to produce two sets of 
stimuli, one where the object was overlaid with a green (R: 55, G: 225, B: 1) 
filter and one where the overlay was red (R: 255, G: 14, B: 3). The filter was set 
to an opacity of 30%, making the object type still clearly visible. 
 
Procedure. The training session was identical to the previous 2 
experiments apart from training block +/-4 not being administered. 
Throughout the experiment, object colour was chosen randomly. The frequency 
of object colour across the factors action direction, object type and probe was 
not significantly different from chance (X2 = 3.73, df = 11, p = .98). If 
participants saw a green object they responded “Forward” to initiate the action 
sequence, while if the object was red, they responded “Backward” to start the 
action. 
Results 
 
Exclusions. Five participants were excluded based on their performance 
on the experimental session. 1.1% of trials of the remaining 31 participants’ 
responses was excluded based on reaction time cut-offs. 
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Main analyses. Participants detected 93% (SD = 13%) of displacements 
in the catch trials and 62% (SD = 15%) in the experimental trials. Responses 
were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with Intention (“Forward” vs. 
“Backward”), Action Direction (reach vs. withdrawal), Object (safe vs. painful) 
and Probe Direction (‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) as factors. The ‘same’ probes 
were not analysed. There was a significant effect of Probe Direction, F(1,30) = 
11.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .558, 95% CI [21, 40]. As expected, backward 
displacements were detected more often than forward displacements, 
replicating the representational momentum effect. There was also a significant 
effect of Action Direction, F(1,30) = 12.02, p = .002, ηp2 = .286, 95% CI [3, 11], 
with displacements for withdrawals more readily detected than displacements 
for reaches. There was also a significant effect of Object, F(1,30) = 5.72, p = .023, 
ηp2 = .160, 95% CI [1, 6], with displacements for safe objects more readily 
detected than displacements for painful objects. Crucially there was a three-
way interaction between Intention, Action Direction and Probe Direction, 
F(1,30) = 4.31, p = .047, ηp2 = .126, 95% CI [1, 22], showing that 
representational momentum increased when action and intention matched (see 
Figure 16). There was also a three-way interaction between Intention, Object 
and Probe Direction, F(1,30) = 10.88, p = .003, ηp2 = .266, 95% CI [6, 23]. This 
showed that when observing actions involving painful objects, saying 
“Forward” increased representational momentum (irrespective of whether the 
action was a reach or a withdrawal) compared to saying “Backward”, but the 
reverse was true when observing actions involving safe objects, 
representational momentum being greater when saying “Backward” compared 
 
 
111 
to saying “Forward”. Incongruence between verbal statement and object 
therefore generally increased representational momentum, irrespective of 
action direction. There were no further main effects or interactions (all F < 3.56, 
all p > 0.068). 
 
 
 
Figure 16. The interaction between prior expectation and action direction 
on the size of the representational momentum effect (‘backward’ probe detections 
– ‘forward’ probe detections) in Experiment 8. The colour of the object was 
randomly assigned as green (black bars) or red (white bars) independent of object 
type and participants said “Forward” if the object was green and “Backward” if 
the object was red. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
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The results from Experiment 8 further replicate the representational 
momentum effect and confirm that the new stimuli and changes in 
methodology produce a more consistent effect. More importantly, the findings 
of the current experiment reveal that the effect of expectancies generated by 
the verbal statements was still present when they were derived from abstract 
colour cues, independent of object type. Results showed that verbal utterances 
in response to the colour of the object, regardless of the object type, generated 
expectations that altered the level of representational momentum in the same 
way as the previous two experiments. This demonstrates that the effects of the 
previous two experiments rely on the verbal statements uttered, and not the 
painfulness of the object. 
 
In contrast, object type had a more general effect on representational 
momentum, being generally larger whenever verbal statement (forward, 
backward) and object type (painful, safe) mismatched. This is in line with the 
view that the representational momentum effect is highly automatic, and that 
mismatches occupy cognitive resources that cannot be used for accurate (not 
biased) detection of the displacements.  
 
Taken together, all these findings provide evidence that perception not 
only relies on bottom-up sensory information, but also involves the influence of 
prior knowledge. The current results demonstrate that verbal utterances can 
modify expectations and alter subsequent social perception. When expectations 
were satisfied representational momentum was larger, suggesting greater 
perceptual prediction. In contrast, when expectations were not satisfied 
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representational momentum was reduced, suggesting weaker perceptual 
prediction.  
 
Here though such expectations were always forced on the participant 
through the requirement to verbally respond to the stimuli. One question about 
such expectations then is whether they require some form of generation or 
whether they can also be generated automatically. For example, would the 
effect of expectation on representational momentum still be visible if the verbal 
statements were not spoken but only heard, as if from the observed?  
 
 
Experiment 9 & 10 – Auditory cue 
 
 
The previous experiments demonstrated that expectancies generated by 
the spoken statement of a participant could modulate their perception of a 
subsequently observed action. However, what is less clear is whether these 
effects rely on the participants producing the verbal statement themselves, or 
whether the words themselves can generate such perceptual expectancies, for 
instance when heard by the participant but produced by the observed actor. 
That is, are expectations created because the verbal statements were self-
generated or did they emerge from the linguistic content itself? 
 
In the following two experiments the same stimuli and representational 
momentum task were implemented but this time rather than performing a 
verbal response, participants heard verbal statements as if coming from the 
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owner of the observed hand. Participants heard the verbal statements from 
Experiment 7, “I’ll take it” and “I’ll leave it”. This tested whether the effect of 
intentionality on representational momentum was present in the absence of 
any verbal response by the participant. In Experiment 9 the audio stimuli were 
object specific, so participants always heard “I’ll take it” when a safe object was 
present and “I’ll leave it” when a painful object was present. This allowed 
investigation of whether the verbal statements themselves were sufficient to 
generate expectations and modulate representational momentum, or whether 
the modulation required a self-generated expectation. In Experiment 10, the 
verbal statements and object type were not linked, making the audio stimuli 
unrelated to the object present. This meant that the verbal statements heard 
were now independent of object type, allowing the influence of movement 
expectancies alone, regardless of object type, to be investigated when the verbal 
statements were merely heard. 
 
Method 
 
 
All aspects of the experiment were identical to previous experiments (4, 
5, 6) in methodology and application apart from the following. 
 
Participants. 35 (23 females, mean age = 27.7, SD = 10.3) participants 
took part in Experiment 9 and 32 (20 females, mean age = 26.8, SD = 9.2 ) in 
Experiment 10. 
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Apparatus and Stimuli. Audio stimuli were recorded using an M-Audio 
Microtrack 2 Digital Voice Recorder. Two audio stimuli of an actor saying “I’ll 
take it” and “I’ll leave it” were created, each of 1000ms duration and played 
through the headphones at 75% volume. The audio stimuli were biased to the 
right earphone by 50% to match the position of the actor on the right of the 
screen. A Logitech PC120 combined microphone and headphone set was used 
to deliver audio stimuli. All other stimuli and apparatus were the same as 
previous experiments. 
 
Procedure. The procedure mirrored previous experiments but this time 
no training session was included. Instead, two probe levels were included in the 
main experiment. These two probe levels were designed to capture most of the 
variability in participants’ detection threshold to detect the displacements. 
They should therefore reduce loss of participants in the calibration/practice 
session prior to the experiment, and should protect the measurement from 
shifts in a participant’s detection threshold over the experiment. The 
experimental session was identical to the previous experiments but this time 
when the first frame of the action sequence was presented following a random 
variable delay between 1000 and 3000ms the audio stimulus – “I’ll take it” for 
safe objects and “I’ll leave it” for painful objects – was presented. The action 
sequence began 200ms after the end of the audio stimulus. The variable SOA 
between trial onset and auditory stimulus and the highly predictable start of 
the action sequence after auditory offset again created a causal link between 
statement of intention and action initiation. The rest of the stimulus 
presentation followed the previous experiments, with the following exceptions.  
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While in previous experiments one probe level was used throughout, 
here two ‘different’ probe levels (+/-1 and  +/-2) were implemented resulting 
in five possible probe positions (-2, -1, 0, +1, +2). In Experiment 9 there were 
160 experimental trials, which were made up of 8 iterations of the Intention 
(“I’ll take it”, “I’ll leave it”) x Action direction (toward or away) x Probe 
direction (-2, -1, 0, +1, +2). For each trial the object was randomly selected. To 
ensure that participants processed the audio statements, an extra 16 trials were 
added which included the actor stating the wrong intention (“I’ll take it” for 
painful objects, “I’ll leave it” for safe objects). As soon as participants detected 
the wrong intention they were required to say “STOP” into the microphone, 
which ended the trial. In addition to this another 16 catch trials where the 
probe was +/-4 were also added. In Experiment 10 there were 240 trials which 
were made up of 6 iterations of the factors Object Type (safe, painful), Intention 
(“I’ll take it”, “I’ll leave it”), Action Direction (reach, withdrawal), and Probe (-2, 
-1, 0, +1, +2), and 16 catch trials with +/-4 probes. 
 
Inclusion criteria. As no training blocks were administered, participants 
were excluded based on their performance in the experimental session. This 
mirrored the previous three experiments, with the only difference being that 
the two probe levels were collapsed together when comparing performance in 
the experimental trials with performance in the catch trials. 
Results - Experiment 9 
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Exclusions. Eleven participants were excluded based on the exclusion 
criteria. 
 
Main analyses. Participants detected 82% (SD = 15%) of displacements 
in the catch trials and 58% (SD = 8%) in the experimental trials. Responses 
were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with Intention (“I’ll take it” vs. 
“I’ll leave it”), Action Direction (reach vs. withdrawal) and Probe Direction 
(‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) as factors. The ‘same’ probes were not analysed. 
There was a significant effect of Probe Direction, F(1,23) = 68.6, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.749, 95% CI [20, 32], as expected backward displacements were detected more 
often than forward displacements, replicating the representational momentum 
effect. Crucially there was a three-way interaction between Intention, Action 
Direction and Probe Direction, F(1,23) = 14.9, p = .001, ηp2 = .395, 95% CI [10, 
30], showing that representational momentum increased when action and 
intention matched (see Figure 17). There were no further main effects or 
interactions, all F < 1.89, all p > .182. 
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Figure 17. The interaction between prior expectation and action direction 
on the size of the representational momentum effect (‘backward’ probe detections 
– ‘forward’ probe detections) in Experiment 9. Participants heard “I’ll take it” if 
the object was safe and “I’ll leave it”if the object was dangerous. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Results - Experiment 10 
 
 
Exclusions. Seven participants were excluded based on the exclusion 
criteria. 
 
Main analyses. In the catch trials 82% (SD = 15%) of displacements were 
detected, while in the experimental trials 55% (SD = 17%) were detected. The 
proportion of displacements were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA 
with Intention “I’ll take it”, “I’ll leave it”), Action Direction (reach, withdrawal), 
Object Type (safe, painful) and Probe Direction (‘forward’ vs. ‘backward’) as 
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factors. There was a significant effect of Probe Direction, F(1,24) = 53.5, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .690, 95% CI [20, 35], once again replicating the representational 
momentum effect. Most importantly though, there was once again a three-way 
interaction between Intention, Action Direction and Probe Direction, F(1,24) = 
7.61, p = .011, ηp2 = .241, 95% CI [4, 21] (see Figure 18). Like Experiment 9, the 
representational momentum effect was larger when action and intention 
matched, compared to when they did not match. There were no further main 
effects or interactions, all F < 2. 
 
 
Figure 18. The interaction between prior expectation and action direction 
on the size of the representational momentum effect (‘backward’ probe detections 
– ‘forward’ probe detections) in Experiment 10. Participants heard “Take it” or 
“Leave it” independently of whether the object was safe or painful to grasp. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Discussion 
 
 
The two auditory experiments replicate the robust representational 
momentum effect found in the first three experiments, with once again 
‘backward’ probes more likely to elicit a response than ‘forward’ probes. More 
interestingly, the present two experiments provide evidence that forward bias 
can be affected by the prior stated intentions of the observed, even when this is 
task-irrelevant in Experiment 10. Participants were more likely to misperceive 
the observed action as further along its trajectory when they heard a verbal 
statement that matched the intention of the subsequently observed reach. 
Building on the finding that verbally produced statements can modulate the 
perception of another’s action, these results suggest that the modulation of 
perception can be affected automatically. Hearing verbal intentions in line with 
the subsequent observed movement increased representational momentum 
even when there was no overt requirement to process the audio stimuli. This 
demonstrates the automaticity of these predictions and their sensitivity to 
intentional language. It shows moreover that predictions relating to observed 
actions are informed not only by self-generated expectations (Experiments 6-8) 
but also by expectations generated by the verbal stated intentions of the 
observed (Experiments 9 and10). Taken together these findings emphasise that 
social perception can modulate the perception of biological movements in line 
with higher-level inputs based upon intentions.  
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General Discussion  
 
 
The findings of the five studies presented here have demonstrated a 
robust representational momentum effect and can be seen as strong evidence 
that the perception of biological motion, like object motion, is subject to a 
perceptual bias in line with the direction of motion. This supports the idea that 
we predict the movement of other people’s bodies in line with prior knowledge. 
More importantly, the current findings provide the first evidence that such 
predictions are sensitive to prior expectations of intention generated by 
language. In the first three experiments verbal statements performed by the 
participant prior to any observed arm movement altered their subsequent 
judgments of where the movement ended. When observed movements were in 
line with the intention of the verbal statement representational momentum 
increased, compared to when they contradicted the verbalised intention. This 
shows that expectations generated by the participant affected their subsequent 
perception. This is evidence not only that we predict, but that social cues, such 
as language, can directly affect these predictions. Such an assertion is further 
supported by the finding in later experiments that the same effect is present 
when verbal statements were only heard, as if from the observed actor, 
demonstrating that intentional cues affect prediction automatically. These 
results support the idea that language production and comprehension rely on 
an integrated system, which is directly linked to action prediction (Wolpert, 
Doya & Kawato, 2003; Springer, Huttenlocher & Prinz, 2012;).  
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The current findings also support recent models of prediction, in which 
higher-level knowledge interacts with, and guides, perceptual experience 
(Grush, 2004; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010). 
They extend these ideas to include processing and understanding the actions of 
others. Here, the expected intentions of the observed actor facilitated the 
generation of predictions about how the action might continue, which are 
incorporated with incoming sensory information. When the expected intention 
and observed movement are in line, perceived displacements that contradict 
expectations (‘backward’ probes) result in a prediction error, while 
displacements in line with expectations (‘forward’ probes) remain undetected. 
When intention and movement contradict one another, detection of 
displacements is more equatable, resulting in reduced representational 
momentum. While previous research studying prediction errors in visual 
perception have concentrated on low-level aspects such as local movement 
(Roach et al., 2011) or the probability of presentation (Summerfield et al., 
2006), these findings show that similar perceptual effects can result from 
higher-level expectations, and emphasise the importance of prior expectations 
during social perception. This supports recent theories of social cognition that 
emphasise the importance of top-down expectancies when understanding the 
actions of others (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Bach et al., 2014).  
 
The studies in this chapter demonstrate that bottom-up perception can 
be altered through top-down prior expectations established by verbal cues. 
Moreover, the results of Experiment 8 showed that the verbal cues generated 
these top-down expectancies themselves and did not require a connection to 
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the object. However, current theories of object processing suggest that they are 
important drivers of action predictions (van Elk, van Schie & Bekkering, 2014; 
Bach et al., 2014). Indeed, a number of studies have provided evidence that 
objects automatically potentiate motor programs related to the objects’ 
affordance, facilitating perception (Bub et al., 2008; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; 
Riddoch, Edwards, Humphreys, West, & Heafield, 1998), and that such 
affordances are also derived for objects near other people (for a review, Creem-
Regehr, Gagnon, Geuss, & Stefanucci, 2013). 
 
In the present studies, while objects were always present, the actions 
related to them were always preceded by a verbal cue. Moreover, the object 
type was only independent of the action direction in two of the experiments 
(Experiments 8 and 10). While the object type interacted with the verbal cue 
and probe direction in Experiment 8 this was independent of the action 
direction, making any interpretation in relation to top-down predictions 
meaningless. Moreover, there were no interactions involving object type in 
Experiment 10. Therefore, it is impossible to know from these studies whether 
objects do not affect predictive processing or whether the verbal cues in the 
current experimental set-up were just stronger intentional cues. Indeed, this 
latter explanation is supported by evidence, which suggests that short-term 
action intentions can override long-term semantic knowledge (van Elk et al., 
2008).  
 
The findings from Chapter 3 failed to show consistently that objects and 
the actions they afford alter predictive processing, but the cue of grip type may 
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have been too subtle. A more effective way to investigate the role of objects in 
prediction using the representational momentum paradigm would be to 
compare how object presence affects expectations of intention. In the 
experiments outlined above, the verbal cue defined the intention, whereas by 
comparing representational momentum when observing reaches to objects 
against reaches to empty space, the object itself defines the intention. 
Therefore, one would expect that reaches to an object would be viewed as 
including a clear intention, whereas a reach to empty space does not. If objects 
are important to predictions, representational momentum should be greater 
when reaches are object-directed compared to when they are not. 
 
In conclusion, while the present studies show that prior expectations 
established through language can increase predictive processing of an actor’s 
arm, they leave open the role of objects within this process. To test this, the 
next chapter set out to investigate how object presence affected predictive 
processing by directly comparing representational momentum when observing 
object-directed reaches compared to reaches to empty space.  
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Chapter 5 - The effect of object cues on visual and 
tactile perception 
 
The experiments in Chapter 4 have confirmed the tendency for 
participants to predict the actions of others further into the future, and 
uncovered that this tendency is enhanced when they match prior expectations 
of intention. They have therefore provided the first evidence that cues of 
intention can modulate predictive processing. Interestingly, these verbal cues 
were shown to be independent of the type of object present (Experiments 8 and 
10), suggesting that objects are not an important cue to intention. However, this 
is at odds with prior research, which suggests that seeing an object 
automatically elicits motor knowledge thought to result from its affordances, as 
well as the action goals it helps to achieve, and that this also occurs when 
observing other people near objects (for a review, see Bach et al., 2014; Tucker 
& Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004; Vainio, Tucker & Ellis, 2007; Stoffregen, Gorday, 
Sheng, & Flynn, 1999; Costantini et al, 2011; Cardellicchio et al, 2013) 
 
If objects do activate object affordances when observing somebody else 
interacting with them then they should act as a cue to the action and generate a 
top-down prediction of what might happen next. In previous experiments 
objects were always present but varied with regard to their painfulness 
(Chapter 4). Based on a previous study, it was expected that reaches to painful 
objects would not elicit the same affordances for reaches toward them (Anelli et 
al., 2012). Yet, only the intentional statements, not object type, were found to 
modulate predictions of further movement. One reason may have been because 
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while the objects were processed semantically for the task, the subsequent 
action intention induced by the verbal cue overruled any semantic effect (van 
Elk et al., 2008).  
 
One way to investigate the role of objects as an intentional cue is to 
measure the effect of object presence on action perception. A new experiment 
was designed to compare visual perceptual prediction when an object is 
present with when no object is present (pantomime action). Participants were 
presented with reaches to objects and the same reaches into empty space, 
based on the assumption that an object-directed reach would be viewed as 
having a clear intention, whereas a reach to empty space would be seen as 
having no clear intention. Thus, if objects provide such cues to intention during 
action observation, object presence should increase perceptual predictions, and 
thereby representational momentum. In contrast, when the object is absent any 
perceptual prediction is likely to be reduced due to the lack of clear intention, 
and result in a decrease in representational momentum 
 
The focus on object presence allowed a secondary question to be 
investigated as well. According to prediction theories (Friston, 2010; Friston & 
Stephan, 2007; Panichello et al., 2013), and seen in the last chapter, top-down 
expectations affect perceptual judgements. These top-down predictions are 
informed by intentional cues, such as the verbal instructions of the participants 
or the utterances of the observed actors. However, at least some of these cues – 
the objects from which the intentions were derived – were present from before 
action onset till just before appearance of the probes.  Yet, if the observed 
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forward predictions truly stem from top-down expectations, then they should 
be observed both when the relevant cue is currently present during the 
perception of the action and when it is absent, and only known about. With 
regard to the present experiment, this would suggest that object presence 
should affect forward prediction of movement, both when the goal object of the 
action is present in the scene, and when it is only known to be present.  
 
A study investigating mirror neurons in the macaque monkey by Umilta 
and colleagues (2001) shed some light on this issue. They demonstrated 
activation of ‘mirror neurons’ when the monkey observed grasps of an object, 
but not when observing pantomimed grasps. Interestingly, when object and 
destination of the pantomimed grasp were occluded prior to the reach, mirror 
neuron responses showed the same pattern, firing for real but not pantomimed 
grasps, even though the bottom-up visual input in both conditions was now 
identical. This suggests that the firing pattern of the mirror neurons does 
indeed reflect primarily top-down responses, that reflect higher-level 
understanding of the event, and which fill in the action information that could 
not be derived from direct visual experience (Csibra, 2007). However, as this is 
a monkey single cell study caution should be applied to any interpretation. 
While mirror neuron activity has previously been seen as equivocal with action 
understanding, there is now much discussion about what mirror neuron firing 
represents (Csibra, 2007; Heyes, 2010). However, in humans it has indeed been 
shown that observation of an action towards an occluded object, compared to a 
pantomime action, activates part of the somatosensory cortex implying some 
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form of prediction of the sensory consequences of the observed action in the 
absence of any direct vision of it (Turella et al, 2011).  
 
Therefore, a modified version of the experimental paradigm used in the 
Umilta study was run with the representational momentum methodology. 
Stimuli consisted of reaches towards an object or the same reach towards an 
empty space. In addition, half the time, prior to the beginning of the reach, the 
object or empty space could be hidden by an occluder. This meant that an 
observer would only know whether an object was present or absent in the 
occluded trials, but would not have direct bottom-up access to that information 
when observing the movement. This allowed firstly a more direct test of 
whether objects can serve as an intentional cue in their own right, and secondly, 
whether knowledge of an intentional cue in the absence of direct bottom-up 
sensory information can modulate top-down predictive processing. 
 
Experiment 11 – Object as cue for intentionality 
 
 
Object presence itself was used to manipulate intentionality, based on 
the assumption that predictive processing should be evident when observing an 
intentional reach (object-directed) compared to a non-intentional reach 
(directed to empty space). Participants observed an actor reach across a table 
either towards an object or towards empty space. If reaches towards objects are 
perceived as more intentional, they should elicit more representational 
momentum than reaches to empty space, demonstrating the role of the object 
as an intentional cue. In addition, observed reaches were either fully visible or 
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their target was hidden behind an occluder. If prior knowledge of the object’s 
presence is sufficient to initiate predictive processing then representational 
momentum should be larger when an object is present in the occluded 
condition compared to when observers only know of its presence. If however, 
predictive processing relies on constant bottom-up sensory information then 
representational momentum should not be affected by object presence in the 
occluded conditions. 
 
A concern from the opening studies was the processing of the object 
itself. As the verbal cue, which was used to achieve this in the previous chapter, 
could not be used here, an alternative solution was required to ensure object 
presence was processed. Therefore a catch trial question was added after 
performing the representational momentum task (in 20% of the trials) that 
asked the participant whether, in the just seen action, the object was present or 
absent. This forced participants to remember whether an object was hidden 
behind the occluder; they could not simply ignore it. 
 
Method 
 
 
Participants. 29 participants took part in Experiment 11. Participants 
were made up of students from Plymouth University or members of the public 
from the wider Plymouth community and they took part in exchange for 
participation points or payment (£8 p/h). All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, were native English speakers and right handed. All provided 
written informed consent before participating and were debriefed at the end of 
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the experiment. The study was approved by the University of Plymouth’s ethics 
committee. One participant failed the training session leaving Experiment 11 
with 28 participants (4 males, mean age = 21.1 years, SD = 5.9) 
 
Stimuli and apparatus. Stimuli were filmed with a Casio Exilim EX-ZR100 
at a high-speed frame rate of 240 frames per second and edited using Moviedek 
and Corel PaintShop Photo Pro x6. They consisted of a side on view of a man sat 
at a table reaching with his right hand towards one of four different objects 
(orange, stapler, book, coke bottle) positioned in the same location (see Figure 
19). In addition, a video was filmed where an occluder (two black lever arch box 
files attached together) was pushed into the scene from the opposite side of the 
table to hide the space where the four objects were located while the man 
remained static. Every 12th frame (representing a 50ms step in real time) was 
extracted from each video, and 14 images were chosen for each action that 
spanned the trajectory, from the start of the reach to approximately half way 
through its trajectory towards the target location.  
 
These images were then duplicated and in one set the object was 
digitally removed, resulting in two sets of 14 images where the same reaches 
either directed to an object or empty space. The first image of the each 
sequence, where the hand was rested still on the table, was used as the basis for 
the occluder movies. Upon it the occluder was pasted at different stages of its 
trajectory across the table until it obscured the whole of the object, creating 13 
new images for each action sequence. Next, each of 14 images for each action 
sequence had the occluder inserted before the start of the sequence. This 
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resulted in 27 images for each action sequence, 13 where the actor was still and 
the occluder emerged into the picture and 14 showing the reach towards the 
now hidden target location. This resulted in 4 sets of images, one for each 
condition. 2 sets of 14 images (spanning 700ms) for the two visible conditions 
(object/no object), where the target location (object or empty space) was 
visible, and 2 sets of 27 images (spanning 1350ms, 650ms of occlusion) where 
the object or empty space was hidden prior to the onset of the reach (see Figure 
19, panel C). Four different sequence lengths were used ranging from 5-11 
frames in length and proceeding in one frame steps.  
 
As in the earlier experiments, the probe image could either be the same 
as the last image of the action sequence (same probe), or different. When the 
probe was different, again it could either be further forward along its trajectory 
in a future position (forward probe) or back along the trajectory in a past 
position (backward probe). As in the experiments from Chapter 4, different 
probes were chosen as the future or past frames in the sequence rather than 
modifying the last image. Different probes varied between 2 or 3 (depending 
upon calibration, see below) frames in distance from the last image of the action 
sequence in experimental trials. The experiment was administered using a 22-
inch Philips Brilliance 221P3LPY monitor (resolution: 1920 X 1080, refresh 
rate: 60 Hz) using Presentation software (Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc.). 
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Figure 19. A: The four target objects (orange, book, coke, stapler) used in 
experiments 11-13. B: Trial sequence for the non-occluded conditions of a reach 
towards an object (upper row) and empty space (lower row), followed by a blank 
screen, the probe stimulus and then the catch trial question. In this example, the 
upper row shows a forward probe (+2) and the lower shows a backward probe (-
2).C: Trial sequence for the occluded conditions of a reach towards an occluded 
object (upper row) and occluded empty space (lower row), followed by a blank 
screen, the probe stimulus and then the catch trial question. In this example, the 
upper row shows a backward probe (-2) and the lower shows a forward probe 
(+2). 
 
Design & procedure. Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from 
a colour monitor, and were given written and verbal instructions. The 
experiment began with a training session comprised of 3 training blocks (each 
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24 trials) that measured participants’ ability to discriminate between the 
different types of probe. The first block contained different probes that were 4 
frames from last image, and with each subsequent block they became closer to 
the same probe (+/-4, +/-3, +/-2). This meant that in the first block different 
probes were easier to judge, and with each block the task became harder.  
 
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms. 
Then, a blank screen was presented for 500 ms, before the action sequence was 
displayed with each image presented for 50ms. After the last image of the 
sequence was displayed, a blank screen was presented for 250ms, before a 
probe image was displayed (distance of different probes varying as specified 
above). All action sequences were presented along the vertical midline of the 
screen, but, as in the experiments of Chapter 4, the position along the X axis 
varied across trials and across the full length of the axis, thereby increasing 
variation and maintaining the participant’s attention. Participants’ task was to 
press the spacebar with their left hand if they thought the probe was in a 
different position to its last position, and not respond if they thought the probe 
was in the same position. Participants had 3,000 ms in which to make a 
response.  
 
Participants who did not meet the inclusion criteria did not proceed to 
the main experiment (see below). The main experimental session was identical 
to the training session, apart from one important change, the requirement of a 
post judgement question. In order to direct participants’ attention to the 
presence of an object, a catch trial question was added after the end of every 
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trial. Participants were asked ‘Was an object present?’ and asked to press the Y 
key for yes, when an object was present, and the N key for no, when no object 
was present. Participants had 2,000 ms in which to make this response. 
 
The main experimental session began with computer driven 
instructions, before a short training phase of 8 training trials that allowed 
participants to get used to the catch trial question. The experimental session 
consisted of 192 experimental trials with each stimulus combination shown 
once (4 objects,  4 conditions, 4 movie lengths, 3 probe types). The experiment 
was split into 3 blocks of 64 trials with breaks available in between blocks. The 
whole experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Inclusion criteria. Like the experiments from Chapter 4, performance on 
the training session was rated on two measures, accuracy and sensitivity. 
Accuracy was merely the average of correct responses across all probe types. 
Sensitivity was calculated by subtracting the percentage of “same” responses 
when the probe was different from the percentage of “same” responses when 
the probe was the same. If participant performance within a block dropped 
below chance on either accuracy (50%) or sensitivity (0%) the block was failed. 
Participants only proceeded to the main experiment if they passed at least 
block +/-3. If a participant passed block  +/-3, but not +/-2, then their 
experimental session was set at +/-3. However, if block +/-2 was also passed 
then their experimental session was set at +/-2. In the experimental session if a 
participant’s catch trial accuracy was 1SD below the mean group accuracy they 
were excluded. 
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Results 
 
 
Exclusions. In line with the inclusion criteria, two participants were 
excluded after the experimental session. This left 26 participants whose data 
was analysed. 
 
Main analyses. Participants detected 72% (SD = 11%) of displacements 
in the experimental session. Responses were entered into a repeated measures 
ANOVA with Intention (intentional/object vs. non-intentional/no object), 
Visibility (visible vs. occluded) and Probe Direction (forward vs. backward) as 
factors. The “same” probes were not analysed. There was a significant effect of 
Probe Direction, F(1,25) = 65.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .725, 95% CI [28, 46]. Backward 
displacements were detected more often than forward displacements, 
replicating the representational momentum effect. However, neither the main 
effect of Intention, F(1, 25) = 2.29, p = 0.142, ηp2 = .084, 95% CI [-5, 10], nor the 
two-way interaction between Intention and Probe Direction, F(1, 25) = 0.44, p = 
0.514, ηp2 = .017, 95% CI [-3, 7], was significant (see Figure 20). There were no 
other significant effects, all F’s< 0.682. 
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Figure 20. The size of the representational momentum effect (‘backward’ 
probe detections – ‘forward’ probe detections) when observing a reach toward an 
object (Intentional, black bars) or empty space (Non-Intentional, white bars), 
when the target location was either visible (left bars) or occluded (right bars) in 
Experiment 11. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The results of Experiment 11 replicate the previous studies in 
demonstrating a robust representational momentum effect when observing the 
object-directed actions of others, but extend these findings to actions where the 
whole of the actor’s body is visible. In addition, it extends them by showing 
biological representational momentum exists also when the actions are 
presented in real time. However, crucially no effect of intention was found. 
While intentional actions – those directed towards an object – again elicited 
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more representational momentum numerically than non-intentional actions 
directed into empty space, and this held regardless of visibility, there was no 
statistical difference between them.  
 
These findings suggest that object presence is not a strong enough 
intentional cue to generate expectations concerning the observed action and 
increase perceptual prediction. However, previous research has shown that 
objects can activate affordances even for the potential actions of others 
(Stoffregen et al, 1999; Costantini et al, 2011; Cardellicchio et al, 2013), and the 
tactile consequences of observed actions, even when object presence is only 
known about but not seen (Turella, et al., 2011). These studies suggest that 
objects do serve as a basis for predictions during action observation. But if this 
is the case, why was no effect of intention found here for object presence? 
 
One possibility is that the object was not processed fast enough to 
modulate visual predictive processing. In the visible conditions, participants 
could wait until the end of the sequence to process the object for the catch trial 
questions, as it was available throughout the action sequence. However, in the 
occluded conditions, object presence had to be processed prior to the reach, so 
here any effect of intention should have been present but was not.  
 
Alternatively, as reaches were kinematically identical, it may have been 
that action predictions were not distinct enough: in effect, both object-directed 
and non-object directed body movements were the same, compared to the 
categorically different reaches and withdrawals in the previous experiments. 
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Especially if one believes that predictions originate from higher-level codes 
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010), a categorical representation might be likely, where 
actions are distinguished by their gross movement patterns – such as towards 
or away from an object – rather than by subtle kinematic features, such as, 
perhaps, a slightly more determined motion towards present compared to 
absent objects. 
 
The above issues therefore suggest that the representational momentum 
paradigm may not be the best method to identify differences in top-down and 
bottom-up perceptual about object presence. While any visual predictions may 
have been similar regardless of whether an object was present or absent, tactile 
predictions associated with the sensory consequences the action – whether 
contact happens or does not – should be far more distinct, and again reflect a 
categorical difference between predictions in the two conditions. Therefore, 
one way to address these issues is to shift the paradigm from a purely visual 
representational momentum task to a cross modal tactile paradigm. This would 
allow a different test of whether differences in visual perceptual prediction are 
produced by object presence by measuring how they affect tactile perception.   
 
Tactile responses are a good candidate for investigating the impact of 
action observation because they are both embodied and perceptual, allowing an 
insight into how much participants ‘feel’ the action they see. A number of 
studies have demonstrated that observing touch activates somatosensory areas 
of the brain, and can enhance touch perception (Bufalari et al, 2007; Serino, 
Pizzoferrato & Làdavas, 2008; Cardini, Tajadura-Jiménez, Serino & Tsakiris, 
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2013; Morrison et al, 2013; Bach, Fenton-Adams & Tipper, 2014). Tactile 
perception is also enhanced when the affected body part is visible during tactile 
stimulation (Haggard, 2006; Tipper et al, 2001). This suggests that different 
sensory inputs sum together for efficient perceptual processing. In this case, 
vision of touch enhances tactile perception. In fact, Haggard (2006) also found 
that the sight of another persons’ hand compared to the sight of an object 
improved tactile perception when one’s own hand was hidden, showing the 
extent to which bottom-up visual information can effect tactile perception. 
These studies therefore provide ample evidence that object-directed actions do 
elicit predictions about the sensory consequences of the action.  
 
Therefore, using the same stimuli as in the previous experiment, the 
following two studies investigated the role of object presence on tactile 
predictions by measuring participants tactile perception when observing an 
actor either reach to touch an object or reach into empty space. Previous 
research has shown that the somatosensory cortices are involved in object-
directed reaches, but not pantomimed reaches, suggesting a prediction of the 
resulting contact (Turella et al, 2011). The occluded conditions allowed 
investigation of whether these tactile predictions continue when touch cannot 
be seen but only inferred. 
 
In Experiment 12, participants had to detect supraliminal tactile 
stimulation while watching visible or occluded reaches towards objects or into 
empty space. Tactile detection times were compared, in order to test if 
predicted contact speeds up detection of tactile stimulation, both when contact 
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was observed and supplied top-down. In light of the findings of the Umilta 
study (2001), the hypothesis was that object presence would lead to faster 
detections to tactile stimulation, both in the visible and the occluded conditions. 
This would provide evidence that object presence does affect perception, 
suggesting that objects do provide a cue for predictions. 
 
In Experiment 13 the same experimental set up was employed, but 
stimulation was administered at detection threshold, to conduct a signal 
detection analysis to measure the sensitivity and biases of tactile perception 
when object presence and bottom-up and top-down information varied. Again it 
was hypothesised that detection profiles would be affected similarly by object 
presence, across conditions of object visibility. 
 
These experiments therefore allow testing whether prediction of object 
contact affect the observers’ own tactile processes, and whether these effects 
differ for bottom-up and top-down guided predictions of contact. While the 
prior mirror neuron work (Umilta et al., 2001) suggests that similar processes 
occur in the visible and occluded conditions, other findings pointing to altered 
processing in the top-down cases. For example, Avenanti and colleagues (2013) 
reported that, when visual processing of an action was disrupted via TMS to the 
superior temporal sulcus, tactile-motor processing was enhanced, as if tactile 
processing stood in for the missing visual information (Avenanti et al., 2013). 
Others have reported that the anticipation – but not perception – of the 
consequences of one’s own actions often lead to changes in sensitivity, rather 
than the changes in response bias reported above for directly observed contact 
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(Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2014; van Ede, Jensen & Maris, 2010; van Ede, de 
Lange & Maris, 2014).  
 
Experiment 12 – Object cue – Tactile reaction time 
 
 
The aim of Experiment 12 was to assess detection times to tactile 
stimulation on participants’ own finger when observing the actions of others, in 
conditions where object presence and bottom-up information varied. The 
observed actions were identical to those used in Experiment 12, apart from in 
two aspects (see Figure 20). Firstly, in order to make sure all conditions were 
matched temporally to control for sequence length and level of motion in the 
scene, here the non-occluded conditions were lengthened. The images depicting 
the introduction of the occluder from the occluded conditions were reversed 
and added to the non-occluded conditions, so that the object or empty space 
began occluded and was revealed before the action onset. Secondly, instead of 
the reach stopping mid-way through, it continued until just prior to contact 
with the object. In all conditions at this point, the scene disappeared and 
participants had to respond as fast as possible if they detected tactile 
stimulation on their finger. If stimulation occurred it always happened 
immediately after the end of the movie, which in the case of reaches to objects 
coincided with the moment of touch. This allowed the investigation of how the 
prediction of touch affected one’s own tactile perception.  
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Previous research has shown that the observation of touch can facilitate 
one’s own perception of touch, providing evidence that we predict the sensory 
consequences of others’ actions (Serino et al., 2008; Serino, Giovagnoli & 
Làdavas, 2009; Cardini, Bertini, Serino & Làdavas, 2012; Bach, Fenton-Adams & 
Tipper, 2014). Therefore, it was hypothesised that responses to tactile 
stimulation would be faster when observing a reach to touch an object, 
compared to a reach to empty space. This would support the notion that the 
consequences of touch are predicted when observing the actions of others, 
using one’s own sensory-tactile system, and would provide evidence that, 
contrary to the results of experiment 11, objects do act as a cue for predictive 
processing. 
 
In addition, as before, in half the trials the reaches were fully visible 
while in the other half an occluder obscured the location of the end of the 
action, and therefore whether contact occurred, from view. This allowed the 
comparison of top-down predictions of touch when the amount of bottom-up 
information varied. In the visible condition all of the action up until the moment 
of contact was available so that touch was all but observed, and could therefore 
be predicted bottom-up from sensory information. In contrast, in the occluded 
condition, the end of the action was hidden from view, so that touch could only 
be predicted based on prior knowledge of object presence. The comparison of 
observed and predicted touches (relative to observed and predicted reaches 
into empty space) allowed the investigation of how top-down prior knowledge 
alters one’s own perception. 
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Figure 21. A: Schematic of the design of Experiment 12 and 13. 
Participants watched reaches towards objects or into empty space while the point 
of contact was either fully visible or hidden behind an occluder. Just before contact 
would be made, the scene disappeared and participants had to detect either above 
threshold (Experiment 12) or at threshold (Experiment 13) tactile stimulation on 
their own fingers (administered in 50% of trials). In 20% of trials, a catch trial 
question was presented afterwards, asking participants whether the action they 
just saw was directed at an object or empty space (“Was the action real or 
pantomimed?”). B: Schematic illustration of the experimental setup showing 
stimulator attached to index finger of right hand and left hand over the spacebar 
to report a tactile detection. 
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Method 
 
 
Participants. 36 (26 females, mean age = 20.2 years, SD = 4.3) 
participants took part in the experiment. Participants were recruited and 
rewarded in the same manner as Experiment 11, adhering to the same ethical 
guidelines and participant requirements. 
 
Stimuli and apparatus. The stimuli and apparatus were identical to 
Experiment 11 apart from the following. 
 
In order to control for the different length of the conditions within 
Experiment 11 here all conditions were made temporally equivalent. To 
achieve this the opening frames from the occluded conditions were reversed 
and added to the start of the non-occluded conditions. This meant that the 
object or empty space began occluded before the occluder moved out of the 
frame to reveal the object or empty space before the action started (see Figure 
21). This made all conditions temporally identical. 
 
In addition to this for each reach extra frames were extracted, so that the 
whole of the action was present in the action sequence up to until just prior to 
object contact (see Figure 21). As before, for the occluded conditions, the extra 
frames of the sequence were modified using Corel PaintShop Photo Pro x6 to 
include the occluder in the image. Due to the slightly different lengths of the 
reaches towards the four different objects this resulted in 3 different sequence 
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lengths ranging from 18 frames (900ms) to 24 frames (1200ms) with identical 
sequence lengths in the object present and object absent conditions. 
 
Tactile stimulation was delivered via a custom-built amplifier and Oticon 
BC462 bone conductors (100 X), which were attached with a gauze band to the 
underside of the tip of the participants’ right index fingers. The bone 
conductors convert auditory input from the computer’s sound card into 
vibrations that can be varied in terms of frequency and amplitude. The tactile 
stimulus was a 200 Hz sine wave overlaid with white noise of 50ms duration. 
The first and last 10ms were faded in and out to prevent sharp transients. 
 
Design & procedure. Participants were seated in a dimly lit room facing a 
colour monitor at a distance of 60 cm. After the experiment had been verbally 
explained to participants, the tactile stimulators were connected to their right 
index finger and ear defenders were placed over their ears to block out 
background noise. First, a calibration was performed to find participants 
approximate detection threshold. The tactile stimuli to be used in the main 
experiment were administered in a constant stream every 1000ms. Stimulation 
began at the lowest intensity and was slowly increased until the participant 
reliably detected the stimulation. This stimulation level was then used for the 
main experiment.  
 
The main experimental session began with computer driven 
instructions, before a short training phase of 8 training trials (4 with 
stimulation). During the training, the catch trial question was administered in 
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every trial in order to train participants to pay attention to the presence or 
absence of an object. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross 
for 500ms. After a 300ms blank screen, the stimulus sequence was presented 
(1,550-1850ms total), followed by a 750ms blank screen. The tactile 
stimulation was administered 100ms after the start of this blank screen in 50% 
of the trials. Participants were asked to press the space bar as quickly as 
possible if they detected stimulation. Participants had 2,000ms in which to 
make a response. Like in Experiment 11, in order to direct participants’ 
attention to the presence of an object a catch trial question (“Was the action 
real or pantomimed?”) was asked at the end of the trial. The question asked was 
changed from the previous experiment in order to try and encourage 
participants to process the object in terms of its consequences to the action 
rather than its mere presence. Participants were instructed that a reach 
towards to an object was a “real” action and a reach towards empty space was a 
“pantomimed” action. Unlike the previous experiment this time the catch trial 
question was presented randomly with a 20% chance in each trial.  
 
A total of 256 trials were presented in the main experimental session, in 
which each of the four conditions was presented at equal rates in a randomized 
order. Half the trials included stimulation (128 trials) while the other half 
included no stimulation. Stimulation was administered at the previously 
calibrated threshold intensity. The whole experiment lasted approximately 25 
minutes. 
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Results 
 
 
Exclusions. As the stimulation intensity was supraliminal, it should have 
been obvious for participants to detect, and this was reflected in the overall hit 
rate (M= 92%, SD= 16%). However, due to experimenter error, for some 
participants a too low stimulation intensity was chosen and this was reflected 
in hit rates well below 90%. These participants were excluded. In addition, our 
catch trial question (“Was the action real or pantomimed?”) was designed to 
both draw attention to the presence or absence of the object, but also to 
measure task attention. Therefore participants whose catch trial accuracy was 
below 75% were also excluded, resulting in 2 further exclusions. The data of the 
remaining 27 participants’ data was analysed fully. The percentage of hits to 
stimulation for these participants was 98%, and their mean question accuracy 
was 94%.  
 
Reaction times. The data for reaction times, hits and false alarms for 
these participants were then entered into separate 2 x 2 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors Object Presence (present or 
absent) and Visibility (revealed and occluded). The ANOVA revealed no main 
effect of Visibility, F(1,26)  = 0.48 , p = 0.52, ηp2 =0.02, 95% CI [-7, 15]. There 
was, however, a main effect of Object Presence, F(1,26) = 8.57, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 
0.25, 95% CI [6, 29], with participants detecting tactile stimulation more 
quickly when  viewing object-directed reaches compared to reaches into empty 
space. In addition, there was a significant interaction of Visibility and Object 
Presence, F(1,26) = 5.03, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.16, 95% CI [2, 29], indicating a larger 
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effect of object presence for occluded relative to fully visible objects. Indeed, 
paired t-tests showed that object presence had only a numerical effect on tactile 
detection for fully visible actions, t(26)= 1.37, p = 0.18. For occluded actions, 
however, participants detected tactile stimulation more quickly when viewing 
object-directed actions compared to reaches into empty space, t(26)= 3.79, p = 
0.001 (see Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22. Mean detection times for tactile stimuli depending on whether 
participants viewed reaches towards objects (black bars) or into empty space 
(white bars), depending on whether the region of contact was visible (left bars) or 
occluded (right bars) in Experiment 12. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Hits. As the stimulation was supraliminal, there was little variation in 
hits between conditions. There were no significant effects, all F’s <0.68.  
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False alarms. As stimulation was supraliminal, false alarms were rare (M 
= 1%, SD = 1). Nevertheless, there was a trend towards a main effect of 
visibility, F(1,26) = 3.98, p = 0.06, ηp2 = 0.12, 95% CI [0, 1], with more false 
alarms when the end point of the action was visible than when it was occluded. 
There was also a trend towards an interaction, F(1,26) = 3.46, p = 0.07, ηp2 = 
0.12, 95% CI [0, 2]. Subsequent paired t-tests revealed that, in the visible 
conditions, there was a trend for participants to falsely report more stimulation 
when observing object-directed reaches compared to reaches into empty space, 
t(26)= 1.69, p = 0.10. In contrast, for occluded actions, numerically fewer false 
alarms were made for object-directed reaches, compared to reaches into empty 
space, t(26)= 1.36, p = 0.19. The main effect of object was not significant, F = 
0.45, p = 0.51. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The results of the current experiment showed, as expected, that 
observing an actor’s reach to grasp an object resulted in the faster detection of 
tactile stimulation on one’s own finger, compared to when observing the same 
reach directed into empty space. This demonstrates the effect of object 
presence on tactile perception and can be taken as evidence that predictions of 
contact facilitate tactile perception. In all conditions, the time when stimulation 
would occur was the same, so participants could anticipate the time of 
stimulation regardless of the condition. Despite this, when an object was 
present, reaction times were faster. This complements prior research that has 
shown that the observation of touch can speed up tactile perception on one’s 
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own finger (Bach, Fenton-Adams & Tipper, 2014). It also fits with prior 
research showing perceptual resonance when observing the actions of others 
that is taken as evidence for motor matching (for a review see Avenanti, Candidi 
& Urgesi, 2013). However, of importance here is that the current experiment 
provides evidence for perceptual - rather than motor - prediction, as the 
expectation of touch facilitated tactile detections. 
 
Interestingly, in the occluded conditions, when the end of the action was 
hidden during action observation, knowledge of object presence led to even 
faster detection of tactile stimulation compared to reaches to empty space, even 
though visually the actions were identical in both conditions. There are two 
possibilities to account for this finding. One possibility is that, in the occluded 
conditions, predictive processing was more necessary, because crucial parts of 
the action – the goal object – was missing from view. Predictive coding might 
therefore have been explicitly recruited in these conditions to fill in the missing 
information. The larger decrease in response times to object-directed reaches 
in the occluded conditions would therefore reflect this increase in predictive 
processing due to the reduced visual information.  
 
Alternatively, however, it might be that top-down and bottom-up 
predictions of contact rely on different mechanisms, and the false alarm data do 
provide preliminary evidence for this idea. In the visible conditions, object 
presence increased false alarms, while in the occluded conditions object 
presence decreased false alarms numerically. This implies that object presence 
may produce different effects depending upon visibility, as it suggests that 
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when the object is visible, tactile stimulation is detected faster but also induces 
false alarm when this is none, in line with prior work that visual information 
about other’s hand-object contact lowers one’s own tactile detection threshold 
(Bach et al., 2014; Morrison et al., 2013), In contrast, in the occluded condition, 
object presence leads to faster detections but with better accuracy, reflected in 
a relative decrease of false alarms. This is suggestive of an increase in 
sensitivity, in line with other research that has reported such sensitivity shifts 
for anticipated effects of one’s own actions (Desantis et al., 2014). 
 
Of course, as stimulation was supraliminal, false alarms were very rare. 
Caution should therefore be applied to any interpretation. In addition, the 
relevant interaction, while close, did not reach full statistical significance (p = 
.07). Despite this, when taken together the reaction time and false alarm data 
suggest that the differences observed reflect different processes in tactile 
perception depending upon the amount of visual information available. To 
investigate this more directly, a second experiment was conducted in which 
tactile perception was measured at detection threshold, which allowed a signal 
detection analysis to be run, which can dissociate effects on detection threshold 
and sensitivity.  
 
Experiment 13 – Object cue – Tactile Signal detection  
 
 
Based on the findings of Experiment 12 the detection time effect of 
object presence on tactile perception is enhanced when the end of the action is 
occluded. This was an interesting finding and one that suggested either that (1) 
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top-down predictive processing might be stronger when bottom-up 
information is reduced, or (2) that the effects in both conditions might emerge 
from different processes, one affecting detection thresholds and the other 
affecting tactile sensitivity. 
 
In order to better understand these differences a second experiment was 
run to investigate how the differences in visibility affected participants’ 
sensitivity to tactile stimulation and detection thresholds. To do this, the 
strength and variety of stimulation was varied. Experiment 13 was identical to 
experiment 12 apart from the fact that instead of administering supraliminal 
stimulation to participants’ fingers, stimulation was now at threshold (in fact, 
ranging in intensities from slightly above threshold to slightly below threshold). 
Applying stimulation at threshold allowed the running of a signal detection 
analysis that distinguishes two distinct factors determining responses to tactile 
stimulation: bias and sensitivity. Bias (c) measures the overall detection 
threshold: the amount of tactile evidence required for participants to report 
tactile stimulation. Within the current paradigm it allows the investigation of 
how far object presence alone increases the likelihood of a tactile stimulus 
being detected, while also providing potential evidence for illusory perception, 
in cases where visually perceived contact is enough to cause participants to 
report stimulation even though there was none (false alarms). 
 
Sensitivity (d-prime) measures the accuracy of detection, that is, correct 
responses to stimulation combined with correct no responses. This provides 
information about how accurate participants are at distinguishing stimulation 
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from the neuronal background noise when stimulation is absent. These 
measures should address the hypothesis motivated by experiment 12 that 
hand-object contact either produces different effects on tactile detection 
depending on whether it was directly observed or occluded, or whether it 
merely leads to stronger effects in the occluded conditions.  
 
Method 
 
 
Participants. 56 participants (11 males, mean age = 22.6 years, SD = 5.1) 
were recruited from the Plymouth University student participant pool and the 
wider Plymouth community. They received either course credit or payment (£8 
per hour) for participation. All were right handed, had normal or corrected to 
normal vision. All provided written informed consent prior to participation and 
were debriefed following completion of the experiment. 
 
Stimuli and apparatus. All stimuli and apparatus were identical to 
experiment 1. 
 
Design & procedure. The design of Experiment 13 was identical to 
Experiment 12 apart from one key difference. Rather than the stimulation being 
only supraliminal as in Experiment 12, five different stimulation levels were 
used (90%, 88%, 86%, 84%, 82%), representing a gradient of strength ranging 
from detectable, 90%, to undetectable (or barely detectable), 82%. Due to the 
increase in stimulation levels, trial numbers in the main experimental session 
were increased to 320, 160 with stimulation equally distributed across 
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stimulation levels and conditions, and 160 without stimulation. Participants 
were instructed to emphasise accuracy over response speed. The whole 
experiment lasted approximately 45 minutes.  
 
In order to validate the detection gradient, after the calibration session 
participants completed a simple tactile detection task lasting about 3 minutes. 
Participants were asked to press the space bar whenever they detected 
stimulation. To match the visual input to the main experiment, participants 
were instructed to look at their own hand during this procedure. Sixty tactile 
stimuli were delivered randomly in a constant train, every 1,500ms, with 36 
trials without stimulation randomly interspersed and participants pressed a 
space bar whenever they felt stimulation. After that, the experimenter analyzed 
the detection probabilities across these intensities. If the data showed a 
decrease from accurate detection at 90% stimulus intensity to chance 
performance at 82% stimulus intensity, the main experiment began. If no such 
decrease was detectable, a new calibration session was performed.  
 
Results 
 
 
Exclusions. To be considered for analysis, stimulation needed to be 
roughly at threshold. 5 participants with calibration errors, who detected 
stimulation almost never (< 5% of the trials), or in almost every trial (> 95%) 
were therefore excluded. Such data are inappropriate for signal detection 
analysis, for which cells with no misses or no hits need to be manually 
interpolated. Secondly, we excluded 4 participants that did not show at least a 
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minimum improvement (< 10%) of responses in trials with stimulation 
compared to trials without stimulation and which therefore showed a random 
response profile without staircase. Finally, as in Experiment 12, participants 
were excluded if they had catch trial accuracies below 75%. Unfortunately, in 
the current experiment, probably due to the more demanding at threshold 
detection task, participants found it harder to pay attention to object presence. 
A relative high number (8 participants) was excluded due to insufficient 
accuracy in the catch trials. The data of the remaining 39 participants for 
reaction times, hits and false alarms for these participants were then entered 
into separate 2 x 2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
factors object (object and no object) and visibility (revealed and occluded). 
 
Hits and false alarms. The analysis of Hits (correct detections) did 
neither reveal a main effect of object, F(1,38) = 2.27, p = 0.14, ηp2 = 0.06, 95% CI 
[-4, 1], nor of visibility, F(1,38) = 3, p = 0.09, ηp2 = 0.07, 95% CI [0, 4], nor an 
interaction of these factors, F(1,38) =1.34, p = 0.25, ηp2 = 0.03, 95% CI [-6, 2]. 
The analysis of false alarms did not reveal a main effect of object (p = 0.85) or of 
visibility (p = 0.51), but a highly significant interaction, F(1,38) = 10.46, p < 
0.005, ηp2 = 0.22, 95% CI [1, 4], replicating the previous experiment. In the 
visible conditions participants were significantly more likely to falsely detect 
stimulation when viewing object-directed actions (M = 0.04, SD = 0.05) 
compared to non-object directed actions (M = 0.03, SD = 0.04), t(38)= 2.13, p < 
0.05. Conversely, in the occluded conditions there was a trend for participants 
to falsely detect stimulation more when viewing non-object directed actions (M 
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= 0.04, SD = 0.05) compared to object-directed actions (M = 0.03, SD = 0.04), 
t(38)= 1.95, p < 0.06 (see Figure 23). 
 
 
Figure 23. Mean percentage of false alarms (erroneous detections of tactile 
stimulation) for tactile stimuli depending on whether participants viewed reaches 
towards objects (black bars) or into empty space (white bars), depending on 
whether the region of contact was visible (left bars) or occluded (right bars) in 
Experiment 13. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Signal detection analysis. A main focus of this experiment was to test 
whether differences in hits and false alarm reflect differences in sensitivity and 
bias measures. For each participant both d-prime (sensitivity) and c (bias) was 
calculated and these were entered into separate 2 x 2 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors object (object and no object) and 
visibility (revealed and occluded).  
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The analysis of sensitivity revealed neither a main effect of object, 
F(1,38) = 1.03, p = 0.32, ηp2 = 0.03, 95% CI [-5, 17], nor or visibility, F(1,38) = 
0.27, p = 0.61, ηp2 < 0.01, 95% CI [-7, 13]. However, the interaction was 
significant, F(1,38) = 7.33, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 0.16, 95% CI [7, 46], (see Figure 24). 
Post hoc t-tests revealed that there was no significant difference between 
object-directed (M= 2.31, SD= 0.82) and non-object directed actions (M= 2.39, 
SD= 0.80) in the visible conditions, t(38)= 1.08, p = 0.29. However, there was a 
significant difference between object-directed (M= 2.42, SD= 0.89) and non-
object directed actions (M= 2.23, SD= 0.87) in the occluded conditions, t(38)= 
2.46, p=0.02. This demonstrated that participants’ ability to detect tactile 
stimulation was significantly better when viewing object-directed actions in the 
occluded condition compared to occluded non-object directed actions.  
 
 
Figure 24. Mean sensitivity (d-prime) scores for the detection of tactile 
stimuli depending on whether participants viewed reaches towards objects (black 
bars) or into empty space (white bars), depending on whether the region of 
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contact was visible (left bars) or occluded (right bars) in Experiment 13. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The analysis of the response bias again did neither reveal a main effect 
of object, F(1,38) =0.348, p=0.559, ηp2 < 0.01, 95% CI [-11, 21], nor of visibility, 
F(1,38) =0.345, p=0.56, ηp2 < 0.01, 95% CI [-20, 11], but the interaction was 
significant, F(1,38) =9.82, p<0.005, ηp2 = 0.21, 95% CI [16, 67], (see Figure 25). 
Post hoc t-tests revealed that, for fully visible actions, participants had a 
stronger bias to respond when observing object-directed actions compared to 
reaches into empty space, t(38)= 2.23, p=0.03. For occluded actions, there was 
no such difference, t(38)= 1.68, p=0.1, and, if anything, the effect was in the 
opposite direction.  
 
In summary, therefore, the signal detection analysis revealed two 
different effects of object presence in the occluded and fully visible conditions. 
For fully visible actions, object presence increases response bias. In contrast, for 
occluded actions object presence increases sensitivity, but not response bias.  
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Figure 25. Mean response bias scores for the detection of tactile stimuli 
depending on whether participants viewed reaches towards objects (black bars) 
or into empty space (white bars), depending on whether the region of contact was 
visible (left bars) or occluded (right bars) in Experiment 13. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
By measuring tactile perception at threshold, Experiment 13 allowed 
testing whether the different levels of visual information affect tactile 
perception differently. When the whole of the action was visible, participants 
were more likely to both correctly (hits) and falsely report stimulation (false 
alarms) when viewing reaches to objects compared to viewing reaches into 
empty space. In contrast, when the end of the action was occluded, and hand-
object contact could only be inferred, if anything the converse was true, with 
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participants more likely to falsely report stimulation when viewing reaches to 
empty space.  
 
This shows that the direct observation of touch elicits a bias to report 
sensations on one’s own fingers, which could be due to the lowering of ones 
tactile threshold for perceiving touch, akin to some form of illusory perception. 
This fits with others studies that show observing touch can enhance tactile 
perception, leading participants to sometimes report stimulation even when 
there was none (Blakemore et al., 2005; Schaefer, Heinze & Rotte, 2005; Ro, 
Wallace, Hagedorn, Farne, & Pienkos, 2004; Serino et al., 2008; Bach et al., 
2014). More interestingly, in the occluded conditions, the ability to accurately 
detect tactile stimulation was improved by object presence. Here then the 
prediction of touch did not produce a response bias, but instead improved the 
sensitivity of participants’ tactile perception, allowing participants to more 
clearly distinguish tactile stimulation from background noise.  
 
These differing effects of object presence on tactile perception when 
visual access to hand-object contact is varied provides evidence for dissociable 
processes depending on whether touch is seen or just inferred. It seems that 
while visual information biases perception in line with expectations, this bias is 
eradicated if the end of the action is occluded and instead tactile perception is 
enhanced.  
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General Discussion 
 
 
Across three different experiments visual and tactile perception were 
measured while participants observed reaches towards an object or empty 
space, when the object or empty space were either visible or occluded prior to 
the start of the action. The aim of the experiments was to investigate the 
influence of object presence on perceptual prediction during action 
observation. In addition, the relationship between bottom-up and top-down 
prediction processes was tested, by varying the visibility of the object during 
action observation, to measure how perceptual prediction altered when the 
level of visual sensory input was changed. While fully visible reaches provide 
direct bottom-up information about the intention of the observed action, this 
information can only be supplied by top-down information when the target 
location is hidden prior to action onset. Taken together, the findings provide 
evidence that objects do generate predictions based on their cue to intention, 
which modulate perception, but that this affects predictive processing 
differently depending upon the sensory domain measured (visual or tactile) 
and the amount of sensory information available. 
 
When measuring visual perception, once again a reliable 
representational momentum effect was found demonstrating a robust tendency 
to predict the future course of an observed action, and report it to be displaced 
further into the future than it actually was. This supports the findings of the 
previous chapters and prior research (Hubbard, 2005; 2014), and extends them 
by demonstrating that the effect remains when observing biological actions in 
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real time. However, the presence of an object as a cue to the intention of the 
action did not increase visual perceptual prediction. Observing reaches to an 
object, compared to those to empty space, did not increase the likelihood of 
perceiving the action further along its trajectory (i.e. representational 
momentum). Likewise, the occlusion of the object or empty space prior to 
action observation also did not significantly alter the level of perceptual 
prediction. This suggests that objects may not be a salient enough cue of 
intention to affect visual perception. However, the visual similarity between the 
actions and the concern that top-down predictions may have not had sufficient 
time to affect visual perceptual processing may explain the lack of an effect of 
intention.  
 
In two further experiments participants’ tactile detection ability was 
measured while seeing others’ full reach for objects or into empty space, when 
the point of contact (or non-contact) was either visible or occluded. The two 
experiments revealed that both visually guided and inferred predictions of 
contact affect the observer’s tactile processing. Yet, they also demonstrated that 
these tactile changes might emerge from different mechanisms. Observing a 
fully visible reach towards an object (compared to the same reach into empty 
space) led to a tendency to report stimulation even when there was none. This 
increase in false alarms was observed both when participants detected 
supraliminal tactile stimulation (Experiment 12) and when stimulation was at 
detection threshold (Experiment 13). It replicates prior reports that observing 
touch enhances the bias to feel touch and report illusory stimulation (Ro et al., 
2004; Bach et al., 2014; Morrison et al., 2013).  
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In the prior studies, these effects have been interpreted as emerging 
from a neural summation of contact information from the observed action and 
the tactile input, such that any response threshold is reached more readily 
when both are available. They were predicted from the assumption that seeing 
others reach for objects might induce the same prediction processes that 
inform observers about the impeding sensory consequences of their own 
actions, as if they happened on the participants’ own body. As such, the current 
effects are in line with recent views of multisensory integration, which assume 
that visual and tactile information summate, in a Bayesian manner, to produce 
an integrated perceptual experience (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Deneve & Pouget, 
2004; Wozny, Beierholm & Shams, 2008; Talsma, 2015). 
 
In contrast, touch that could only be inferred – because the point of 
contact was hidden behind an occluder – did not induce such a bias to report 
illusory stimulation. Instead, inferred touch improved observers’ ability to 
discriminate between whether stimulation occurred or not. It sped up detection 
of tactile stimuli on one’s own fingers (Experiment 12), while lowering false 
alarms (Experiment 12 and 13). Indeed, the signal detection analysis revealed 
that this change reflected a change in tactile sensitivity rather than response 
bias. Thus, while directly observed touch led to a tendency to report stimulation 
even when there was none, inferred touch made participants better at 
distinguishing tactile stimulation from no stimulation. This suggests that merely 
knowing an object is present behind the occluder improves tactile perception, 
demonstrating that objects are a strong cue for top-down predictive processing. 
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While the bias shift for visible contact is indicative for neuronal 
summation of visual and tactile signals, this sensitivity shift for occluded 
contact reveals an enhancement of tactile processing itself, similar perhaps to 
the changes present if one anticipates (but not observes) contact on one’s own 
finger (van Ede et al., 2010; van Ede et al., 2014) or foot (Carlsson, Petrovic, 
Skare, Petersson, & Ingvar, 2000), or anticipates the distal sensory 
consequences of one’s own actions (Desantis et al, 2014). As such, the data from 
inferred touches are in line with recent predictive coding models of the brain 
(e.g., Kilner et al., 2007). According to this view prior experience helps to 
generate predictions related to current perception allowing anticipation and 
proactive behaviour. Here, therefore, rather than motor simulation providing a 
basis for action understanding, instead a prediction based on what the observer 
‘thinks’ will happen – based on their own prior experience with tactile 
interactions with objects – allows observers to test its hypothesis against the 
incoming sensory input. These predictions are assumed to affect perceptual 
processing itself, and to lead to changes in coding precision of the perceptual 
input, predicting changes in tactile sensitivity (rather than bias) just as was 
observed here (Howhy, 2012; Den Ouden, Kok & De Lange, 2012; Clark, 2013; 
Seth, 2014).  
 
A possible alternative explanation for the tactile effects observed here 
could be that they result from a general effect of increased arousal – and the 
associated heightened state of attention – produced by the presence of the 
object, as opposed to any increase in top-down predictions specifically in 
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somatosensory processing. However, it is not clear how such arousal related 
explanations could account for both the results on detection threshold and 
tactile sensitivity. Nevertheless, one way to address such a concern would be to 
employ a control experiment to see if the same results emerge when 
participants have to respond to auditory, rather than tactile, stimuli. Indeed, in 
a previous paper such a control experiment has been used to show that the bias 
to perceive tactile stimulation when viewing reaches to painful objects, 
compared to safe objects, did not persist when auditory stimuli were used 
(Morrison et al., 2013). This suggests that the bias effect found was not due to a 
general arousal effect, supporting the ideas that the sensory predictions of 
touch affected tactile perception. This supports the notion that the effects found 
here are also the result of sensory predictions of touch rather than attention or 
general arousal. Moreover, the convergence of the findings across both 
response times and signal detection measures strengthen the interpretation 
that the effects emerge from top-down sensory predictions. 
 
In conclusion, the experiments here show that predictive processing is 
influenced by object presence, but that the nature of these effects is dependent 
on the sensory modality. While object presence did not affect perceptual 
prediction when measuring visual perception, it was shown to have an effect 
when measuring tactile perception. Interestingly, this effect of object presence 
differed depending upon the amount of bottom-up information available. When 
the object was visible during action observation a bias to report tactile 
perception was revealed, even when no tactile stimulus was present. While 
when the object was known about but not visible during action observation the 
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sensitivity of tactile perception increased. This demonstrates that objects do 
generate predictions and that the nature of these predictions can change 
depending upon the level of bottom-up information available. While Bayesian 
theories of multisensory integration can explain the bias effect found, with the 
summation of different sensory inputs, predictive coding theories can explain 
the sensitivity effect, with prior knowledge guiding top-down predictions of 
touch resulting in tactile perception being enhanced. 
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Chapter 6 - Predictive perception in a social 
context 
 
Summary of findings 
 
 
Across a series of experiments, the current thesis has provided robust 
evidence that people perceptually predict the actions of others (Experiments 1-
13). This supports prior research that has demonstrated perceptual prediction 
for social stimuli (Thornton & Hayes, 2004; Hudson et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 
2010; Uono, Sato & Toichi, 2010; Hudson & Jellema, 2011), and extends it to 
include the observation of object-directed manual actions. In addition, the 
tendency to perceptually predict increased in line with verbal cues to intention 
when these cues were both self-produced and produced by the actor being 
observed (Experiments 6-10). In contrast, intentional cues provided by the grip 
or gaze of the actor, or by the presence of a target object did not increase 
perceptual prediction in the visual modality (Experiments 2, 4, 5 and 11). 
Moreover, perceptual prediction was found to increase in response to subtle 
differences in kinematics when intentional cues were the same (Experiment 5). 
Finally, the presence of a target object modulated tactile prediction processes 
and the nature of the modulation differed depending upon the level of bottom-
up information available during the action (Experiments 12 and 13). These 
studies provide a complex picture of perceptual prediction during action 
observation, which implies variation depending upon the level of prior 
knowledge, bottom-up sensory input and the number/types of sensory systems 
involved. 
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Predictive visual perception 
 
 
Visual perception has traditionally been studied as a purely bottom-up 
process whereby input via the senses is received in low-level regions and 
propagated through the neural hierarchy in a feed forward manner up to high-
level regions where it is interpreted. However, as research in the field has 
grown, it has become apparent that such a conception is not sufficient to 
explain how we process the complex visual environment within which we are 
situated and where the amount of bottom-up information is constantly shifting 
(Kveraga, Ghuman & Bar, 2007). This has led to theories positing the 
involvement of top-down feedback projections during perception, which 
interact with and inform feed-forward sensory inputs (Friston, 2010). 
 
Indeed, research has begun to show that these top-down predictions can 
sometimes bias visual perception when expectations are met. Evidence for this 
has been found in relation to how we visually process motion. For example, 
motion has been shown to induce a very specific prediction of a spatial pattern 
at the leading, but not trailing, edge of a stimulus, providing evidence for 
forward predictions during motion perception (Roach et al., 2011). This 
evidence for forward predictions during visual perception has been supported 
by other studies investigating low-level vision, which have also demonstrated 
visual perceptual biases in line with expectations (Denison, Piazza & Silver, 
2011; Hisakata, Terao & Murakami, 2013; Schellekens et al., 2014). 
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Modelling work on the visual system has also emphasised the 
importance of a top-down predictions for vision (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Lee & 
Mumford, 2003; Hosoya, Baccus & Meister, 2005). These models suggest that 
early visual neurons in V1 and V2 are tightly coupled to higher-order visual 
neurons not just in a feed-forward manner but also in relation to feedback from 
top-down inferences, assumed to help reduce delays in neural processing 
(Nijhawan, 2008). Within this conception, the visual system balances bottom-
up sensory input against top-down inferences, which can directly affect 
perception by facilitating timely responses to changes in the environment.   
 
The influence of these top-down predictions is also apparent from 
research comparing expected and unexpected stimuli. For example, expected 
stimuli tend to result in a decrease of neuronal activity, whereas unexpected 
stimuli tend to result in an increase (Kimura et al., 2011; Kimura & Takeda, 
2015). Such findings are in line with the expectations of predictive coding in 
that the increase in neural response when viewing unexpected stimuli can be 
seen as equivalent to a prediction error (Winkler & Czigler, 2012; Stefanics, 
Astikainen & Czigler, 2014). In this way, prior knowledge aids perception 
through implemented top-down predictions that help to reduce the use of 
neuronal resources and anticipate future events. 
 
These findings and models can explain phenomena such as the 
representational momentum effect, where the final position of a stimulus is 
judged as further along its motion trajectory, implying a visual prediction of its 
most likely future course (Freyd & Finke, 1984; for a review see Hubbard, 2005; 
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2014). Because the effect emerges when participants are instructed to 
accurately report the stimulus disappearance point, it reflects an at least 
partially automatic and involuntary forward prediction that happens even 
though the task incentivizes participants against it. It helps perceptual 
judgements of moving stimuli and allows planning of actions towards where it 
will be in the future rather than where it is in the present (Hubbard, 2006). 
 
The experiments in the current thesis add to this previous research in 
the non-social domain, and extend research applying the effect to social stimuli 
(Thornton & Hayes, 2004; Hudson et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2010; Uono et al., 
2010; Hudson & Jellema, 2011), by demonstrating the effect when observing 
object-directed actions using a number of different social stimuli. This provides 
support for the notion that visual perception is at least partly predictive 
(Nijhawan, 2008), and is in line with current theories that suggest prediction is 
important when considering how the brain operates (Friston, 2010; Panichello 
et al., 2013). Moreover, it argues against theories of social perception focused 
on bottom-up mechanisms and emphasises the strong influence provided by 
predictive mechanisms. The current thesis demonstrates that such top-down 
predictive processes are directly influenced by social cues that provide 
information about an actor’s intentions. 
 
The effect of intentional cues on social perceptual prediction 
 
 
A crucial aspect of social perception is the anticipation of people’s future 
actions (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), and this often 
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relies upon the prediction of the other person’s intention (Liepelt, von Cramon 
& Brass, 2008; Woodward & Cannon, 2013). This ability arises developmentally 
early (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Bakker, Kochukhova & von Hofsten, 2011), 
and is key for social interactions (Sebanz et al., 2006; Kunde, Lozo & Neumann, 
2011; Ondobaka, de Lange, Newman-Norlund, Wiemers, & Bekkering, 2012) 
and social competition (Huys et al., 2009; Mann, Abernethy & Farrow, 2010). 
Prior research has hinted that such predictions are likely to be driven by the 
social cues generated by the observed, such as their eye gaze (Castiello, 2003; 
Pierno et al, 2006, 2008), bodily movements (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Becchio, 
Manera, Sartori, Cavallo, & Castiello, 2012; Thioux & Keysers, 2015) and verbal 
utterances (Baus et al., 2014), as well as the context within which such 
behaviours occur, stressing an importance for the role of objects (Costantini et 
al., 2011; Jacquet et al., 2012; Cardellicchio et al., 2013; for a review, see Bach et 
al., 2014). Current theories of how such predictions emerge in the brain also 
stress the importance of context for prediction generation (Bar, 2007; Barrett & 
Bar, 2009; Kilner et al., 2007).  
 
While these studies imply predictive processing during social perception 
by showing that certain cues direct attention, for example, none of them 
measure changes in perception itself to assess whether it is directly influenced 
by intentional cues to the point where what is perceived actually changes. The 
current set of experiments fill this gap and are therefore novel in showing that 
intentions generated by language directly increased perceptual prediction of 
other people’s actions, as measured by representational momentum. 
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We found that people consistently overestimated the vanishing point of 
a hand reaching towards an object in the direction of motion, such that probe 
stimuli displaced in the direction of motion were perceived as identical with the 
hand’s last seen position, and probe stimuli displaced against the direction of 
motion easily detected. Importantly, when spoken verbal statements – such as 
“Take it!” or “Leave it” – matched the subsequent direction of an actor’s arm 
movement towards or away from objects, this led to a further increase of this 
overestimation, compared to when statement and direction mismatched. This 
demonstrates that perceptual predictions of a hand’s future course are directly 
affected by social, verbal cues. 
 
This was true when the cue related to simple kinematic intentions 
(Forward or Backward, Experiment 6) and to higher level intentions related to 
the action’s goal (Take it or Leave it, Experiment 7). This shows the power of 
intentional language as a cue that can directly bias perceptual judgements of 
others’ actions. Moreover, the same visual bias was also evident when the 
verbal statements were not spoken but heard, as if spoken by the actor 
themselves. This demonstrated that the effect that language can have on 
subsequent perception does not only apply when the verbal statements are 
spoken but also when they are passively heard prior to action observation. This 
shows that both predictions generated internally and those generated 
externally, based on the language of another person, can bias perceptual 
judgements in line with the prediction. This perceptual bias can be seen as 
beneficial in facilitating anticipatory processing during social interactions 
(Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). For example, the representational momentum effect 
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is seen as crucial in “bridging the gap” between where a stimulus is now and 
where it will have to be responded to, considering the neuronal delays 
associated with perception and action planning (Hubbard, 2006). It also shows 
the influence of top-down processing on how we perceive bottom-up sensory 
inputs by demonstrating that a verbal cue can directly bias subsequent visual 
judgments of an actor’s reach further forward in its path. Here then bottom-up 
visual perception is not direct and unmediated but influenced by top-down 
prior knowledge and biased in line with top-down predictions associated with 
verbal cues specifying an actor’s intentions. 
 
This finding fits in with a body of research that also demonstrates the 
effect of verbal information on perception. For example, matching verbal labels 
can bring supraliminally presented objects to visual awareness (Lupyan & 
Ward, 2013). In addition, self-produced speech has been shown to improve 
performance on a visual search task, particularly when the association between 
the visual target and the spoken word is strong (Lupyan & Swingley, 2012). 
Likewise, listening to task irrelevant directional verbs while performing a 
motion detection task improved participants’ sensitivity to motion when the 
heard verbs matched the direction of motion (Meteyard, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 
2007). Moreover, it has also been shown that processing language that includes 
descriptions of motion can induce a motion aftereffect that is in line with the 
direction specified by the language (Dils & Boroditsky, 2010). All these studies 
emphasise that language perception (whether spoken or heard) can affect 
subsequent visual perception in line with the experiments described in Chapter 
4.  
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As in the experiments from Chapter 4, in all these studies the verbal 
information appears to bias the visual processing, facilitating accurate detection 
in some situations while in others creating illusory perception. These findings 
support the idea that language can guide top-down predictions, which can 
directly influence bottom-up sensory inputs to both aid and distort perception. 
The new findings presented in this thesis reveal that such effects are not 
restricted to low-level verbal cues, or abstract point motion at the detection 
threshold (Meteyard, et al., 2007), but can directly emerge from cues suggesting 
an action goal, and affect the forward prediction of observed actions. They 
therefore provide evidence that inferred higher-level goals of other people are 
translated into the movements in space that would bring them about, such that 
these actions can be identified more effectively, and one’s own actions can be 
planned in response (e.g., Csibra, 2007). This is line with other recent 
demonstrations that the anticipation of another person’s action can facilitate 
one’s own performance of the same, or a corresponding, action (Pfister, 
Dignath, Hommel & Kunde, 2013; Genschow & Brass, 2015). 
 
An important question is what the representational momentum effect 
reflects. Traditionally, the effect has been assumed to take place in the “gap” 
between the offset of the moving stimulus and the reappearance of the probe, 
as if the movement continued in the observer’s mind after it had disappeared 
(Hubbard, 1990; Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988). Yet, the effect peaks at gap 
lengths of 260 ms, much too short to reflect memory processes in the 
traditional sense, and much closer to lower level perceptual processes in iconic 
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memory. Indeed, more recent research suggests that representational 
momentum can also reflect processes that happen during the perception of the 
movement (Jordan, Stork, Knuf, Kerzel, & Müsseler, 2002; Musseler, Stork & 
Kerzel, 2002). For example, as mentioned above, even during the perception of 
a moving stimulus, processing at the leading edge of the stimulus is enhanced, 
reflecting a forward prediction of what the observer will see that happens 
during movement perception (Roach et al., 2011). On the basis of the current 
thesis, it is not possible to distinguish between these alternatives. Both, 
however, reflect perceptual processes that are assumed to serve both cognitive 
judgments (e.g. where an object will be in the future), to fill in missing 
perceptual information (where it is while it disappears), and allow the planning 
of own actions towards it (Hubbard, 2006). Importantly, in at least one prior 
study (Hudson et al., 2009), gap length was varied while participants performed 
a representational momentum like task on heads moving in the direction of eye 
gaze or against it. At least for this study, the length of the gap (0 vs. 1000 ms) 
did not affect the amount of prediction at all. At both gap lengths, gaze biased 
the perception of head motion in its direction.  
 
This suggests that the effect could result from processes, which occur 
throughout the movement and persist into the gap, rather than only occurring 
during the gap (Jordan et al., 2002; Musseler et al., 2002). One way to 
investigate whether the representational momentum effect emerges from 
processing during the movement or the gap would be to utilise another 
mislocalisation error: the flash lag effect. In the flash lag effect a flashed 
stimulus is perceived as lagging behind the position of a moving stimulus, even 
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though when the flash occurs it is spatially aligned with the position of the 
moving stimulus. While there is some debate as to exactly what causes the 
effect (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Brenner & Smeets, 2000; Nijhawan, 2002; 
Munger & Owens, 2004), it does provide an opportunity to compare whether 
verbal cues modulate perception during the movement or during the gap, by, 
for example, comparing the size of the flash lag effect when an action either 
matches, or mismatches, a verbal cue (Chapter 4). If the size of the flash lag 
effect is the same in both predicted and unpredicted actions then it suggests 
that the effect of intention on representational momentum occurs during the 
gap. However, if predicted actions (verbal cue and action are congruent) 
produce a larger flash lag effect than unpredicted actions (verbal cue and action 
are incongruent) then it suggests that perceptual prediction occurs during the 
perception of motion.  
 
Further experiments could also explore if varying the length of the gap 
affects the influence that verbal cues have on the size of the representational 
momentum effect. For instance, even if the effect of intention emerges during 
the movement, this does not rule out the possibility that perceptual prediction 
also occurs during the gap as well. Therefore, by varying the length of the gap 
one can test whether the effect of intention decreases or increases in relation to 
the size of the gap, remains constant and at what point the effect emerges.  
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The influence of bottom-up and top-down inputs on perceptual 
prediction 
 
 
The representational momentum effect found across a range of studies 
highlights a visual bias to predict the future position of an actor’s arm further 
along its current trajectory. When the direction of the action matched a prior 
verbal cue this visual bias increased. This reveals an effect of top-down 
predictions, automatically generated by the meaning of the verbal statement, on 
perception. The tactile experiments on the other hand, demonstrated that the 
effect of object presence on tactile perception differed depending upon whether 
the object was seen during the observed action or whether its presence could 
only be inferred. This subtle shift in the available bottom-up information 
resulted in a striking dissociation regarding its effect on tactile perception, with 
seen goal objects of a reach resulting in a perceptual bias and inferred objects 
producing an increase in perceptual sensitivity, reflecting an increased ability 
to distinguish tactile stimuli from the neuronal background noise. 
 
The tactile perceptual bias observed when the object was visible during 
the observed action is in line with previous research. For example, studies have 
shown that observing somebody else touch an object can produce a bias to 
perceive touch on one’s own finger even in the absence of a tactile stimulus 
(Morrison et al., 2013; Bach et al., 2014). This can be seen as an example of the 
dominant effect vision can have on tactile perception (Tipper et al., 1998, 2001; 
Press, Taylor-Clarke, Kennett, & Haggard, 2004; Ro et al., 2004; Haggard, 2006). 
Moreover, a number of studies have shown that observing touch activates 
somatosensory areas of the brain, suggesting that the social perception of touch 
 
 
178 
is processed similarly to the direct experience of touch (Keysers et al., 2004; 
Bufalari et al., 2007; Morrison, et al., 2013; Singer et al., 2004; but see Chan & 
Baker, 2015, for a critical review). These findings are thought to emerge from 
the multisensory nature of perception, in that observing touch involves the 
same perceptual code as when perceiving one’s own touch.  
 
It appears then that in the visible condition seeing impending touch 
increased the perceptual evidence in support of the prediction of touch, as if the 
observed action was processed as one’s own, such that it lowered the viewers’ 
threshold for perceiving touch on their own finger. This is line with the idea 
that such effects reflect a neural summation of signals from the observed action 
and the tactile input resulting in a reduction in the viewer’s response threshold. 
They are assumed to emerge from the same processes evolved to predict the 
sensory consequences of one’s own actions. Such an interpretation is line with 
current views of multisensory integration within which different sensory 
sources (e.g. visual and tactile) summate to combine the information into a 
unified perceptual experience (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Deneve & Pouget, 2004; 
Wozny et al., 2008; Talsma, 2015). 
 
In the representational momentum studies, verbal intentional cues 
biased visual perception. Similarly, here, a visual intentional cue, an object, 
biased tactile perception. That is object presence specified the intention of the 
actor to grasp the object, and this predicted intention modulated tactile 
perception despite object presence being irrelevant to the task. Both these 
findings demonstrate the affect that predictions can have on one’s own 
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perception and the tendency to integrate sensory inputs to unify perception. 
They are also in line with theoretical models suggesting that predictions are 
generated through the integration of prior knowledge and intentional cues 
(Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007). 
 
In contrast, when the object was known about but visually occluded 
prior to action observation, any knowledge generated via bottom-up 
information had to be stored and retained. Therefore, any effect of object here 
resulted from the memory of the object rather than the perception of it. When 
the object or empty space was occluded during action observation, object 
presence resulted in an increase in perceptual sensitivity, instead of producing 
a response bias. Here it would seem the influence of memory and prior 
knowledge improved the precision of tactile perception compared to when 
bottom-up visual cues were permanently available. This effect appears similar 
to changes observed when contact on one’s own finger (van Ede et al., 2010; 
van Ede et al., 2014) or foot (Carlsson et al., 2000) is anticipated (but not seen), 
or when the distal sensory consequences of one’s actions are anticipated 
(Desantis et al., 2014). It is also in line with research showing that when visual 
processing is disrupted via TMS, tactile processing is enhanced, suggesting that 
tactile processing compensated for the reduction in visual information 
(Avenanti et al., 2013). These findings support recent predictive coding models 
of the brain which suggest that prior experience helps to generate predictions 
about current perception facilitating anticipation and proactive behaviour, and 
sharpening the representation of the expected input (Kilner et al., 2007).  
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One explanation for the differential effects may come from the nature of 
multisensory integration (van Atteveldt, Murray, Thut & Schroeder, 2014). 
Visual and tactile information, it has been proposed, are integrated in an 
optimal fashion via a maximum-likelihood estimate, produced by combining the 
different sensory information streams to increase the power of a given estimate 
(Ernst & Banks, 2002). However, this integration is fluid, and vision can 
dominate when variance of visual estimations are lower than variance of tactile 
estimations. Hence, in the visible condition, object presence may have produced 
a bias because the visual variance was low due to constant sensory input 
reinforcing top-down predictions of touch. In contrast, in the occluded 
condition the removal of visual information would have disrupted visual 
estimations providing more weight to tactile estimations, which resulted in 
object presence sharpening the precision of perception. This sharpening can be 
seen as occurring due to the tendency to integrate signals, explaining why 
knowledge of object presence did not bias perception but did improve 
sensitivity. Therefore the memory or awareness of object presence in the 
absence of any direct visual perception boosted tactile perception without 
overshadowing it and producing a bias. 
 
Recent models that assume a hierarchical integration of multimodal and 
top-down information also capture this distinction (Altieri, 2014; Talma, 2015). 
In such models, information on the same level – such as observed and felt tactile 
stimulation here – are directly integrated with one another, such that the 
combined evidence leads to stronger sensations than when only one source of 
information is available, or one source can compensate for the other. These 
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multisensory integration processes can rely on direct (or thalamus-mediated) 
connections between primary and secondary sensory cortices (e.g., Falchier, 
Clavagnier, Barone & Kennedy, 2002; van den Brink et al., 2014; for a review, 
see Talma, 2015), via which contact information from vision and touch can 
interact directly and feed from one channel to the other, inducing multisensory 
summation effects just as were found here when contact was directly observed.  
 
In contrast, when stimulation is not observed visually but inferred from 
top-down information, such direct interactions cannot take place. Instead, in 
hierarchical prediction models (cf. Clark, 2013), such top-down expectations 
are assumed to primarily act on the precision of sensory coding in both 
modalities, reflecting a sharpening of the representation of the expected 
stimulus (e.g., Kok et al., 2012), or the distribution of attention to the specific 
time, location and features that characterise the incoming stimulus (Klemen & 
Chambers, 2011). As found here for inferred contact, these changes in coding 
precision would go along with changes in tactile sensitivity (rather than 
threshold), such that the stimulus can be detected more effectively and 
distinguished from background noise. Indeed, there is now converging evidence 
that anticipating consequences of one’s own actions induces such changes in 
sensitivity, for both proximal and distal consequences of one’s own actions, and 
across different stimulus modalities (Desantis et al., 2014; van Ede et al., 2010; 
2014). Such effects can be likened, perhaps, to the very specific anticipations 
one experiences when groping, for example, for a door handle in the dark that 
one knows is there. The studies in this thesis show a similar effect may happen 
for actions one observes in others. 
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In sum, then, the different results here can be understood within the 
context of hierarchical predictive coding models of multisensory integration 
where different sensory systems and top-down information interact to shape 
perception. The extra visual information provided by seeing the object during 
the action strengthened predictions of touch which in turn lowered the 
threshold for perceiving touch. In contrast, when the object could not be seen 
but was only known about, predictions of touch did not lower the threshold for 
perceiving touch but did improve tactile sensitivity. The picture of the collected 
findings of the current thesis then seem to suggest that both top-down 
predictions and multisensory integration can interact to influence social 
perception and produce changes in what is perceived. 
 
Open questions and future directions 
 
 
In addition to addressing questions about the link between predictive 
coding and social perception, the current thesis also generated several 
questions that currently remain unresolved. In the following section some of 
the more important questions are discussed along with some potential avenues 
for future research designed to address them. 
 
Multisensory integration as an explanation for the intentional 
cue effects? 
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The assumption guiding the representational momentum experiments 
was that the spoken and heard verbal cues acted as a top-down signal for 
predictive processing. However, given the results of the tactile detection 
experiments, an alternative interpretation is that these effects, too, reflect the 
integration of multimodal signals. Indeed, one important difference between 
the experiments that showed modulation of perceptual prediction during social 
perception compared to those that did not was the number of sensory 
modalities involved. The verbal studies (Experiments 6-10) included visual and 
auditory (spoken and heard) perception, while the tactile studies (Experiments 
12 and 13) included visual and tactile perception, whereas the majority of 
unsuccessful experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 4, 5 and 11) only included visual 
perception. Therefore, one reason behind the modulation of perceptual 
prediction could have been the integration of these multiple sensory systems. 
While all experiments showed a visual perceptual bias (representational 
momentum effect), the modulation of this effect by intentional cues was only 
found when there was the requirement for multisensory integration 
(Experiments 6-10 & 12-13). 
 
In the experiments from Chapter 4 all verbal statements were causally 
linked to the subsequent actions. This meant that each action began temporally 
close (within 200ms) to the offset of each verbal utterance whether spoken or 
heard. In the tactile experiments, tactile stimulation always occurred at the 
exact same time that the actor would make contact with the object. This meant 
that any prediction generated by the auditory stimuli in the verbal studies 
would be causally linked to the subsequent visual perception. Likewise, any 
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prediction generated by the visual stimuli in the tactile studies would be 
causally linked to the subsequent tactile perception. In models of multisensory 
integration, such temporal and causal couplings are crucial for creating 
crossmodal effects (Ohshiro, Angelaki & DeAngelis, 2011; Zmigrod & Hommel, 
2013). Therefore, it could be that the modulation of perceptual prediction in 
line with the action’s intentions relied upon the integration of the different 
perceptual inputs. This would suggest that the initial sensory information, 
whether verbal or visual, activated the intention and therefore top-down 
prediction of the action, which influenced subsequent perception, whether 
visual or tactile through multisensory integration. The representational 
momentum effects could therefore emerge from the same multisensory 
integration mechanisms as the tactile prediction effects in the non-occluded 
conditions. 
 
A number of different studies have shown that vision can affect tactile 
perception. For example, studies have shown that the presentation of a visual 
stimulus at the same time as a tactile stimulus can improve tactile perception 
(Johnson, Burton & Ro, 2006; Arabzadeh, Clifford & Harris, 2008). Likewise, 
merely observing a body part can also enhance the perception of touch 
(Kennett, Taylor-Clarke & Haggard, 2001; Taylor-Clarke, Kennett & Haggard, 
2002; Tipper et al., 1998, 2001). In addition, observing oneself being touched 
enhances tactile perception and this also extends, albeit to a lesser extent, to 
observing another person being touched (Serino et al., 2008). Other studies 
have shown how observing touch can bias observers to perceive touch when it 
is not really there (Ro et al., 2004; Morrison et al., 2013; Bach et al., 2014). 
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Moreover, phenomena such as the rubber hand illusion show how perceiving 
touch while observing a rubber hand being touch in synchrony can lead to 
observers feeling as the though the rubber hand is their own hand, and thereby 
shift the perceived position of one’s own hand towards the rubber hand 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). All these studies demonstrate that tactile perception 
can be modulated depending upon the observer’s visual perception in line with 
the studies reported in Chapter 5 (Experiments 12 and 13).  
 
Likewise a number of effects demonstrate how the integration between 
auditory and visual information can alter perception (Parise & Spence, 2013). 
While many studies have shown the impact of vision on audition, a number of 
studies have begun to show how sound can alter visual perception (Shams, 
Kamitani & Shimojo, 2004). For example, an auditory stimulus has been shown 
to improve the perception, identification and perceived intensity of a visual 
stimulus (Stein, London, Wilkinson & Price, 1996; McDonald, Teder-Salejarvi & 
Hillyard, 2000; Vroomen and de Gelder, 2000). Similarly, the ‘illusory flash 
effect’ has demonstrated that when a single visual flash is accompanied by 
multiple auditory beeps, it is perceived as multiple visual flashes (Shams, 
Kamitani & Shimojo, 2000, 2002). The effect of auditory stimuli on visual 
stimuli has also been shown when perceiving motion. For example, visual 
motion has been shown to be susceptible to biases in the direction of an 
auditory motion stimulus (Meyer & Wuerger, 2001). Moreover, an auditory 
motion stimulus has also been shown to modulate perception of a static visual 
stimulus (Shams et al., 2004). All these studies demonstrate that visual 
perception can indeed be modulated by auditory perception, once again 
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showing that in some circumstances this improves the precision of perception 
while in other cases it biases it. 
 
Recent explanations of such crossmodal effects have appealed to 
Bayesian probability (Pouget, Deneve & Duhamel, 2002; Ernst, 2006; Talsma, 
2015). Bayes theorem was originally applied to statistics but has subsequently 
been applied to a number of different fields including cognition (Knill & Pouget 
2004). Essentially it involves a calculation between the current probability of an 
event occurring and the events prior probability to produce a more accurate 
measure of the events overall probability of occurring (Efron, 2013). This 
combination of prior and current information has made it a good candidate for 
assessing perception. All the information that we receive from the senses 
contains an element of uncertainty, which results in the reduction of perceptual 
precision. Therefore, Bayesian probability allows a method to address such 
uncertainties and improve precision. This makes it a useful tool for 
understanding the integration between the senses to optimise perception. 
Optimal cue integration theory suggests that when multiple sources of 
independent information are available combining them can reduce uncertainty 
and therefore improve perception (Fetsch, DeAngelis & Andelaki, 2010).  
 
Therefore, the reason that the experiments with more than one sensory 
system involved resulted in the modulation of perceptual prediction might be 
because of the extra evidence that the multiple senses provided to such 
Bayesian priors. Here then the integration of multiple streams of perceptual 
information provided predictions more weight and led to more perceptual 
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modulation. According to such a view, the dominant sense, visual in Chapter 4 
and tactile in Chapter 5, is modulated via the quality of the additional 
multisensory integration (Ernst & Banks, 2002). This is line with recent models 
within which both multisensory and top-down signals are integrated 
hierarchically (Altieri, 2014; Talsma, 2015). According to such views, when 
different sensory sources are processed, the evidence from both sources can be 
integrated, so that any detection threshold is surpassed more readily, leading to 
a bias in perception. This can explain why the experiments involving multiple 
sensory systems modulated perception based on the combination of 
predictions specifying the intention of the action. 
 
In such a view, the brain treats the intentional cues – the self-produced 
or heard verbal statements – not as top-down signals of the actor’s intention, 
but as multisensory cues to motion that were integrated with what was really 
perceived. One way to test this hypothesis would be tease apart whether the 
effects on representational momentum – like those in the tactile detection 
experiments – reflect bias or sensitivity effects. On the basis of the present data 
in Chapter 4, both interpretations are possible. On the one hand, a verbal cue 
could have led to a bias that was “added” to the motion that was perceived, 
thereby biasing it into the expected direction, in the same way as tactile and 
visual multisensory signals of contact are summed to bias tactile perception. On 
the other hand, the representational momentum effects could reflect a 
sensitivity effect. In this view, representational momentum was increased 
because the verbal cue led to a top-down sharpening of the representation of 
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these motion codes that matched the expected direction, thereby leading to a 
sharper impression of motion.  
 
If the results from the tactile experiment are an indication, one way to 
distinguish these effects would be to present the hand’s motion close to 
detection threshold, perhaps in an image with visual noise, and ask participants 
whether motion had occurred or not. If verbal cues lead to a top-down effect, 
then they should make participants better at distinguishing seen motion from 
the background noise, similar to the top-down effects in the tactile detection 
experiment. In contrast, if verbal cues lead to a bottom-up biasing in line with 
multisensory integration, they should lead to the tendency to “see” movement 
in the expected direction, even if there was no movement at all, similar to the 
bias effects for fully visible actions in the tactile detection experiment. 
 
Of course, there are reasons why one could be sceptical of the idea that 
the effects on representational momentum reflect multisensory integration. For 
example, first, the effects did not differ depending on whether the verbal cues 
specified an intention (Take it, Leave it) or merely a movement path (Forward, 
Backward). If the effects reflect multisensory integration, the simpler kinematic 
cues that are more closely related to the incoming stimulation would perhaps 
be expected to produce larger effects. Similarly, the verbal cues “Forward” and 
“Backward” as well as “Take it” and “Leave it” are meaningful only from the 
perspective to the current actor and the situation they are in. From the 
perspective of the participants, in contrast, the actions go left and right rather 
than forward and backward. Thus, if the effects indeed reflect multisensory 
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integration, then this integration does not reflect only lower level sensory cues 
to action. Instead, these integration processes themselves appear to be related 
to relatively sophisticated processes related to goal attribution and perspective 
taking.  
 
One way to investigate this would to see if whether similar effects could 
be achieved with more high-level verbal utterances. While the verbal 
experiment discussed in Chapter 3 did not find any effect of emotional verbal 
labels, the methodology and experimental set up was different. Therefore, 
running similar experiments to those in Chapter 4 but with more emotional or 
abstract language, which can still be associated with the different objects, 
would be an interesting extension.  
 
Are objects a cue to intentions? 
 
 
Both the spatial matching experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) and the 
occluder representational momentum experiment (Experiment 11) relied on 
objects and their integration with actions as the cue to the action’s intention, 
but neither produced (replicable) results. One potential explanation for this is 
that objects are not a strong enough cue of intention to produce predictions 
themselves. However, there are a number of reasons to discount such an 
interpretation. One reason is the large body of research that makes a strong 
case objects do facilitate top-down expectations. For example, a number of 
studies have provided evidence suggesting that objects prime the retrieval of 
manipulation knowledge supporting the assumption that, at least on some level, 
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objects facilitate a prediction of possible actions (Tucker & Ellis, 2001; Myung, 
Blumstein & Sedivy, 2006; Helbig, Graf & Kiefer, 2006; Bub et al., 2008; Ellis et 
al., 2013). Research has also shown that premotor and parietal areas of the 
brain are activated when merely viewing graspable objects, implying some 
form of action information is involved in object recognition (Chao & Martin, 
2000; Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005). The effect of object affordances also appears 
to be apparent not just for the action possibilities of one own action, but also for 
others when they are in the vicinity of objects (Costantini et al., 2011; 
Cardellicchio et al., 2013). Most tellingly, a recent neuroimaging study showed 
that when viewing a match between an action and an object the brain 
reinforces the relationship in order to supress other competing actions, 
providing support that objects facilitate action predictions that specify the most 
likely goal of the action (Schubotz, Wurm, Wittman & von Cramon, 2014).  
 
A similar reason is complementary research suggesting that appropriate 
grip types influence subsequent action processing. For example, seeing a 
matching grip type enhances judgements regarding the action’s 
appropriateness (Bach, 2004). Likewise grip type has been shown to facilitate 
eye movements towards an object that affords it (Fischer et al, 2008), speed up 
recognition of matching objects (Helbig et al., 2010), and aid the prediction of 
an action’s intention (van Elk et al., 2008; Ambrosini et al., 2011). Moreover, 
other studies have shown that kinematic cues are important for the accurate 
prediction of observed actions (Manera et al., 2011; Stapel et al., 2012). These 
studies suggest that grip type and kinematics are useful cues during object 
processing and action observation. Taken together this body of research 
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suggests that seeing graspable objects accesses the appropriate manipulation 
knowledge associated with using the object, while observing grip types 
accesses appropriate objects to perform an action. This is good evidence that 
both objects and grip-types, and the relationship between the two, could guide 
action predictions during perception. This does not imply that actions have to 
be processed in order to extract their intention before a prediction can be 
made. Instead, it suggests that grips imply certain intentions that can generate 
predictions that influence subsequent perception. Likewise objects imply 
certain grips which can also generate predictions linked to the intention of the 
actor. 
 
Indeed, there might be another reason for the lack of modulations in 
these experiments. In both the spatial matching experiments (Chapter 3) and 
the occluder representational momentum experiment (Chapter 5), all actions 
followed the same direction. In contrast, in the experiments from Chapter 4 
(Experiments 6-10) the direction varied between action alternatives (reaches, 
withdrawals) and was directly linked to the linguistic intentional cues, which 
modulated perception (Take it, Leave it). In effect, both the observed actions 
and the associated predictions were categorically different. The assumption in 
the spatial matching experiments was that while matching grips would increase 
perceptual prediction mismatching grips would not. However, as the actions 
were all aimed in the same direction, only ever directed to one object and all 
finished well in advance of contact with the object, it could be predictions for 
matching and mismatching actions overlapped conceptually and were not so 
distinct. Representational momentum that would be elicited from these 
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predictions would therefore not show strong differences. Likewise, in the 
occluder representational momentum experiment, the assumption was that 
reaches to objects would increase perceptual prediction whereas pantomimed 
reaches would not. But like the spatial experiments all actions were aimed in 
the same direction and finished well in advance of the object, meaning once 
again predictions for object-directed and pantomimed reaches may have 
overlapped and not been distinguished conceptually.  
 
This might suggest that the difference between both object-directed and 
pantomimed reaches, and between matching and mismatching grips, may have 
been too subtle to differentiate the predictions based on their intentions. 
Especially if one assumes that predictions emerge from higher-level action 
expectations that are categorically different and, perhaps, distinguished by their 
gross movement patterns such an interpretation might seem likely. If this the 
case, then adding multiple, categorically different directions (e.g. reach vs 
withdrawal) to grip-object stimuli may encourage predictions for reaches 
forward to a matching object. Similarly, instead of a reach or withdrawal, an 
additional object could be added so that action observation was categorical in 
regards to which object one predicts the actor to reach for. This could mean 
that a horizontally oriented object is visible on the left and an upright object is 
visible on the right. Therefore not only could the direction of the reach 
encourage perceptual prediction but so to could the type of grasp visible, and 
bias perception of the reach towards one object or the other. 
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Do intentions require a top-down signal prior to action onset? 
 
 
Another reason for the differences between the experiments might be 
that prior intentions need to be available well before start of the action to have 
an effect on perception. In the verbal and auditory experiments this is exactly 
what happened. The intention was uttered or heard, and then the action was 
observed. However, in the spatial experiments any intention could only be 
deciphered during the course of the movement, which may have been too late 
to have a significant effect on the perception of the hand’s final position. 
Therefore, had the intention of the reach been accessed prior to the beginning 
of movement onset then matching grips may well have resulted in more 
perceptual prediction than mismatching grips. When thinking about social 
perception in real life, action observation is a continuous flow, which is not 
always easily segmented. This means that on most occasions an observed action 
follows some previous event or action that can provide a cue to an action’s 
intention.  
 
If such an interpretation were true, however, it would be less clear why 
object presence did not lead to an increase in prediction in the occluder 
experiment (Experiment 11), as the catch trial question had forced participants 
to process the object. One potential explanation, at least for the non-occluded 
conditions, is that as object presence or absence was fully accessible to 
participants during the reach, they may not have prioritised attention towards 
the fact before the reach began. That is, they may have focused on the reach and 
only processed object presence or absence later in the trial, or even when the 
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probe was shown, as this was closer in time to when the question would be 
asked. If this was the case, the target of the reach may not have been processed 
in time to produce an effect of intention. However, this explanation cannot 
explain why no effect was found in the occluded conditions where object 
presence had to be processed in advance of the action onset, discounting the 
possibility of any delay in object processing. Therefore, the lack of object effects 
here would suggest that top-down information concerning object presence does 
not modulate visual perception, at least not for non-categorically different 
actions used here, and that the lack of finding is not related to the prior 
availability of top-down information. However, there may be other reasons may 
have led to the lack of perceptual modulation found. 
 
For example, one possibility is that the occluder may have been 
strategically used as a form of landmark or reference in order to perform the 
task. This may have guided visual perception and dampened any effect of object 
presence or absence on perceptual prediction. An alternative, but similar, 
explanation is that the occluder may have been perceived as the object to which 
the action was directed itself. This may have made any impact of object 
presence irrelevant to perceptual predictive processing. Both these 
explanations suggest that the occluded conditions may have led to the use of 
other mechanisms to drive perceptual prediction other than the presence or 
absence of the object behind the occluder. This might explain why similar levels 
of perceptual prediction were found in both occluded conditions, with any 
effect of intention regarding object presence overridden by the occluder itself. 
These explanations would suggest that top-down knowledge can be superseded 
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by bottom-up cues as participants were instructed that the actions were 
directed not to the occluder but to the space behind it. 
 
While such an explanation may explain the failure to observe any effect 
of intention in the occluder experiment, they cannot explain why object effects 
were found in the tactile experiments (Experiments 12 and 13). These results 
demonstrate that object presence can alter perceptual prediction, which could 
suggest that perceptual prediction is either varies within different modalities or 
that object effects take longer to emerge, as in the representational momentum 
experiment all actions ended well in advance of the object.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
 
The current thesis provides evidence that our perception of other 
people’s actions does not rely solely on the passive receipt of bottom-up 
sensory information, but instead is directly shaped by our prior knowledge. The 
findings of the present experiments show that social perception is strongly 
influenced by top-down processes, which can result in the automatic 
anticipation of an observed action’s future course. When saying or hearing a 
verbal statement, which is in line with the direction of a subsequently observed 
action, people judged the action as further forward in time than when the 
verbal statement was not in line with the action’s direction. This shows that 
social cues, such as language, can facilitate perceptual prediction based on the 
intentions implied by the linguistic content, and directly affect perceptual 
judgments. The current experiments therefore directly support top-down 
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theories of social perception, which emphasise the predictive nature of 
perception (Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007).  
 
Moreover, the findings of the current thesis also uncovered that the 
influence of top-down predictive processes changes as a result of the level of 
bottom-up information available. When observing an object-directed action the 
prediction of contact reduced people’s threshold for detecting tactile 
stimulation on their own finger. Conversely, when observing an object-directed 
action where contact could only be inferred, due to a reduction in bottom-up 
input, people’s tactile sensitivity increased. These findings demonstrate that 
top-down predictions of touch can have different effects on tactile perception 
depending upon the amount of bottom-up available and that these effects are 
dissociable. Both effects fit with recent models of hierarchical integration of 
top-down and multisensory signals. While the reduction in tactile threshold 
when predicting touch would reflect multisensory integration of signals on the 
same level (Hasson, Ghazanfar, Galantucci, Garrod, & Keysers, 2012; van 
Atteveldt et al., 2014), the increase in tactile sensitivity is in line with a top-
down sharpening of expected stimulus representations (Friston, 2010). 
 
Further studies need to test what specifically the effects of 
representational momentum reflect. Do they reflect processes happening in the 
gap or during motion perception, and are they better described by top-down 
predictive processes, or processes of multisensory integration. Do objects serve 
as a similar intentional cue that leads to predictions of future movement, and do 
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such intentional cues need to be processed before the associated action is 
observed?  
 
Overall, the current findings provide support for top-down theories of 
social perception, which suggest that we actively anticipate the actions of 
others. This can be seen as beneficial for understanding the actions of others 
and also for planning one’s own actions in response. They also suggest that 
information from multiple sensory inputs is integrated to shape the weight of 
such top-down predictions. This supports recent models linking multisensory 
integration to predictive coding (Talsma, 2015). It is also in line with the 
suggestion that the integration of different cues which is the hallmark of 
multisensory integration, also provides potential avenues to better understand 
the mechanisms of social perception (Zaki, 2013). While the precise nature of 
this interaction between top-down predictions and multisensory integration is 
not clear, the findings of the current thesis provide useful clues and potential 
directions for future research to pursue in the search for a more complete 
understanding of social perception.  
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